Pyschological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare

Pyschological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare

Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare

PREFACE

Guerrilla warfare is essentially a political war. Therefore, its
area of operations exceeds the territorial limits of conventional
warfare, to penetrate the political entity itself: the "political
animal" that Aristotle defined. In effect, the human being
should be considered the priority objective in a political war.
And conceived as the military target of guerrilla war, the
human being has his most critical point in his mind. Once his
mind has been reached, the "political animal" has been
defeated, without necessarily receiving bullets.

Guerrilla warfare is born and grows in the political
environment; in the constant combat to dominate that area of
political mentality that is inherent to all human beings and
which collectively constitutes the "environment" in which
guerrilla warfare moves, and which is where precisely its
victory or failure is defined.

This conception of guerrilla warfare as political war turns
Psychological Operations into the decisive factor of the results.
The target, then, is the minds of the population, all the
population: our troops, the enemy troops and the civilian
population.

This book is a manual for the training of guerrillas in
psychological operations, and its application to the concrete
case of the Christian and democratic crusade being waged in
Nicaragua by the Freedom Commandos.

INTRODUCTION

1. Generalities

The purpose of this book is to introduce the guerrilla student to
the psychological operations techniques that will be of
immediate and practical value to him in guerrilla warfare. This
section is introductory and general; subsequent sections will
cover each point set forth here in more detail.

The nature of the environment of guerrilla warfare does not
permit sophisticated psychological operations, and it becomes
necessary for the chiefs of groups, chiefs of detachments and
squadron leaders to have the ability to carry out, with minimal
instructions from the higher levels, psychological action
operations with the contacts that are thoroughly aware of the
situation, i.e. the foundations.

2. Combatant-Propagandist Guerrillas

In order to obtain the maximum results from the psychological
operations in guerrilla warfare, every combatant should be as
highly motivated to carry out propaganda face to face as he is a
combatant. This means that the individual political awareness
of the guerrilla of the reason for his struggle will be as acute as
his ability to fight.

Such a political awareness and motivation is obtained through
the dynamic of groups and self-criticism, as a standard method
of instruction for the guerrilla training and operations. Group
discussions raise the spirit and improve the unity of thought of
the guerrilla training and operations. Group discussions raise
the spirit and improve the unity of thought of the guerrilla
squads and exercise social pressure on the weak members to
carry out a better role in future training or in combative action.
Self-criticism is in terms of one's contribution or defects in his
contribution to the cause, to the movement, the struggle, etc.;
and gives a positive individual commitment to the mission of
the group.

The desired result is a guerrilla who can persuasively justify
his actions when he comes into contact with any member of the
People of Nicaragua, and especially with himself and his fellow
guerrillas in dealing with the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare.
This means that every guerrilla will be persuasive in his face-
to-face communication - propagandist-combatant - ins his
contact with the people; he should be able to give 5 or 10
logical reasons why, for example, a peasant should give him
cloth, needle and thread to mend his clothes. When the
guerrilla behaves in this manner, enemy propaganda will never
succeed in making him an enemy in the eyes of the people. It
also means that hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity will have a
meaning, psychologically, in the cause of the struggle due to his
constant orientation.

3. Armed Propaganda

Armed propaganda includes every act carried out, and the good
impression that this armed force causes will result in positive
attitudes in the population toward that force; ad it does not
include forced indoctrination. Armed propaganda improves the
behavior of the population toward them, and it is not achieved
by force.

This means that a guerrilla armed unit in a rural town will not
give the impression that arms are their strength over the
peasants, but rather that they are the strength of the peasants
against the Sandinista government of repression. This is
achieved through a close identification with the people, as
follows: hanging up weapons and working together with them
on their crops, in construction, in the harvesting of grains, in
fishing, etc.; explanations to young men about basic weapons,
e.g. giving them an unloaded weapon and letting them touch it,
see it, etc.; describing in a rudimentary manner its operation;
describing with simple slogans how weapons will serve the
people to win their freedom; demanding the requests by the
people for hospitals and education, reducing taxes, etc.

All these acts have as their goal the creation of an identification
of the people with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry
them, so that the population feels that the weapons are,
indirectly, their weapon to protect them and help them in the
struggle against a regime of oppression. Implicit terror always
accompanies weapons, since the people are internally "aware"
that they can be used against them, but as long as explicit
coercion is avoided, positive attitudes can be achieved with
respect to the presence of armed guerrillas within the
population.

4. Armed Propaganda Teams

Armed Propaganda Teams (EPA) are formed through a careful
selection of persuasive and highly motivated guerrillas who
move about within the population, encouraging the people to
support the guerrillas and put up resistance against the enemy.
It combines a high degree of political awareness and the
"armed" propaganda ability of the guerrillas toward a planned,
programmed, and controlled effort.

The careful selection of the staff, based on their persuasiveness
in informal discussions and their ability in combat, is more
important than their degree of education or the training
program. The tactics of the Armed Propaganda Teams are
carried out covertly, and should be parallel to the tactical effort
in guerrilla warfare. The knowledge of the psychology of the
population is primary for the Armed Propaganda Teams, but
much more intelligence data will be obtained from an EPA
program in the area of operations.

5. Development and Control of the "Front" Organizations

The development and control of "front" (or facade)
organizations is carried out through subjective internal control
at group meetings of "inside cadres," and the calculations of the
time for the fusion of these combined efforts to be applied to
the masses.

Established citizens-doctors, lawyers, businessmen, teachers,
etc.-will be recruited initially as "Social Crusaders" in typically
"innocuous" movements in the area of operations. When their
"involvement" with the clandestine organization is revealed to
them, this supplies the psychological pressure to use them as
"inside cadres" in groups to which they already belong or of
which they can be members.

Then they will receive instruction in techniques of persuasion
over control of target groups to support our democratic
revolution, through a gradual and skillful process. A cell control
system isolates individuals from one another, and at the
appropriate moment, their influence is used for the fusion of
groups in a united national front.

6. Control of Meetings and Mass Assemblies

The control of mass meetings in support of guerrilla warfare is
carried out internally through a covert commando element,
bodyguards, messengers, shock forces (initiators of incidents),
placard carriers (also used for making signals), shouters of
slogans, everything under the control of the outside commando
element.

When the cadres are placed or recruited in organizations such
as labor unions, youth groups agrarian organizations or
professional associations, they will begin to manipulate the
objectives of the groups. The psychological apparatus of our
movement through inside cadres prepares a mental attitude
which at the crucial moment can be turned into a fury of
justified violence. Through a small group of guerrillas
infiltrated within the masses this can be carried out; they will
have the mission of agitating by giving the impression that
there are many of them and that they have a large popular
backing. Using the tactics of a force of 200-300 agitators, a
demonstration can be created in which 10,000-20,000 persons
take part.

7. Support of Contacts with Their Roots in Reality

The support of local contacts who are familiar with the deep
reality is achieved through the exploitation of the social and
political weaknesses of the target society, with propagandist-
combatant guerrillas, armed propaganda, armed propaganda
teams, cover organizations and mass meetings.

The combatant-propagandist guerrilla is the result of a
continuous program of indoctrination and motivation. They will
have the mission of showing the people how great and fair our
movement is in the eyes of all Nicaraguans and the world.
Identifying themselves with our people, they will increase the
sympathy towards our movement, which will result in greater
support of the population for the freedom commandos, taking
away support for the regime in power.

Armed propaganda will extend this identification process of the
people with the Christian guerrillas, providing converging
points against the Sandinista regime.

The Armed Propaganda Teams provide a several-stage
program of persuasive planning in guerrilla warfare in all areas
of the country. Also, these teams are the "eyes and ears" of our
movement.

The development and control of the cover organizations in
guerrilla warfare will give our movement the ability to create a
"whiplash" effect within the population when the order for
fusion is given. When the infiltration and internal subjective
control have been developed in a manner parallel to other
guerrilla activities, a comandante of ours will literally be able
to shake up the Sandinista structure, and replace it.

The mass assemblies and meetings are the culmination of a
wide base support among the population, and it comes about in
the later phases of the operation. This is the moment in which
the overthrow can be achieved and our revolution can become
an open one, requiring the close collaboration of the entire
population of the country, and of contacts with their roots in
reality.

The tactical effort in guerrilla warfare is directed at the
weaknesses of the enemy and at destroying their military
resistance capacity, and should be parallel to a psychological
effort to weaken and destroy their sociopolitical capacity at the
same time. In guerrilla warfare, more than in any other type of
military effort, the psychological activities should be
simultaneous with the military ones, in order to achieve the
objectives desired.


COMBATANT-PROPAGANDIST GUERRILLA

1. Generalities

The objective of this section is to familiarize the guerrilla with
the techniques of psychological operations, which maximizes
the social-psychological effect of a guerrilla movement,
converting the guerrilla into a propagandist, in addition to
being a combatant. The nature of the environment in guerrilla
warfare does not permit sophisticated facilities for
psychological operations, so that use should be made of the
effective face-to-face persuasion of each guerrilla.

2. Political Awareness

The individual political awareness of the guerrilla, the reason
for his struggle, will be as important as his ability in combat.
This political awareness and motivation will be achieved:

-- By improving the combat potential of the guerrilla by
improving his motivation for fighting.

