Export Credit Agencies Explained
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www.eca-watch.org
Export Credit Agencies Explained:
What they are, how they impact development, the environment and human rights, and what the international reform campaign is doing about it.
Introduction: What are ECAs?
Export Credit Agencies and Investment Insurance Agencies, commonly known as ECAs, are public agencies that provide government-backed loans, guarantees, credits and insurance to private corporations from their home country to do business abroad, particularly in the financially and politically risky developing world. Most industrialized nations have at least one ECA, which is usually an official or quasi-official branch of their government.
Today, ECAs are collectively among the largest sources of public financial support for foreign corporate involvement in industrial projects in the developing world. For example, ECAs are estimated to support four times the amount of oil, gas and mining projects as do all Multilateral Development Banks such as the World Bank Group. Half of all new greenhouse gas-emitting industrial projects in developing countries have some form of ECA support. ECAs often back such projects even though the World Bank Group and other multilateral banks find them too risky and potentially harmful to support.
What are the Impacts of these ECAs?
Now one of the biggest source of financing for harmful projects "In recent years ECAs are estimated to have supported between US $50 - $70 billion annually in what are called "medium and long-term transactions," a great portion of which are large industrial and infrastructure projects in developing countries. Many of these projects have very serious environmental and social impacts. For example, ECAs finance greenhouse gas-emitting power plants, large scale dams, mining projects, road development in pristine tropical forests, oil pipelines, chemical and industrial facilities, forestry and plantation schemes, to name a few.
Because most of these projects are high risk due to their environmental, political, social and cultural impacts, most would not come to life without the support and financial backing of ECAs. Hence, ECAs are strategic development linchpins that play an enormous part in the harmful impacts of corporate globalization.
Undercutting progress, violating laws... While the World Bank Group and most bilateral aid agencies minimum social and environmental guidelines, most ECAs have few or no such standards in place. Hence, the same countries that accept and promote environmental and social policies through their aid agencies and their membership in the World Bank Group circumvent or disregard these same policies when supporting projects through their ECAs. The lack of environmental and social policies and associated professional staff to perform due diligence also results in ECA projects that contravene the international environmental, human rights and other treaties and agreements to which these ECAs' own governments are party.
Fueling a race to the bottom... ECAs help corporations within their own country expand into the developing world, and as a result they compete intensely with ECAs from other countries that do the same. They are quick to back projects that other ECAs and multilateral development banks will refuse on environmental and social grounds. This creates a "race to the bottom," that encourages ECA support of projects with weak or no project environmental or social safeguards.
One of the best examples of the race to the bottom is the Three Gorges Dam in China: This project of 1.8 million people, the flooding of millions of hectares of prime farmland, multi-billion dollar cost overruns, and corruption. In 1996, the German, Swiss and Canadian ECAs raced with one another to help finance this project, even though the World Bank and US Export Import Bank had refused to support it on environmental grounds. Now growing internal opposition in China is calling for a scaling down and even a halt to the gigantic dam.
No transparency and contempt for affected communities...Another characteristic of ECAs is an often complete lack of public disclosure of the impacts of their projects. Most ECAs are not required to conduct environmental impact assessments. Nor do they consult with affected communities and civil society in the development of their projects. This lack of public discourse is antagonistic to democratic principles and highly suspect since ECAs back projects that affect people's health, environment, and their ability to maintain a sustainable local livelihood.
Most ECAs do not disclose the name, nature or location for the projects they back even after the project is well underway or completed. In so doing, ECAs place the desires of private corporations and their own economic gain above the rights of citizens to protect their lives and environment. This obviously contradicts the principles of democracy and transparency to which their parent governments aspire.
Corruption... According to Transparency International, "Bribing foreign officials in order to secure overseas contracts for their exports has become a widespread practice in industrial countries, particularly in certain sectors such as exports of military equipment and public works. Normally these contracts are guaranteed by government - owned or - supported Export Credit Insurance (ECI) schemes (HERMES in Germany, COFACE in France, DUCROIRE in Belgium, ECGD in the UK)."
Crushing debt... ECAs for the most part also have no developmental mandate or obligations, yet they account for the single biggest component of developing country debt, consisting in 1996 some 24% of total debt and 56% of debt owed to official agencies. While proper debt management can lead to positive development impacts, ECAs often push countries to create debt to pay back loans for projects that are inconsistent with the goals of sustainable development, that have design weaknesses, and that are associated with corruption. Thus, to the extent that excessive or inappropriate developing country debt loads shackles the sustainable development process in these countries, ECAs are in large part responsible.