-- By the guerrilla recognizing himself as a vital tie between
the democratic guerrillas and the people, whose support is
essential for the subsistence of both.

-- By fostering the support of the population for the national
insurgence through the support for the guerrillas of the locale,
which provides a psychological basis in the population for
politics after the victory has been achieved.

-- By developing trust in the guerrillas and in the population,
for the reconstruction of a local and national government.

-- By promoting the value of participation by the guerrillas and
the people in the civic affairs of the insurrection and in the
national programs.

-- By developing in each guerrilla the ability of persuasion
face-to-face, at the local level, to win the support of the
population, which is essential for success in guerrilla warfare.

3. Group Dynamics

This political awareness-building and motivation are attained
by the use of group dynamics at the level of small units. The
group discussion method and self-criticism are a general
guerrilla training and operations technique. Group discussions
raise the spirit and increase the unity of thought in small
guerrilla groups and exercise social pressure on the weakest
members to better carry out their mission in training and
future combat actions. These group discussions will give special
emphasis to:

-- Creating a favorable opinion of our movement. Through local
and national history, make it clear that the Sandinista regime is
"foreignizing," "repressive" and "imperialistic," and that even
though there are some Nicaraguans within the government,
point out that they are "puppets" of the power of the Soviets
and Cubans, i.e. of foreign power.

-- Always a local focus. Matters of an international nature will
be explained only in support of local events in the guerrilla
warfare.

-- The unification of the nation is our goal. This means that the
defeat of the Sandinista armed forces is our priority. Our
insurrection movement is a pluralistic political platform from
which we are determined to win freedom, equality, a better
economy with work facilities, a higher standard of living, a true
democracy for all Nicaraguans without exception.

-- Providing to each guerrilla clear understanding about the
struggle for national sovereignty against Soviet-Cuban
imperialism. Discussion guides will lead the guerrillas so that
they will see the injustices of the Sandinista system.

-- Showing each guerrilla the need for good behavior to win the
support of the population. Discussion guides should convince
the guerrillas that the attitude and opinion of the population
play a decisive role, because victory is impossible without
popular support.

-- Self-criticism will be in constructive terms that will
contribute to the mission of the movement, and which will
provide the guerrillas with the conviction that they have a
constant and positive individual responsibility in the mission of
the group. The method of instruction will be:

a) division of the guerrilla force into squads for group
discussions, including command and support elements,
whenever the tactical situation permits it.
The makeup of the small units should be maintained when
these groups are designated.

b) Assignment of a political cadre in the guerrilla force to each
group to guide the discussion. The squad leader should help the
cadre to foster study and the expression of thoughts. If there
are not enough political cadres for each squad or post, leaders
should guide the discussions, and the available cadres visit
alternate groups.

c) It is appropriate for the cadre (or the leader) to guide the
discussion of a group to cover a number of points and to reach
a correct conclusion. The guerrillas should feel that it was their
free and own decision. The cadre should serve as a private
teacher. The cadre or leader will not act as a lecturer, but will
help the members of the group to study and express their own
opinions.

d) The political cadre will at the end of every discussion make
a summary of the principal points, leading them to the correct
conclusions. Any serious difference with the objectives of the
movement should be noted by the cadre and reported to the
commandant of the force. If necessary, a combined group
meeting will be held and the team of political cadres will
explain and rectify the misunderstanding.

e) Democratic conduct by the political cadres: living, eating and
working with the guerrillas, and if possible, fighting at their
side, sharing their living conditions. All of this will foster
understanding and the spirit of cooperation that will help in
the discussion and exchange of ideas.

f) Carry out group discussions in towns, and areas of operations
whenever possible with the civilian population, and not limit
them to camps or bases. This is done to emphasize the
revolutionary nature of the struggle and to demonstrate that
the guerrillas identified with the objectives of the people move
about within the population. The guerrilla projects himself
toward the people, as the political cadre does toward the
guerrilla, and they should live, eat and work together to realize
a unity of revolutionary thought.

The principles for guerrilla and political-cadre group
discussions are:

-- Organize discussion groups at the post or squad level. A
cadre cannot be sure of the comprehension and acceptance of
the concepts and conclusions by guerrillas in large groups. In a
group of the size of a squad of 10 men, the judgment and
control of the situation is greater. In this way, all students will
participate in an exchange among them; the political leader, the
group leader, and also the political cadre. Special attention will
be given to the individual ability to discuss the objectives of
the insurrection struggle. Whenever a guerrilla expresses his
opinion, he will be interested in listening to the opinions of
others, leading as a result to the unity of thought.

-- Combine the different points of view and reach an opinion or
common conclusion. This is the most difficult task of a political
guerrilla cadre. After the group discussions of the democratic
objectives of the movement, the chief of the team of political
cadres of the guerrilla force should combine the conclusions of
individual groups in a general summary. At a meeting with all
the discussion groups, the cadre shall provide the principal
points, and the guerrillas will have the opportunity to clarify or
modify their points of view. To carry this out, the conclusions
will be summarized in the form of slogans, wherever possible.

-- Face with honesty the national and local problems of our
struggle. The political cadres should always be prepared to
discuss solutions to the problems observed by the guerrillas.
During the discussions, the guerrillas should be guided by the
following three principles:

-- Freedom of thought.
-- Freedom of expression.
-- Concentration of thoughts on the objectives of the
democratic struggle.

The result desired is a guerrilla who in a persuasive manner
can justify all of his acts whenever he is in contact with any
member of the town/people, and especially with himself and
with his guerrilla companions by facing the vicissitudes of
guerrilla warfare.

This means that every guerrilla will come to have effective
face-to-face persuasion as a combatant-propagandist in his
contact with the people, to the point of giving 5-10 logical
reasons why, e.g. a peasant should give him a piece of cloth, or
a needle and thread to mend his clothes. When behaves in this
manner, no type of propaganda of the enemy will be able to
make a "terrorist" of him in the eyes of the people.

In addition, hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity in the existence
of the guerrilla acquire meaning in the cause of the struggle
due to the constant psychological orientation.

4. Camp Procedures

Encamping the guerrilla units gives greater motivation, in
addition to reducing distractions, and increases the spirit of
cooperation of small units, relating the physical environment to
the psychological one. The squad chief shall establish the
regular camping procedure. Once they have divested
themselves of their packs, the chief will choose the appropriate
ground for camping. He should select land that predominates
over the zone with two or three escape routes. He will choose
among his men and give them responsibilities such as:

-- Clean the camp area.

-- Provide adequate drainage in case of rain. Also build some
trenches or holes for marksmen in case of emergency. In
addition, he will build a stove, which will be done by making
some small trenches and placing three rocks in place; in case
the stove is built on a pedestal, it will be filled with clay and
rocks.

-- Build a wind breaking wall, which will be covered on the
sides and on the top with branches and leaves of the same
vegetation of the zones. This will serve for camouflaging and
protecting it from aerial visibility or from enemy patrols
around.

-- Construct a latrine and a hole where waste and garbage will
be buried, which should be covered over at the time of
abandoning the camp.

-- Once the camp has been set up, it is recommended that a
watchman be positioned in the places of access at a prudent
distance, where the shout of alarm can be heard. In the same
moment the password will be established, which should be
changed every 24 hours. The commander should establish
ahead of time an alternate meeting point, in case of having to
abandon the camp in a hurried manner, and they will be able
to meet in the other already established point, and they should
warn the patrol that if at a particular time they cannot meet at
the established point, the should have a third meeting point.

These procedures contribute to the motivation of the guerrilla
and improve the spirit of cooperation in the unit. The danger,
sense of insecurity, anxiety and daily concern in the life of a
guerrilla require tangible evidence of belonging in an order for
him to keep up his spirit and morale.

In addition to the good physical conditions in which the
guerrilla should find himself, good psychological conditions are
necessary, for which group discussions and becoming a self-
critic are recommended, which will greatly benefit the spirit
and morale of the same.

Having broken camp with the effort and cooperation of
everyone strengthens the spirit of the group. The guerrilla will
be inclined then towards the unity of thought in democratic
objectives.

5. Interaction with the People

In order to ensure popular support, essential for the good
development of guerrilla warfare, the leaders should induce a
positive interaction between the civilians and the guerrillas,
through the principle of "live, eat , and work with the people,"
and maintain control of their activities. In group discussions,
the leaders and political cadres should give emphasis to
positively identifying themselves with the people.

It is not recommendable to speak of military tactical plans in
discussions with civilians. The Communist foe should be
pointed out as the number one enemy of the people, and as a
secondary threat against our guerrilla forces.

Whenever there is a chance, groups of members should be
chosen who have a high political awareness and high
disciplinary conduct in the work to be carried out, in order to
be sent to the populous areas in order to direct the armed
propaganda, where they should persuade the people through
dialogue in face-to-face confrontations, where these principles
should be followed:

-- Respect for human rights and others' property.

-- Helping the people in community work.

-- Protecting the people from Communist aggressions.

-- Teaching the people environmental hygiene, to read, etc., in
order to win their trust, which will lead to a better democratic
ideological preparation.

This attitude will foster the sympathy of the peasants for our
movement, and they will immediately become one of us,
through logistical support, coverage and intelligence
information on the enemy or participation in combat. The
guerrillas should be persuasive through the word and not
dictatorial with weapons. If they behave in this way, the
people will feel respected, will be more inclined to accept our
message and will consolidate into popular support. In any place
in which tactical guerrilla operations are carried out in
populous areas, the squad should undertake psychological
actions parallel to these, and should proceed, accompany and
consolidate the common objective and explain to all the people
about our struggle, explaining that our presence is to give
peace, liberty and democracy to all Nicaraguans without
exception, and explaining that out struggle is not against the
nationals but rather against Russian imperialism. This will
serve to ensure greater Psychological achievements which will
increase the operations of the future.

6. Conclusions

The nature of the environment in guerrilla warfare does not
permit sophisticated facilities for psychological operations, and
the face-to-face persuasion of the guerrilla combatant-
propagandists with the people is an effective and available tool
which we should use as much as possible during the process of
the struggle.



ARMED PROPAGANDA

1. Generalities

Frequently a misunderstanding exists on "armed propaganda,"
that this tactic is a compulsion of the people with arms. In
reality, it does not include compulsion, but the guerrilla should
know well the principles and methods of this tactic. The
objective of this section is to give the guerrilla student an
understanding of the armed propaganda that should be used,
and that will be able to be applied in guerrilla warfare.

2. Close Identification with the People

Armed propaganda includes all acts carried out by an armed
force, whose results improve the attitude of the people toward
this force, and it does not include forced indoctrination. This is
carried out by a close identification with the people on any
occasion. For example:

-- Putting aside weapons and working side by side with the
peasants in the countryside: building, fishing, repairing roofs,
transporting water, etc.

-- When working with the people, the guerrillas can use
slogans such as "many hands doing small things, but doing
them together."

-- Participating in the tasks of the people, they can establish a
strong tie between them and the guerrillas and at the same
time a popular support for our movement is generated.

During the patrols and other operations around or in the midst
of villages, each guerrilla should be respectful and courteous
with the people. In addition he should move with care and
always be well prepared to fight, if necessary. But he should
not always see all the people as enemies, with suspicions or
hostility. Even in war, it is possible to smile, laugh or greet
people. Truly, the cause of our revolutionary base, the reason
why we are struggling, is our people. We must be respectful to
them on all occasions that present themselves.

In places and situations wherever possible, e.g. when they are
resting during the march, the guerrillas can explain the
operation of weapons to the youths and young men. They can
show them an unloaded rifle so that they will learn to load it
and unload it; their use, and aiming at imaginary targets they
are potential recruits for our forces.

The guerrillas should always be prepared with simple slogans
in order to explain to the people, whether in an intentional
form or by chance, the reason for the weapons.

"The weapons will be for winning freedom; the are for you."

"With weapons we can impose demands such as hospitals,
schools, better roads, and social services for the people, for
you."

"Our weapons are, in truth, the weapons of the people, yours."

"With weapons we can change the Sandino-Communist regime
and return to the people a true democracy so that we will all
have economic opportunities."

All of this should be designed to create an identification of the
people with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry them.
Finally, we should make the people feel that we are thinking of
them and that the weapons are the people's, in order to help
them and protect them from a Communist, totalitarian,
imperialist regime, indifferent to the needs of the population.

3. Implicit and Explicit Terror

A guerrilla armed force always involves implicit terror because
the population, without saying it aloud, feels terror that the
weapons may be used against them. However, if the terror does
not become explicit, positive results can be expected.

In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant threat of
physical damage. If the government police cannot put an end to
the guerrilla activities, the population will lose confidence in
the government, which has the inherent mission of
guaranteeing the safety of citizens. However, the guerrillas
should be careful not to become an explicit terror, because this
would result in a loss of popular support.

In the words of a leader of the Huk guerrilla movement of the
Philippine Islands: "The population is always impressed by
weapons, not by the terror that they cause, but rather by a
sensation of strength/force. We must appear before the people,
giving them the message of the struggle." This is, then, in a few
words, the essence of armed propaganda.

An armed guerrilla force can occupy an entire town or small
city that is neutral or relatively passive in the conflict. In order
to conduct the armed propaganda in an effective manner, the
following should be carried out simultaneously:

-- Destroy the military or police installations and remove the
survivors to a "public place."

-- Cut all the outside lines of communications: cables, radio,
messengers.

-- Set up ambushes in order to delay the reinforcements in all
the possible entry routes.

-- Kidnap all officials or agents of the Sandinista government
and replace them in "public Places" with military or civilian
persons of trust to our movement; in addition, carry out the
following:

-- Establish a public tribunal that depends on the guerrillas,
and cover the town or city in order to gather the population for
this event.

-- Shame, ridicule and humiliate the "personal symbols" of the
government of repression in the presence of the people and
foster popular participation through guerrillas within the
multitude, shouting slogans and jeers.

-- Reduce the influence of individuals in tune with the regime,
pointing out their weaknesses and taking them out of the town,
without damaging them publicly.

-- Mix the guerrillas within the population and show very good
conduct by all members of the column, practicing the following:

Any article taken will be paid for with cash.

The hospitality offered by the people will be accepted and this
opportunity will be exploited in order to carry out face-to-face
persuasion about the struggle.

Courtesy visits should be made to the prominent persons and
those with prestige in the place, such as doctors, priests,
teachers, etc.

The guerrillas should instruct the population that with the end
of the operative, and when the Sandinista repressive forces
interrogate them, they may reveal EVERYTHING about the
military operation carried out. For example, the type of
weapons they use, ho many men arrived, from what direction
they came and in what direction they left, in short,
EVERYTHING.

In addition, indicate to the population that at meetings or in
private discussion they can give the names of the Sandinista
informants, who will be removed together with the other
officials of the government of repression. When a meeting is
held, conclude it with a speech by one of the leaders of
guerrilla political cadres (the most dynamic), which includes
explicit references to:

The fact that the "enemies of the people" -- the officials or
Sandinista agents -- must not be mistreated in spite of their
criminal acts, although the guerrilla force may have suffered
casualties, and that this is done due to the generosity of the
Christian guerrillas.

Give a declaration of gratitude for the "hospitality" of the
population, as well as let them know that the risks that they
will run when the Sandinistas return are greatly appreciated.

The fact that the Sandinista regime, although it exploits the
people with taxes, control of money, grains and all aspects of
public life through associations, which they are forced to
become part of, will not be able to resist the attacks of our
guerrilla forces.

Make the promise to the people that you will return to ensure
that the "leeches" of the Sandinista regime of repression will
not be able to hinder our guerrillas from integrating with the
population.

A statement repeated to the population to the effect that they
can reveal everything about this visit of our commandos,
because we are not afraid of anything or anyone, neither the
Soviets nor the Cubans. Emphasize that we are Nicaraguans,
that we are fighting for the freedom of Nicaragua and to
establish a very Nicaraguan government.

4. Guerrilla Weapons Are The Strength of the People over an
Illegal Government

The armed propaganda in populated areas does not give the
impression that weapons are the power of the guerrillas over
the people, but rather that the weapons are the strength of the
people against a regime of repression. Whenever it is necessary
to use armed force in an occupation or visit to a town or village,
guerrillas should emphasize making sure that they:

-- Explain to the population that in the first place this is being
done to protect them, the people, and not themselves.

-- Admit frankly and publicly that this is an "act of the
democratic guerrilla movement," with appropriate
explanations.

-- That this action, although it is not desirable, is necessary
because the final objective of the insurrection is a free and
democratic society, where acts of force are not necessary.

-- The force of weapons is a necessity caused by the oppressive
system, and will cease to exist when the "forces of justice" of
our movement assume control. If, for example, it should be
necessary for one of the advanced posts to have to fire on a
citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in which the
guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political
proselytism, the following is recommended:

-- Explain that if that citizen had managed to escape, he would
have alerted the enemy that is near the town or city, and they
could carry out acts of reprisal such as rapes, pillage,
destruction, captures, etc., it this way terrorizing the
inhabitants of the place for having given attention and
hospitalities to the guerrillas of the town.

-- If a guerrilla fires at an individual, make the town see that
he was an enemy of the people, and that they shot him because
the guerrilla recognized as their first duty the protection of
citizens.

-- The command tried to detain the informant without firing
because he, like all Christian guerrillas, espouses nonviolence.
Firing at the Sandinista informant, although it is against his
own will, was necessary to prevent the repression of the
Sandinista government against innocent people.

-- Make the population see that it was the repressive system of
the regime that was the cause of this situation, what really
killed the informer, and that the weapon fired was one
recovered in combat against the Sandinista regime.

-- Make the population see that if the Sandinista regime had
ended the repression, the corruption backed by foreign powers,
etc., the freedom commandos would not have had to brandish
arms against brother Nicaraguans, which goes against our
Christian sentiments. If the informant hadn't tried to escape he
would be enjoying life together with the rest of the population,
because not have tried to inform the enemy. This death would
have been avoided if justice and freedom existed in Nicaragua,
which is exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla.

5. Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects

It is possible to neutralize carefully selected and planned
targets, such as court judges, mesta judges, police and State
Security officials, CDS chiefs, etc. For psychological purposes it
is necessary to gather together the population affected, so that
they will be present, take part in the act, and formulate
accusations against the oppressor.