Arms transfers and human rights abuses... ECAs-backed projects are too-often associated with human right abuses in developing countries. For example, large hydro-electric projects such as the proposed Ilisu dam in Turkey can result in the forced resettlement of tens of thousands of people and the flooding of historically and culturally significant communities. Typically, the people resettled are never fairly or adequately compensated, and are forced to live in unfamiliar cultural surroundings and living conditions that are worse than they had before. In the case of Ilisu, many in the communities to be flooded are primarily of the Kurdish minority and view this practice as an extension of decades of repression and war inflicted upon them by the Turkish government. Downstream countries including Syria and Iraq fear that Turkey will use the dam to curtail water flow in this arid, and politically unstable region.
ECAs are also frequently involved in supporting the export of arms and military equipment to war-torn countries, for example, UK-made Hawk fighter jets or US-made Black Hawk helicopters that are exported to countries like Indonesia and Columbia. Once out of the control of the exporters' hands and into the control of the government, these arms are potentially used to kill innocent people and otherwise violate human rights. Moreover, ECA-backed arms transfers are typically onerous debt-producing transactions for countries from the start because they are "non-productive expenditures" that are not associated with economically productive activities that can contribute to debt repayment. Hence, in addition to fostering human rights abuses, these arms transfers can create a vicious cycle that can weaken a country's economic health and in turn fuel more conflict.
Increasing risks they were designed to protect against... The ECAs' "race to the bottom" does more than harm the environment and human communities; it also results in project standards that are so low or non-existent that their absence increases some of the very political risks against which these public agencies were designed to protect. A specific example: the Antamina mine in Peru, insured by the Canadian ECA, Export Development Corporation, experiences civil disturbances such as organized picketing, blockades and strikes that target the project due to its negative impact on local peoples' fishing areas and livelihoods. Another example: ECA backing for the sale of military aircraft to Indonesia, absent adequate controls over their use, contributed to its military and political instability. As a 22 September 1999 "Financial Times" editorial pointed out, careless industrialized country export credit agencies share a major responsibility for "Violence in East Timor and economic disaster in Indonesia." ECAs' support of projects that exacerbate the very risks they were designed to protect against can be compared to a flu medicine that spreads influenza.
Assuming no responsibility... When ECAs' lack of adequate safeguards and due diligence leads to project failures and heightened risks, it is often other branches of their respective governments that must respond. For example, countries' foreign ministries and militaries may be called in to help quell uprising resulting in part from local opposition to ECA-backed projects. Countries' federal treasuries may ultimately cover financial losses stemming from claims by failed ECA project sponsors. The fact that the political and financial cost of project failures and resultant external impacts is borne by others than the ECA and their corporate clients is an indication of a moral hazard that encourages ECAs' harmful activities to continue.
Thanks to ECA support, private commercial banks can shirk much of their responsibilities as well. As a Midland Bank executive in charge of arms deals once described,
"You see, before we advance monies to a company, we always insist on any funds being covered by the [UK] Export Credit Guarantee Department...We can't lose. After 90 days, if the Iraqis haven't coughed up, the company gets paid instead by the British Government. Either way, we recover our loan, plus interest of course. Its beautiful."[i]
For their part, ECAs continue to resist change. The OECD Export Credit Group (ECG), the body where ECAs periodically gather to discuss common issues, strongly resists requests by NGOs and project affected communities to meet, and only this year agreed to meet with three representatives of affected communities. Likewise, its members pay little respect to the findings of other OECD bodies. According to an OECD task force assessing environmental assessment practice:
"There was widespread concern among the Task Force regarding the general lack of environmental guidelines applied to the development activities of the bilateral commercial lending and credit agencies. With a few notable exceptions, the environmental assessment requirements imposed on the bilateral aid agencies of the DAC (OECD Development Advisory Committee) Members do not apply to the commercial arms of bilateral government financing (ECAs). Virtually every Member cited examples where the lack of appropriate environmental planning of projects funded by such organizations had caused significant ecological and social problems. They were of the opinion that the environmental damage resulting from such ventures far outweighed the damage caused from lack of coherence among bilateral donors."[ii]
ECAs have also managed to antagonize other government officials and agencies, including even those sympathetic of the process of corporate globalization. According to European Union Trade Secretary, Pascal Lamy:
"I too am frustrated with the ECAs' lack of progress in adopting common environmental policies. Every time any of them move forward a millimeter, they stop to see if anybody else moved."[iii]
Indeed, ECAs even resist the Presidents and Prime Ministers of the countries they represent. For example, since 1996 the G-8 has issued three separate mandates for ECA environmental policy reform, and all have gone unfulfilled.
Isolating themselves... ECAs insist that they should not have adopt minimal environmental and social policies that other mature international organizations have long accepted as normal, common practice. ECAs argue that they shouldn't have to apply such safeguards because their unique mission makes them different from other international finance institutions like the World Bank Group, different from aid agencies, and different from domestic agencies in their own countries. However, in distancing themselves from virtually every other kind of public agency in the world, ECAs isolate themselves, alienate others, and present a clearer target for citizens and government officials that are concerned about the negative impacts of corporate globalization. Indeed, in resisting these concerns, ECAs seem to be heading for the same kind of political debacle as befell the failed and now infamous OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the late 1990s. In the case of the MAI, which would also reduce local communities' abilities to protect their environment and human rights, a very similar pattern of agency secrecy and contempt of civil society led to worldwide opposition and the eventual collapse of this proposed international agreement.
Reason for hope... Despite the slow progress among ECAs in accepting the need to reform, there are hopeful signs on the horizon for change. For example, significant ECA environmental policy reforms have occurred in the Australia and the US in recent years, and there is the distinct possibility that other leading ECAs may follow suit. The UK's ECGD, for example, has recently released a set of proactive business principles that extends beyond the environment to encompass sustainable development and human rights concerns. In Canada, research and investigations by its Parliament and the Department of Foreign Affairs may result in reforms of the Export Development Corporation. In Japan, new environmental policies are now being drafted. NGO engagement of ECAs on specific projects has resulted in some of these projects being shelved and others significantly improved. Still, there remains strong resistance to change by ECAs in many leading countries, and, where change has occurred, close monitoring to ensure implementation is required.
What are the Impacts of these ECAs?
Now one of the biggest source of financing for harmful projects
In recent years ECAs are estimated to have supported between US $50 - $70 billion annually in what are called medium and long-term transactions, a great portion of which are large industrial and infrastructure projects in developing countries. Many of these projects have very serious environmental and social impacts. For example, ECAs finance greenhouse gas-emitting power plants, large scale dams, mining projects, road development in pristine tropical forests, oil pipelines, chemical and industrial facilities, forestry and plantation schemes, to name a few.
Because most of these projects are high risk due to their environmental, political, social and cultural impacts, most would not come to life without the support and financial backing of ECAs. Hence, ECAs are strategic development linchpins that play an enormous part in the harmful impacts of corporate globalization.
Undercutting progress, violating laws...
While the World Bank Group and most bilateral aid agencies minimum social and environmental guidelines, most ECAs have few or no such standards in place. Hence, the same countries that accept and promote environmental and social policies through their aid agencies and their membership in the World Bank Group circumvent or disregard these same policies when supporting projects through their ECAs. The lack of environmental and social policies and associated professional staff to perform due diligence also results in ECA projects that contravene the international environmental, human rights and other treaties and agreements to which these ECAs' own governments are party.
Fueling a race to the bottom
ECAs help corporations within their own country expand into the developing world, and as a result they compete intensely with ECAs from other countries that do the same. They are quick to back projects that other ECAs and multilateral development banks will refuse on environmental and social grounds. This creates a "race to the bottom," that encourages ECA support of projects with weak or no project environmental or social safeguards.
One of the best examples of the race to the bottom is the Three Gorges Dam in China: This project of 1.8 million people, the flooding of millions of hectares of prime farmland, multi-billion dollar cost overruns, and corruption. In 1996, the German, Swiss and Canadian ECAs raced with one another to help finance this project, even though the World Bank and US Export Import Bank had refused to support it on environmental grounds. Now growing internal opposition in China is calling for a scaling down and even a halt to the gigantic dam.