The target or person should be chosen on the basis of:

-- The spontaneous hostility that the majority of the population
feels toward the target.

-- Use rejection or potential hatred by the majority of the
population affected toward the target, stirring up the
population and making them see all the negative and hostile
actions of the individual against the people.

-- If the majority of the people give their support or backing to
the target or subject, do not try to change these sentiments
through provocation.

-- Relative difficulty of controlling the person who will replace
the target. The person who will replace the target should be
chosen carefully, based on:

-- Degree of violence necessary to carry out the change.

-- Degree of violence acceptable to the population affected.

-- Degree of predictable reprisal by the enemy on the
population affected or other individuals in the area of the
target.

The mission to replace the individual should be followed by:

-- Extensive explanation within the population affected of the
reason why it was necessary for the good of the people.

-- Explain that Sandinista retaliation is unjust, indiscriminate,
and above all, a justification for the execution of this mission.

-- Carefully test the reaction of the people toward the mission,
as well as control this reaction, making sure that the
populations reaction is beneficial towards the Freedom
Commandos.

6. Conclusions

Armed propaganda includes all acts executed and the impact
achieved by an armed force, which as a result produces
positive attitudes in the population toward this force, and it
does not include forced indoctrination. However, armed
propaganda is the most effective available instrument of a
guerrilla force.



ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS (APTs)

1. Generalities

In contact with the very reality of their roots, in a
psychological operation campaign in guerrilla warfare, the
comandantes will be able to obtain maximum psychological
results from an Armed Propaganda program. This section is to
inform the guerrilla student as to what Armed Propaganda
Teams are in the environment of guerrilla warfare.

2. Combination: Political Awareness and Armed Propaganda

The Armed Propaganda Teams combine political awareness-
building with armed propaganda, which will be carried out by
carefully selected guerrillas (preferably with experience in
combat), for personal persuasion within the population.

The selection of the staff is more important than the training,
because we cannot train guerrilla cadres just to show the
sensations of ardor and fervor, which are essential for person-
to-person persuasion. More important is the training of persons
who are intellectually agile and developed.

An Armed Propaganda Team includes from 6 to 10 members;
this number or a smaller number is ideal, since there is more
camaraderie, solidarity and group spirit. The themes to deal
with are assimilated more rapidly and the members react more
rapidly to unforeseen situations.

In addition to the combination as armed propagandist-
combatant each member of the team should be well prepared
to carry out permanent person-to-person communication, face-
to-face.

The leader of the group should be the commando who is the
most highly motivated politically and the most effective in
face-to-face persuasion. The position, hierarchy or range will
not be decisive for carrying out that function, but rather who is
best qualified for communication with the people.

The source of basic recruitment for guerrilla cadres will be the
same social groups of Nicaraguans to whom the psychological
campaign is directed, such as peasants, students, professionals,
housewives, etc. The campesinos (peasants) should be made to
see that they do not have lands; the workers that the State is
putting an end to factories and industries; the doctors, that
they are being replaced by Cuban paramedics, and that as
doctors they cannot practice their profession due to lack of
medicines. A requirement for recruiting them will be their
ability to express themselves in public.

The selection of the personnel is more important than the
training. The political awareness-building and the individual
capabilities of persuasion will be shown in the group
discussions for motivation of the guerrilla as a propagandist-
combatant chosen as cadres to organize them in teams, that is,
those who have the greatest capacity for this work.

The training of guerrillas for Armed Propaganda Teams
emphasizes the method and not the content. A two-week
training period is sufficient if the recruitment is done in the
form indicated. If a mistaken process of recruitment has been
followed, however good the training provided, the individual
chosen will not yield a very good result.

The training should be intensive for 14 days, through team
discussions, alternating the person who leads the discussion
among the members of the group. The subjects to be dealt with
will be the same, each day a different theme being presented,
for a varied practice.

The themes should refer to the conditions of the place and the
meaning that they have for the inhabitants of the locality, such
as talking of crops, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation of crops, etc.
They can also include the following topics:

-- Sawed wood, carpenters' tools for houses or other buildings.

-- Boats, roads, horses, oxen for transportation, fishing,
agriculture.

-- Problems that they may have in the place with residents,
offices of the regime, imposed visitors, etc.

-- Force labor, service in the militia.

-- Forced membership in Sandinista groups, such as women's
clubs, youth associations, workers' groups, etc.

-- Availability and prices of consumer articles and of basic
needs in the grocery stores and shops of the place.

-- Characteristics of education in the public schools.

-- Anxiety of the people over the presence of Cuban teachers in
the schools and the intrusion of politics, i.e. using them for
political ends and not educational ones as should be.

-- Indignation over the lack of freedom of worship, and
persecution, of which priests are victims; and over the
participation of priests such as Escoto and Cardenal in the
Sandinista government, against the explicit orders of his
Holiness, the Pope.

NOTE: Members of the team can develop other themes.

The target groups for the Armed Propaganda Teams are not the
persons with sophisticated political knowledge, but rather
those whose opinion are formed from what they see and hear.
The cadres should use persuasion to carry out their mission.
Some of the persuasive methods that they can use are the
following:

Interior Group/Exterior Group. It is a principle of psychology
that we humans have the tendency to form personal
associations from "we" and "the others," or "we" and "they",
"friends" and "enemies," "fellow countrymen" and
"foreigners,""mestizos" and "gringos."

The Armed Propaganda Team can use this principle in its
activities, so that it is obvious that the "exterior" groups ("false"
groups) are those of the Sandinista regime, and that the
"interior" groups ("true" groups) that fight for the people are
the Freedom Commandos.

We should inculcate this in the people in a subtle manner so
that these feelings seem to be born of themselves,
spontaneously.

"Against" is much easier that "for." It is a principle of political
science that it is easier to persuade the people to vote against
something or someone than to persuade them to vote in favor
of something or someone. Although currently the regime has
not given the Nicaraguan people the opportunity to vote, it is
known that the people will vote in opposition, so that the
Armed Propaganda Teams can use this principle in favor of our
insurrectional struggle. They should ensure that this campaign
is directed specifically against the government or its
sympathizers, since the people should have specific targets for
their frustrations.

Primary Groups and Secondary Groups. Another principle of
sociology is that we humans forge or change our opinions from
two sources: primarily, through our association with our family,
comrades, or intimate friends; and secondarily, through distant
associations such as acquaintances in churches, clubs or
committees, labor unions or governmental organizations. The
Armed Propaganda Team cadres should join the first groups in
order to persuade them to follow the policies of our movement,
because it is from this type of group that the opinions or
changes of opinion come.

Techniques of Persuasion in Talks or Speeches:

Be Simple and Concise. You should avoid the use of difficult
words or expressions and prefer popular words and
expressions, i.e. the language of the people. In dealing with a
person you should make use of concise language, avoiding
complicated words. It is important to remember that we use
oratory to make our people understand the reason for our
struggle, and not to show off our knowledge.

Use Lively and Realistic Examples. Avoid abstract concepts,
such as are used in universities in the advanced years, and in
place of them, give concrete examples such as children playing,
horses galloping, birds in flight, etc. Use Gestures to
Communicate. Communication, in addition to being verbal, can
be through gestures, such as using our hands expressively,
back movements, facial expressions, focusing of our look and
other aspects of "body language," projecting the individual
personality in the message.

Use the Appropriate Tone of Voice. If, on addressing the
people, you talk about happiness, a happy tone should be used.
If you talk of something sad, the tone of the voice should be
one of sadness; on talking of a heroic or brave act, the voice
should be animated, etc.

Above All, Be Natural, Imitation of others should be avoided,
since the people, especially simple people, easily distinguish a
fake. The individual personality should be projected when
addressing the population.

3. "Eyes and Ears" Within the Population

The amount of information for intelligence that will be
generated by the deployment of the Armed Propaganda Teams
will allow us to cover a large area with out commandos, who
will become the eyes and ears of our movement within the
population:

The combined reports of an Armed Propaganda Team will
provide us with exact details on the enemy activities.

The intelligence information obtained by the Armed
Propaganda Teams should be reported to the chiefs. However,
it is necessary to emphasize that the first mission of the Armed
Propaganda Teams is to carry out psychological operations, not
to obtain data for intelligence.

Any intelligence report will be made through the outside
contact of the Armed Propaganda Team, in order not to
compromise the population.

The Armed Propaganda cadres are able to do what others in a
guerrilla campaign cannot do: determine personally the
development or deterioration of the popular support and the
sympathy or hostility that the people feel toward our
movement.

The Armed Propaganda Team program, in addition to being
very effective psychologically, increases the guerrilla capacity
in obtaining and using information.

In addition, the Armed Propaganda cadre will report to his
superior the reaction of the people to the radio broadcasts, the
insurrectional flyers, or any other means of propaganda of
ours.

Expressions or gestures of the eyes, or face, the tone and
strength of the voice, and the use of the appropriate words
greatly affect the face-to-face persuasion of the people.

With the intelligence reports supplied by the Armed
Propaganda Teams, the comandantes will be able to have exact
knowledge of the popular support, which they will make use of
in their operations.

4. Psychological Tactics, Maximum Flexibility

Psychological tactics will have the greatest flexibility within a
general plan, permitting a continuous and immediate
adjustment of the message, and ensuring that an impact is
caused on the indicated target group at the moment in which it
is the most susceptible.