No transparency and contempt for affected communities
Another characteristic of ECAs is an often complete lack of public disclosure of the impacts of their projects. Most ECAs are not required to conduct environmental impact assessments. Nor do they consult with affected communities and civil society in the development of their projects. This lack of public discourse is antagonistic to democratic principles and highly suspect since ECAs back projects that affect people's health, environment, and their ability to maintain a sustainable local livelihood.
Most ECAs do not disclose the name, nature or location for the projects they back even after the project is well underway or completed. In so doing, ECAs place the desires of private corporations and their own economic gain above the rights of citizens to protect their lives and environment. This obviously contradicts the principles of democracy and transparency to which their parent governments aspire.
Corruption
According to Transparency International, Bribing foreign officials in order to secure overseas contracts for their exports has become a widespread practice in industrial countries, particularly in certain sectors such as exports of military equipment and public works. Normally these contracts are guaranteed by government - owned or - supported Export Credit Insurance (ECI) schemes (HERMES in Germany, COFACE in France, DUCROIRE in Belgium, ECGD in the UK).
Crushing debt
ECAs for the most part also have no developmental mandate or obligations, yet they account for the single biggest component of developing country debt, consisting in 1996 some 24% of total debt and 56% of debt owed to official agencies. While proper debt management can lead to positive development impacts, ECAs often push countries to create debt to pay back loans for projects that are inconsistent with the goals of sustainable development, that have design weaknesses, and that are associated with corruption. Thus, to the extent that excessive or inappropriate developing country debt loads shackles the sustainable development process in these countries, ECAs are in large part responsible.
Arms transfers and human rights abuses
ECAs-backed projects are too-often associated with human right abuses in developing countries. For example, large hydro-electric projects such as the proposed Ilisu dam in Turkey can result in the forced resettlement of tens of thousands of people and the flooding of historically and culturally significant communities. Typically, the people resettled are never fairly or adequately compensated, and are forced to live in unfamiliar cultural surroundings and living conditions that are worse than they had before. In the case of Ilisu, many in the communities to be flooded are primarily of the Kurdish minority and view this practice as an extension of decades of repression and war inflicted upon them by the Turkish government. Downstream countries including Syria and Iraq fear that Turkey will use the dam to curtail water flow in this arid, and politically unstable region.
ECAs are also frequently involved in supporting the export of arms and military equipment to war-torn countries, for example, UK-made Hawk fighter jets or US-made Black Hawk helicopters that are exported to countries like Indonesia and Columbia. Once out of the control of the exporters hands and into the control of the government, these arms are potentially used to kill innocent people and otherwise violate human rights. Moreover, ECA-backed arms transfers are typically onerous debt-producing transactions for countries from the start because they are non-productive expenditures that are not associated with economically productive activities that can contribute to debt repayment. Hence, in addition to fostering human rights abuses, these arms transfers can create a vicious cycle that can weaken a countrys economic health and in turn fuel more conflict.
Increasing risks they were designed to protect against
The ECAs race to the bottom does more than harm the environment and human communities; it also results in project standards that are so low or non-existent that their absence increases some of the very political risks against which these public agencies were designed to protect. A specific example: the Antamina mine in Peru, insured by the Canadian ECA, Export Development Corporation, experiences civil disturbances such as organized picketing, blockades and strikes that target the project due to its negative impact on local peoples' fishing areas and livelihoods. Another example: ECA backing for the sale of military aircraft to Indonesia, absent adequate controls over their use, contributed to its military and political instability. As a 22 September 1999 Financial Times editorial pointed out, careless industrialized country export credit agencies share a major responsibility for violence in East Timor and economic disaster in Indonesia. ECAs support of projects that exacerbate the very risks they were designed to protect against can be compared to a flu medicine that spreads influenza.
Assuming no responsibility
When ECAs lack of adequate safeguards and due diligence leads to project failures and heightened risks, it is often other branches of their respective governments that must respond. For example, countries foreign ministries and militaries may be called in to help quell uprising resulting in part from local opposition to ECA-backed projects. Countries federal treasuries may ultimately cover financial losses stemming from claims by failed ECA project sponsors. The fact that the political and financial cost of project failures and resultant external impacts is borne by others than the ECA and their corporate clients is an indication of a moral hazard that encourages ECAs' harmful activities to continue.