Tactically, an Armed Propaganda Equipment program should
cover the majority and if possible all of the operational area.
The communities in which this propaganda is carried out
should not necessarily form political units with an official
nature. A complete understanding of their structure or
organization is not necessary because the cadres will work by
applying socio-political action and not academic theory.

The target populations of the Armed Propaganda Teams will be
chosen for being part of the operational area, and not for their
size or amount of land.

The objective should be the people and not the territorial area.

In this respect, each work team will be able to cover some six
towns approximately, in order to develop popular support for
our movement.

The Team should always move in a covert manner within the
towns of their area. They should vary their route radically, but
not their itinerary,. This is so that the inhabitants who are
cooperating will be dependent on their itinerary, i.e., the hour
in which they can frequently contact them to give them the
information.

The danger of betrayal or an ambush can be neutralized by
varying the itinerary a little, using different routes, as well as
arriving or leaving without previous warning.

Whenever the surprise factor is used, vigilance should be kept
in order to detect the possible presence of hostile elements.

No more than three consecutive days should be spent in a
town.

The limit of three days has obvious tactical advantages, but it
also has a psychological effect on the people, on seeing the
team as a source of current and up-to-date information. Also, it
can overexpose the target audience and cause a negative
reaction.

Basic tactical precautions should be taken. This is necessary for
greater effectiveness, as was indicated in dealing with the
subject of "Armed Propaganda," and when it is carried out
discreetly, it increases the respect of the people for the team
and increases their credibility.

The basic procedures are: covert elements that carry out
vigilance before and after the departure and in intervals. There
should be two at least, and they should meet at a
predetermined point upon a signal, or in view of any hostile
action.

The team's goal is to motivate the entire population of a place,
but to constantly remain aware that defined target groups exist
within this general configuration of the public.

Although meetings may be held in the population, the cadres
should recognize and keep in contact with the target groups,
mixing with them before, during and after the meeting. The
method for holding this type of meeting was included in the
topic "Armed Propaganda," and will be covered in greater
detail under the title "Control of Mass Meetings and
Demonstrations."

The basic focus of the Armed Propaganda cadres should be on
the residents of the town, where their knowledge as formers of
opinion can be applied.

In the first visits of identification with the inhabitants, the
guerrilla cadres will be courteous and humble. They can work
in the fields or in any other form in which their abilities can
contribute to the improvement of the living style of the
inhabitants of the place, winning their trust and talking with
them; helping to repair the fences of their cattle; the cleaning of
the same, collaborating in the vaccination of their animals;
teaching them to read, i.e., closely together in all the tasks of
the peasant or the community.

In his free time, our guerrilla should mix in with the
community groups and participate with them in pastoral
activities, parties, birthdays, and even in wakes or burials of
the members of said community; he will try to converse with
both adults and adolescents. |He will try to penetrate to the
heart of the family, in order to win the acceptance and trust of
all of the residents of that sector.

The Armed Propaganda Team cadres will give ideological
training, mixing these instructions with folklore songs, and at
the same time he will tell stories that have some attraction,
making an effort to make them refer to heroic acts of our
ancestors. He will also try to tell stories of heroism of our
combatants in the present struggle so that listeners try to
imitate them. It is important to let them know that there are
other countries in the world where freedom and democracy
cause those governing to be concerned over the well-being of
their people, so that the children have medical care and free
education; where also they are concerned that everyone have
work and food, and all freedoms such as those of religion,
association and expression; where the greatest objective of the
government is to keep its people happy.

The cadres should not make mention of their political ideology
during the first phase of identification with the people, and
they should orient their talks to things that are pleasing to the
peasants or the listeners, trying to be as simple as possible in
order to be understood.

The tactical objectives for identification with the people are the
following: To establish tight relations through identification
with the people, through their very customs.

To determine the basic needs and desires of the different
target groups.

To discover the weaknesses of the governmental control.

Little by little, to sow the seed of democratic revolution, in
order to change the vices of the regime towards a new order of
justice and collective well-being.

In the motivation of the target groups, by the Armed
Propaganda Teams, the cadre should apply themes of "true"
groups and themes of "false" groups. The true group will
correspond to the target group and the false one to the
Sandinista regime.

For the economic interest groups, such as small businessmen
and farmers, it should be emphasized that their potential
progress is "limited" by the Sandinista government, that
resources are scarcer and scarcer, the earnings/profits minimal,
taxes high, etc. This can be applied to entrepreneurs of
transportation and others.

For the elements ambitious for power and social positions, it
will be emphasized that they will never be able to belong to
the governmental social class, since they are hermetic in their
circle of command. Example, the nine Sandinista leaders do not
allow other persons to participate in the government, and they
hinder the development of the economic and social potential of
those like him, who have desires of overcoming this, which is
unjust and arbitrary.

Social and intellectual criticisms. They should be directed at the
professionals, professors, teachers, priests, missionaries,
students and others. Make them see that their writings,
commentaries or conversations are censored, which does not
make it possible to correct these problems.

Once the needs and frustrations of the target groups have been
determined, the hostility of the people to the "false" groups will
become more direct, against the current regime and its system
of repression. The people will be made to see that once this
system or structure has been eliminated, the cause of their
frustration s would be eliminated and they would be able to
fulfill their desires. It should be shown to the population that
supporting the insurrection is really supporting their own
desires, since the democratic movement is aimed at the
elimination of these specific problems.

As a general rule, the Armed Propaganda teams should avoid
participating in combat. However, if this is not possible, they
should react as a guerrilla unit with tactics of "hit and run,"
causing the enemy the greatest amount of casualties with
aggressive assault fire, recovering enemy weapons and
withdrawing rapidly.

One exception to the rule to avoid combat will be when in the
town they are challenged by hostile actions, whether by an
individual or whether by a number of men of an enemy team.

The hostility of one or two men can be overcome by
eliminating the enemy in a rapid and effective manner. This is
the most common danger.

When the enemy is equal in the number of its forces, there
should be an immediate retreat, and then the enemy should be
ambushed or eliminated by means of sharp-shooters.

In any of the cases, the Armed Propaganda Team cadres should
not turn the town into a battleground. Generally, our guerrilla
will be better armed, so that they will obtain greater respect
from the population if they carry out appropriate maneuvers
instead of endangering their lives, or even destroying their
houses in an encounter with the enemy within the town.

5. A Comprehensive Team Program - Mobile Infrastructure

The psychological operations through the Armed Propaganda
Teams include the infiltration of key guerrilla communicators
(i.e., Armed Propaganda Team cadres) into the population of
the country, instead of sending messages to them through
outside sources, thus creating our "mobile infrastructure."

A "mobile infrastructure" is a cadre of our Armed Propaganda
Team moving about, i.e., keeping in touch with six or more
populations, from which his source of information will come;
and at the same time it will serve so that at the appropriate
time they will become integrated in the complete guerrilla
movement.

In this way, an Armed Propaganda Team program in the
operational area builds for our comandantes in the countryside
constant source of data gathering (infrastructure) in all the
area. It is also a means for developing or increasing popular
support, for recruiting new members and for obtaining
provisions.

In addition, an Armed Propaganda Team program allows the
expansion of the guerrilla movement, since they can penetrate
areas that are not under the control of the combat units. In this
way, through an exact evaluation of the combat units they will
be able to plan their operations more precisely, since they will
have certain knowledge of the existing conditions.

The comandantes will remember that this type of operation is
similar to the Fifth Column, which was used in the first part of
the Second World War, and which through infiltration and
subversion tactics allowed the Germans to penetrate the target
countries before the invasions. They managed to enter Poland,
Belgium, Holland and France in a month, and Norway in a week.
The effectiveness of this tactic has been clearly demonstrated
in several wars and can be used effectively by the Freedom
Commandos.

The activities of the Armed Propaganda Teams run some risks,
but no more than any other guerrilla activity. However, the
Armed Propaganda Teams are essential for the success of the
struggle.

6. Conclusions

In the same way that the explorers are the "eyes and "ears" of
a patrol, or of a column on the march, the Armed Propaganda
Teams are also the source of information, the "antennas" of our
movement, because they find and exploit the sociopolitical
weaknesses in the target society, making possible a successful
operation.



DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL OF FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

1. Generalities

The development and control of front organizations (or "facade"
organizations)is an essential process in the guerrilla effort to
carry out the insurrection. That is, in truth, an aspect of urban
guerrilla warfare, but it should advance parallel to the
campaign in the rural area. This section has as its objective to
give the guerrilla student an understanding of the development
and control of front organizations in guerrilla warfare.

2. Initial Recruitment

The initial recruitment to the movement, if it is involuntary,
will be carried out through several "private" consultations with
a cadre (without his knowing that he is talking to a member of
ours). Then, the recruit will be informed that he or she is
already inside the movement, and he will be exposed to the
police of the regime if he or she does not cooperate.

When the guerrillas carry out missions of armed propaganda
and a program of regular visits to the towns by the Armed
Propaganda Teams, these contacts will provide the commandos
with the names and places of persons who can be recruited.
The recruitment, which will be voluntary, is done through
visits by guerrilla leaders or political cadres.

After a chain of voluntary recruitment's has been developed,
and the trustworthiness of the recruits has been established by
their carrying out small missions, they will be instructed about
increasing/widening the chain by recruiting in specific target
groups, in accordance with the following procedure:
From among their acquaintances or through observation of the
target groups --political parties, workers' unions, youth groups,
agrarian associations, etc. -- finding out the personal habits,
preferences and biases, as well as the weaknesses of the
"recruitable" individuals.

Make an approach through an acquaintance, and if possible,
develop a friendship, attracting him through his preferences or
weaknesses: it might be inviting him for lunch in the
restaurant of his choice or having a drink in his favorite
cantina or an invitation to dinner in the place he prefers.
Recruitment should follow one of the following guidelines:

-- If in an informal conversation the target seems susceptible
to voluntary recruitment based on his beliefs and personal
values, etc., the political cadre assigned to carry out the
recruitment's will be notified of this. The original contact will
indicate to the cadre assigned, in detail, all he knows of the
prospective recruit, and the style of persuasion to be used,
introducing the two.

-- If the target does not seem to be susceptible to voluntary
recruitment, meetings can be arranged which seem casual with
the guerrilla leaders or with the political cadres (unknown by
the target until that moment). The meetings will beheld so that
"other persons" know that the target is attending them,
whether they see him arrive at a particular house, seated at
the table in a particular bar or even seated on a park bench.
The target, then, is faced with the fact of his participation in
the insurrectional struggle and it will be indicated to him also
that if he fails to cooperate or to carry out future orders, he
will be subjected to reprisals by the police or soldiers of the
regime.

-- The notification of the police, denouncing a target who does
not want to join the guerrillas, can be carried out easily, when
it becomes necessary, through a letter with false statements of
citizens who are not implicated in the movement. Care should
be taken that the person who recruited him covertly is not
discovered.

-- With the carrying out of clandestine missions for the
movement, the involvement and handing over of every recruit
is done gradually on a wider and wider scale, and confidence
increases. This should be a gradual process, in order to prevent
confessions from fearful individuals who have been assigned
very difficult or dangerous missions too early.

Using this recruitment technique, our guerrillas will be able to
successfully infiltrate any key target group in the regime, in
order to improve the internal control of the enemy structure.

3. Established Citizens, Subjective Internal Control

Established citizens, such as doctors, lawyers, businessmen,
landholders, minor state officials, etc., will be recruited to the
movement and used for subjective internal control of groups
and associations to which they belong or may belong.

Once the recruitment/involvement has been brought about,
and has progressed to the point that allows that specific
instructions be given to internal cadres to begin to influence
their groups, instructions will be given to them to carry out the
following:

-- The process is simple and only requires a basic knowledge of
the Socrates dialectic: that is the knowledge that is inherent to
another person or the established position of a group, some
theme, some word or some thought related to the objective of
persuasion of the person in charge of our recruitment.

-- The cadre then must emphasize this theme, word or thought
in the discussions or meetings of the target group, through a
casual commentary, which improves the focus of other
members of the group in relation to this. Specific examples are:
Economic interest groups are motivated by profit and generally
feel that the system hinders the use of their capability in this
effort in some way, taxes, import-export tariffs, transportation
costs, etc. The cadre in charge will increase this feeling of
frustration in later conversations.

Political aspirants, particularly if the are not successful, feel
that the system discriminates against them unfairly, limiting
their capabilities, because the Sandinista regime does not allow
elections. The cadres should focus political discussions
towards this frustration.

Intellectual social critics (such as professors, teachers, priests,
missionaries, etc.), generally feel that the government ignores
their valid criticism or censors their comments unjustly,
especially in a situation of revolution. This can easily be
shown by the guerrilla cadre at meetings and discussions, to
bean injustice of the system.

For all the target groups, after they have established
frustrations, the hostility towards the obstacles to their
aspirations will gradually become transferred to the current
regime and its system of repression.

The guerrilla cadre moving among the target groups should
always maintain a low profile, so that the development of
hostile feelings towards the false Sandinista regime seems to
come spontaneously from the members of the group and not
from suggestions of the cadres. This is internal subjective
control. Antigovernment hostility should be generalized, and
not necessarily in our favor. If a group develops a feeling in
our favor, it can be utilized. But the main objective is to
precondition the target groups for the fusion in mass
organizations later in the operation, when other activities have
been successfully undertaken.

4. Organizations of Cells for Security

Internal cadres of our movement should organize into cells of
three persons, only one of them maintaining outside contact.

The cell of three persons is the basic element of the movement,
with frequent meetings to receive orders and pass information
to the cell leader. These meetings are also very important for
mutually reinforcing the members of the cell, as well as their
morale. They should exercise criticism of themselves on the
realization or failures in carrying out individual subjective
control missions.

The coordination of the three-member cell provides a security
net for reciprocal communication, each member having contact
with only an operational cell. The members will not reveal at
the cell coordination meetings the identity of their contact in an
operational cell; they will reveal only the nature of the activity
in which the cell is involved, e.g., political party work, medical
association work, etc.

There is no hierarchy in cells outside of an element of
coordination, who is the leader, who will have direct but covert
contact with our guerrilla comandante in the zone or
operational area. The previous diagram does not indicate which
new operational cell is the limit, but it indicates that for every
three operational cells, we need a coordination cell.

5. Fusion in a "Cover" Organization

The fusion of organizations recognized by the Sandinista
government, such as associations and other groups, through
internal subjective control, occurs in the final stages of the
operation, in a tight connection with mass meetings. When the
guerrilla armed action has expanded sufficiently, armed
propaganda missions will be carried out on a large scale:
propaganda teams will have clearly developed open support of
the institutions; the enemy system of target groups will be well
infiltrated and preconditioned. At the point at which mass
meetings are held, the internal cadres should begin discussions
for the "fusion" of forces into an organization - this organization
will be a "cover" source of our movement.

Any other target group will be aware that other groups are
developing greater hostility to the government., the police and
the traditional legal bases of authority. The guerrilla cadres in
that group - for example, teachers - will cultivate this
awareness-building, making comments such as "So-and-so, who
is a farmer, said that the members of his cooperative believe
that the new economic policy is absurd, poorly planned and
unfair to the farmers."

When the awareness-building is increased, in the sense that
other groups feel hostility towards the regime, the group
discussions are held openly and our movement will be able to
receive reports that the majority of their operatives are united
in common, greater hostility against the regime. This will be
developed and the order to fuse/join will come about. The
fusion into a "cover" front is carried out thusly:

-- Internal cadres of our movement will meet with people such
as presidents, leaders, and others, at organized meetings
chaired by the group chief of our movement. Two or three
escorts can assist the guerrilla cadre if it becomes necessary.

-- Publish a joint communiqu? on this meeting, announcing the
creation of the "cover" front, including names and signatures of
the participants, and names of the organizations that they
represent.

After releasing this communiqu?, mass meetings should be
initiated, which should have as a goal the destruction of the
Sandinista control.

6. Conclusions

The development and control of the "cover" organizations in a
guerrilla war will give our movement the ability to create the
"whiplash" effect within the population, when the order for
fusion is gives. When the infiltration and internal subjective
control have been developed parallel with other guerrilla
activities, a democratic guerrilla commander will literally be
able to shake up the Sandinista structure and replace it.



CONTROL OF MASS CONCENTRATIONS AND MEETINGS

1. Generalities

In the last stages of a guerrilla war, mass concentrations and
meetings are a powerful psychological tool for carrying out the
mission. This section has as its objective giving the guerrilla
student training on techniques for controlling mass
concentrations and meetings in guerrilla warfare.

2. Infiltration of Guerrilla Cadres

Infiltration of guerrilla cadres (whether a member of our
movement or outside element) in workers' unions, student
groups, peasant organizations, etc., preconditioning these
groups for behavior within the masses, where they will have to
carry proselytism for the instructional struggle in a clandestine
manner.

-- Our psychological war team should prepare in advance a
hostile mental attitude among the target groups so that at the
decisive moment they can turn their furor into violence,
demanding their rights that have been trampled upon by the
regime.

-- These preconditioning campaigns must be aimed at the
political parties, professional organizations, students, laborers,
the masses of the unemployed, the ethnic minorities and any
other sector of society that is vulnerable or recruitable; this
also includes the popular masses and sympathizers of our
movement.

* The basic objective of a preconditioning campaign is to create
a negative "image" of the common enemy, e.g.:

Describe the managers of collective government entities as
trying to treat the staff the way "slave foremen" do.

The police mistreat the people like the Communist "Gestapo"
does.

The government officials of National Reconstruction are
puppets of Russian-Cuban imperialism.

Our psychological war cadres will create compulsive obsessions
of a temporary nature in places of public concentrations,
constantly hammering away at the themes pointed out or
desired, the same as in group gatherings; in informal
conversations expressing discontent; in addition passing out
brochures and flyers, and writing editorial articles both on the
radio and in newspapers, focused on the intention of preparing
the mind of the people of the decisive moment, which will
erupt in general violence.

In order to facilitate the preconditioning of the masses, we
should often use phrases to make the people see, such as:

The taxes that they pay the government do not benefit the
people at all, but rather are uses as a form of exploitation in
order to enrich those governing. Make it plain to the people
that they have become slaves, that they are being exploited by
privileged military and political groups.

-- The foreign advisers and their counseling programs are in
reality "interveners" in our homeland, who direct the
exploitation of the nation in accordance with the objectives of
the Russian and Cuban imperialists, in order to turn our people
into slaves of the hammer and sickle.

3. Selection of Appropriate Slogans

The leaders of the guerrilla warfare classify their slogans in
accordance with the circumstances with the aim of mobilizing
the masses in a wide scale of activities and at the highest
emotional level.

When the mass uprising is being developed, our covert cadres
should make partial demands, initially demanding, e.g. "We
want food," "We want freedom of worship," "We want union
freedom" - steps that will lead us toward the realization of the
goals of our movement, which are: GOD, HOMELAND and
DEMOCRACY.

If a lack of organization and command is noted in the enemy
authority, and the people find themselves in a state of
exaltation, advantage can be taken of this circumstance so that
our agitators will raise the tone of the rallying slogans, taking
them to the most strident point.

If the masses are not emotionally exalted, our agitators will
continue with the "partial" slogans, and the demands will be
based on daily needs, chaining them to the goals of our
movement.

An example of the need to give simple slogans is that few
people think in terms
of millions of cordobas, but any citizen, however humble he
may be, understands that a pair of shoes is necessary. The
goals of the movement are of an ideological nature, but our
agitators must realize that food - "bread and butter," "the
tortilla and red beans" - pull along the people, and it should be
understood that this is their main mission.

4. Creation of Nuclei

This involves the mobilization of a specific number of agitators
of the guerrilla organization of the place. This group will
inevitably attract an equal number of curious persons who
seek adventures and emotions, as well as those unhappy with
the system of government. The guerrillas will attract
sympathizers, discontented citizens as a consequence of the
repression of the system. Each guerrilla subunit will be
assigned specific tasks and missions that they should carry out.

Our cadres will be mobilized in the largest number possible,
together with persons who have been affected by the
Communist dictatorship, whether their possessions have been
stolen from them, they have been incarcerated, or tortured, or
suffered from any other type of aggression against them.
They will be mobilized toward the areas where the hostile and
criminal elements of the FSLN, CDS and others live, with an
effort for them to be armed with clubs, iron rods, placards and
if possible, small firearms, which they will carry hidden.

If possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out
specific selected "jobs."

Our agitators will visit the places where the unemployed meet,
as well as the unemployment offices, in order to hire them for
unspecified "jobs." The recruitment of these wage earners is
necessary because a nucleus is created under absolute orders.

The designated cadres will arrange ahead of time the
transportation of the participants, in order to take them to
meeting places in private or public vehicles, boats or any other
type of transportation.

Other cadres will be designated to design placards, flags and
banners with different slogans or key words, whether they be
partial, temporary or of the most radical type.

Other cadres will be designated to prepare flyers, posters, signs
and pamphlets to make the concentration more noticeable. This
material will contain instructions for the participants and will
also serve against the regime. Specific tasks will be assigned to
others, in order to create a "martyr" for the cause, taking the
demonstrators to a confrontation with the authorities, in order
to bring about uprisings or shootings, which will cause the
death of one or more persons, who would become the martyrs,
a situation that should be made use of immediately against the
regime, in order to create greater conflicts.

5. Ways to Lead an Uprising at Mass Meetings

It can be carried out by means of a small group of guerrillas
infiltrated within the masses, who will have the mission of
agitating, giving the impression that there are many of them
and that they have popular backing. Using the tactics of a force
of 200-300 agitators, a demonstration can be created in which
10,00-20,00 persons take part.

The agitation of the masses in a demonstration is carried out by
means of sociopolitical objectives. In this action one or several
people of our convert movement should take part, highly
trained as mass agitators, involving innocent persons, in order
to bring about an apparent spontaneous protest demonstration.
They will lead all of the concentration to the end of it. Outside
Commando. This element stays out of all activity, located so
that they can observe from where they are the development of
the planned events. As a point of observation, they should look
for the tower of a church, a high building, a high tree, the
highest level of the stadium or an auditorium, or any other
high place.

Inside Commando. This element will remain within the
multitude. Great importance should be given to the protection
of the leaders of these elements. Some placards or large
allusive signs should be used to designate the Commando Posts
and to provide signals to the subunits. This element will avoid
placing itself in places where fights or incidents come about
after the beginning of the demonstration.

These key agitators of ours will remain within the multitude.
The one responsible for this mission will assign ahead of time
the agitators to remain near the placard that he will indicate to
them, in order to give protection to the placard from any
contrary element. In that way the commander will know where
our agitators are, and will be able to send orders to change
passwords or slogans, or any other unforeseen thing, and even
eventually to incite violence if he desires it.

At this stage, once the key cadres have been dispersed, they
should place themselves in visible places such as by signs,
lampposts, and other places which stand out.

Our key agitators should avoid places of disturbances, once
they have taken care of the beginning of the same.

Defense Posts. These elements will act as bodyguards in
movement, forming a ring of protection for the chief, protecting
him from the police and the army, or helping him to escape if it
should be necessary. They should be highly disciplined and
will react only upon a verbal order from the chief.

In case the chief participates in a religious concentration, a
funeral or any other type of activity in which they have to
behave in an organized fashion, the bodyguards will remain in
the ranks very close to the chief or to the placard or banner
carriers in order to give them full protection.

The participants in this mission should be guerrilla combatants
in civilian clothes, or hired recruits who are sympathizers in
our struggle and who are against the oppressive regime.

These members must have a high discipline and will use
violence only on the verbal orders of the one in charge of them.

Messengers. They should remain near the leaders, transmitting
orders between the inside and outside commandos. They will
use communication radios, telephones, bicycles, motorcycles,
cars, or move on foot or horseback, taking paths or trails to
shorten distances. Adolescents (male and female) are ideal for
this mission.

Shock Troops. These men should be equipped with weapons
(Knives, razors, chains, clubs, bludgeons) and should march
slightly behind the innocent and gullible participants. They
should carry their weapons hidden. They will enter into action
only as "reinforcements" if the guerrilla agitators are attacked
by the police. They will enter the scene quickly, violently and
by surprise, in order to distract the authorities, in this way
making possible the withdrawal or rapid escape of the inside
commando.

Carriers of Banners and Placards. The banners and placards
used in demonstrations or concentrations will express the
protests of the population, but when the concentration reaches
its highest level of euphoria or popular discontent, our
infiltrated persons will make use of the placards against the
regime, which we manage to infiltrate in a hidden fashion, an
don them slogans or key words will be expressed to the benefit
of our cause. The one responsible for this mission will assign
the agitators ahead of time to keep near the placard of any
contrary element. In that way, the comandante will know
where the agitators are, and will be able to send orders to
change slogans and eventually to incite violence if he wishes.

Agitators of Rallying Cries and Applause. They will be trained
with specific instructions to use tried rallying cries. They will
be able to use phrase such as "WE ARE HUNGRY, WE WAND
BREAD," and "WE DON'T WANT COMMUNISM." There work and
their technique for agitating the masses is quite similar to
those of the leaders of applause and slogans at the high school
football or baseball games. The objective is to become more
adept and not just to shout rallying cries.

6. Conclusions

In a revolutionary movement of guerrilla warfare, the mass
concentrations and protest demonstrations are the principle
essential for the destruction of the enemy structures.



MASSIVE IN-DEPTH SUPPORT THROUGH PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS

1. Generalities

The separate coverage in these sections could leave the student
with some doubts. Therefore, all sections are summarized here,
in order to give a clearer picture of this book.

2. Motivation as Combatant-Propagandist

Every member of the struggle should know that his political
mission is as important as, if not more important than, his
tactical mission.

3. Armed Propaganda

Armed propaganda in small towns, rural villages, and city
residential districts should give the impression that our
weapons are not for exercising power over the people, but
rather that the weapons are for protecting the people; that they
are the power of the people against the FSLN government of
oppression.

4. Armed Propaganda Teams

Armed Propaganda Teams will combine political awareness
building and the ability to conduct propaganda for ends of
personal persuasion, which will be carried out within the
population.

5. Cover ("Facade") Organizations

The fusion of several organizations and associations recognized
by the government, through internal subjective control, occurs
in the final stages of the operation, in close cooperation with
mass meetings.

6. Control of Mass Demonstrations

The mixture of elements of the struggle with participants in the
demonstration will give the appearance of a spontaneous
demonstration, lacking direction, which will be used by the
agitators of the struggle to control the behavior of the masses.

7. Conclusion

Too often we see guerrilla warfare only from the point of view
of combat actions. This view is erroneous and extremely
dangerous. Combat actions are not the key to victory in
guerrilla warfare but rather form part of one of the six basic
efforts. There is no priority in any of the efforts, but rather
they should progress in a parallel manner. The emphasis or
exclusion of any of these efforts could bring about serious
difficulties, and in the worst of cases, even failure. The history
of revolutionary wars has shown this reality.



APPENDIX

The purpose of this appendix is to complement the guidelines
and recommendations to the propagandist-guerrillas expressed
under the topic of "Techniques of Persuasion in Talks and
Speeches," to improve the ability to organize and express
thoughts for those who wish to perfect their oratorical abilities.
After all, oratory is one of the most valuable resources for
exercising leadership. Oratory can be used, then, as an
extraordinary political tool.

2. The Audience

Oratory is simultaneous communication par excellence, i.e., the
orator and his audience share the same time and space.
Therefore, every speech should be a different experience at
"that" moment or particular situation which the audience is
experiencing and which influences them. So the audience must
be considered as "a state of mind." Happiness, sadness, anger,
fear, etc., are states of mind that we must consider to exist in
our audience, and it is the atmosphere that affects the target
public.

The human being is made up of a mind and soul; he acts in
accordance with his thoughts and sentiments and responds to
stimuli of ideas and emotions. In that way there exist only two
possible focuses in any plan, including speeches: the concrete,
based on rational appeals, i.e., to thinking; and the idealized,
with emotional appeals, i.e., to sentiment.

For his part the orator, although he must be sensitive to the
existing mass sentiment, he must at the same time keep his
cold judgment to be able to lead and control effectively the
feelings of an audience. When in the oratorical momentum the
antithesis between heart and brain comes about, judgment
should always prevail, characteristic of a leader.

3. Political Oratory

Political oratory is one of the various forms of oratory, and it
usually fulfills one of three objectives: to instruct, persuade, or
move; and its method is reduced to urging (asking), ordering,
questioning and responding. Oratory is a quality so tied to
political leadership that it can be said that the history of
political orators is the political history of humanity, an
affirmation upheld by names such as Cicero, Demosthenes,
Danton, Mirabeau, Robespierre, Clemenceau, Lenin, Trotsky,
Mussolini, Hitler, Roosevelt, etc.

4. Qualities in a Speech

In general terms, the most appreciated qualities of a speech,
and specifically a political speech in the context of the
psychological action of the armed struggle, are the following:

-- Be brief and concise A length of five minutes [line missing in
Spanish text]...that of the orator who said: "If you want a two-
hour speech, I'll start right now; if you want a two-minute one,
let me think awhile."

-- Centered on the theme The speech should be structured by a
set of organized ideas that converge on the theme. A good
speech is expressed by concepts and not only with words.

-- Logic The ideas presented should be logical and easily
acceptable. never challenge logic in the mind of the audience,
since immediately the main thing is lost credibility. As far as
possible, it is recommended that all speeches be based on a
syllogism, which the orator should adjust in his exposition. For
example: "Those governing get rich and are thieves; the
Sandinistas have enriched themselves governing; then, the
Sandinistats are thieves." This could be the point of a speech on
the administrative corruption of the regime. When an idea or a
set of guiding ideas do not exist in a speech, confusion and
dispersion easily arise.

5. Structure of a Speech

Absolute improvisation does not exist in oratory. All orators
have a "mental plan" that allows them to organize their ideas
and concepts rapidly; with practice it is possible to come to do
this in a few seconds, almost simultaneously with the
expression of the word.

The elements that make up a speech are given below, in a
structure that we recommend always putting into practice, to
those who wish to more and more improve their oratorical
abilities:

-- Introduction or Preamble One enters into contact with the
public, a personal introduction can be made or one of the
movement to which we belong, the reason for our presence, etc.
In these first seconds it is important to make an impact,
attracting attention and provoking interest among the
audience. For that purpose, there are resources such as
beginning with a famous phrase or a previously prepared
slogan, telling a dramatic or humorous story, etc.

-- Purpose or Enunciation The subject to be dealt with is
defined, explained as a whole or by parts.

-- Appraisal or Argumentation Arguments are presented,
EXACTLY IN THIS ORDER: First, the negative arguments, or
against the thesis that is going to be upheld, and then the
positive arguments, or favorable ones to our thesis,
immediately adding proof or facts that sustain such arguments.

-- Recapitulation or Conclusion A short summary is made and
the conclusions of the speech are spelled out.

-- Exhortation Action by the public is called for, i.e., they are
asked in and almost energetic manner to do or not to do
something.

6. Some Literary Resources

Although there exist typically oratorical devices of diction, in
truth, oratory has taken from other literary genres a large
number of devices, several of which often, in an unconscious
manner, we use in our daily expressions and even in our
speeches.

Below we enunciate many of their literary devices in frequent
use in oratory, recommending to those interested moderate use
of them, since an orator who over-uses the literary device loses
authenticity and sounds untrue.

The devices that are used the most in oratory are those
obtained through the repetition of words in particular periods
of the speech, such as: Anaphora, or repetition of a word at the
beginning of each sentence, e.g., "Freedom for the poor,
freedom for the rich, freedom for all." In the reiteration,
repetition is of a complete sentence (slogan) insistently through
the speech, e.g., "With God and patriotism we will overcome
Communism because...:

Conversion is the repetition at the end of every phrase, e.g.:
"Sandinismo tries to be about everyone, dominate everyone,
command everyone, and as an absolute tyranny, do away with
everyone."

In the emphasis, repetition is used at the beginning and at the
end of the clause, e.g., "Who brought the Russian-Cuban
intervention? The Sandinistas. And who is engaged in arms
trafficking with the neighboring countries? The Sandinistas.
And who is proclaiming to be in favor of nonintervention?
The Sandinistas."

Reduplication, when the phrase begins with the same word that
ends the previous one. For example: "We struggle for
democracy, democracy and social justice." The concatenation is
a chain made up of duplications. For example: "Communism
transmits the deception of the child to the young man, of the
young man to the adult, and of the adult to the old man."

In the antithesis or word play, the same words are used with a
different meaning to give an ingenious effect: e.g., "The greatest
wealth of every human being is his own freedom, because
slaves will always be poor but we poor can have the wealth of
our freedom."

Similar cadences, through the use of verbs of the same tense
and person, or nouns of the same number and case. For
example: "Those of us who are struggling we will be marching
because he who perseveres achieves, and he who gives up
remains."

Use of synonyms, repetition of words with a similar meaning.
For example: "We demand a Nicaragua for all, without
exceptions, without omissions."

Among the figures of speech most used in oratory are:

Comparison or simile, which sets the relationship of similarity
between two or more beings or things. For example: "Because
we love Christ, we love his bishops and pastors," and "Free as a
bird."

Antithesis, or the counter position of words, ideas, or phrases of
an opposite meaning. For example: "They promised freedom
and gave slavery; that they would distribute the wealth and
they have distributed poverty; that they would bring peace,
and they have brought about war."

Among the logic figures are the following:

Concession, which is a skillful way to concede something to the
adversary in order to better emphasize the inappropriate
aspects, through the use of expressions such as: but, however,
although, nevertheless, in spite of the fact that, etc. For
example: "The mayor here has been honest, but he is not the
one controlling all the money of the nation." It is an effective
form of rebuttal when the opinion of the audience is not
entirely ours.

Permission, in which one apparently accedes to something,
when in reality it is rejected. For example: "Do not protest, but
sabotage them." "Talk quietly, but tell it to everyone."

Prolepsis is an anticipated refutation. For example: "Some will
think that they are only promises; they will say, others said the
same thing, but no. We are different, we are Christians, we
consider God a witness to our words." Preterition is an artifice,
pretending discretion when something is said with total clarity
and indiscretion. For example: "If I were not obligated to keep
military secrets, I would tell all of you of the large amount of
armaments that we have so that you would feel even more
confidence that our victory is assured."

Communication is a way to ask and give the answer to the
same question. For example: "If they show disrespect for the
ministers of God, will they respect us, simple citizens? Never."

Rhetorical questions are a way in which one shows perplexity
or inability to say something, only as an oratorical recourse. For
example: "I am only a peasant and can tell you little. I know
little and I will not be able to explain to you the complicated
things of politics. Therefore, I talk to you with my heart, with
my simple peasant's heart, as we all are."

Litotes is a form of meaning a lot by saying little. For example:
"The nine commanders have stolen little, just the whole
country."

Irony consists of getting across exactly the opposite of what
one is saying. For example: "The divine mobs that threaten and
kill, they are indeed Christians."

Amplification is presenting an idea from several angles. For
example: "Political votes are the power of the people in a
democracy. And economic votes are their power in the
economy. Buying or not buying something, the majorities
decide what should be produced. For something to be produced
or to disappear. That is part of economic democracy."

The most usual plaintive figures of speech are:

Deprecation or entreaty to obtain something. For example:
"Lord, free us from the yoke. Give us freedom."

Imprecation or threat, expressing a sentiment in view of the
unjust or hopeless. For example: "Let there be a Homeland for
all or let there be a Homeland for no one."

Conmination, similar to the previous one, presents a bad wish
for the rest. For example, "Let them drown in the abyss of their
own corruption."

The apostrophe consists of addressing oneself towards
something supernatural or inanimate as if it were a living
being. For example: "Mountains of Nicaragua, make the seed of
freedom grow."

Interrogation consists of asking a question of oneself, to give
greater emphasis to what is expressed. It is different from
communication, since it gives the answer and is of a logical and
not a plaintive nature. For example: "If they have already
injured the members of my family, my friends, my peasant
brothers, do I have any path other than brandishing a
weapon?"

Reticence consists of leaving a thought incomplete,
intentionally, so that mentally the audience completes it. For
example, "They promised political pluralism and gave
totalitarianism. They promised political pluralism and gave
totalitarianism. They promised social justice, and they have
increased poverty. They offered freedom of thought, and they
have given censorship. Now, what they promise the world are
free elections..."