Thanks to ECA support, private commercial banks can shirk much of their responsibilities as well. As a Midland Bank executive in charge of arms deals once described,
You see, before we advance monies to a company, we always insist on any funds being covered by the [UK] Export Credit Guarantee Department
We cant lose. After 90 days, if the Iraqis havent coughed up, the company gets paid instead by the British Government. Either way, we recover our loan, plus interest of course. Its beautiful.[i]
For their part, ECAs continue to resist change. The OECD Export Credit Group (ECG), the body where ECAs periodically gather to discuss common issues, strongly resists requests by NGOs and project affected communities to meet, and only this year agreed to meet with three representatives of affected communities. Likewise, its members pay little respect to the findings of other OECD bodies. According to an OECD task force assessing environmental assessment practice:
There was widespread concern among the Task Force regarding the general lack of environmental guidelines applied to the development activities of the bilateral commercial lending and credit agencies. With a few notable exceptions, the environmental assessment requirements imposed on the bilateral aid agencies of the DAC (OECD Development Advisory Committee) Members do not apply to the commercial arms of bilateral government financing (ECAs). Virtually every Member cited examples where the lack of appropriate environmental planning of projects funded by such organizations had caused significant ecological and social problems. They were of the opinion that the environmental damage resulting from such ventures far outweighed the damage caused from lack of coherence among bilateral donors.[ii]
ECAs have also managed to antagonize other government officials and agencies, including even those sympathetic of the process of corporate globalization. According to European Union Trade Secretary, Pascal Lamy:
I too am frustrated with the ECAs lack of progress in adopting common environmental policies. Every time any of them move forward a millimeter, they stop to see if anybody else moved.[iii]
Indeed, ECAs even resist the Presidents and Prime Ministers of the countries they represent. For example, since 1996 the G-8 has issued three separate mandates for ECA environmental policy reform, and all have gone unfulfilled.
Isolating themselves
ECAs insist that they should not have adopt minimal environmental and social policies that other mature international organizations have long accepted as normal, common practice. ECAs argue that they shouldnt have to apply such safeguards because their unique mission makes them different from other international finance institutions like the World Bank Group, different from aid agencies, and different from domestic agencies in their own countries. However, in distancing themselves from virtually every other kind of public agency in the world, ECAs isolate themselves, alienate others, and present a clearer target for citizens and government officials that are concerned about the negative impacts of corporate globalization. Indeed, in resisting these concerns, ECAs seem to be heading for the same kind of political debacle as befell the failed and now infamous OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the late 1990s. In the case of the MAI, which would also reduce local communities abilities to protect their environment and human rights, a very similar pattern of agency secrecy and contempt of civil society led to worldwide opposition and the eventual collapse of this proposed international agreement.
The NGO Campaign:
Since 1996, NGOs from many countries have joined forces in an international campaign to reform ECAs (see www.eca-watch.org/members.html). The goals and demands of the campaign are best described in the Jakarta Declaration for Reform of Official Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agencies, endorsed by over 300 NGOs following a May 2000 international ECA reform strategy session in Jakarta, Indonesia (see www.eca-watch.org/jakarta_engl.html). While focusing on the impacts of ECAs in Indonesia, the Jakarta Declaration has a global "call for reform"that includes:
Transparency, public access to information and consultation by ECAs and the OECD ECA Working Party;
Binding common environmental and social guidelines and standards that are no lower and less rigorous than existing international procedures and standards for public international finance such as those of the World Bank Group and OECD Development Assistance Committee;
The adoption of explicit human rights criteria guiding the operations of ECAs;
The adoption of binding criteria and guidelines to end ECA abetting of corruption;
The adoption of a commitment only to finance economically productive investments;
The adoption of comprehensive relief for developing countries for ECA debt.
What you can do:
You can join the international campaign to reform export credit agencies! Bookmark this website and come back for late-breaking news, action alerts and contact fellow campaigners near you.
List of ECA's:
OECD Member ECAs:
AUSTRALIA
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC)
Level 5, Export House
22 Pitt Street,
Sydney, NSW 2000
Tel: +61 2 9201 2111
Fax: +61 2 9251 3851
E-mail: [email protected]
Web site: www.efic.gov.au
AUSTRIA
Oesterreichische Kontrollbank Aktiengesellschaft (OeKB)
Am Hof 4, A-1010
Vienna
Tel: +43 1 531 27-0
Fax: +43 1 531 27693
Web site: www.oekb.co.at
CANADA
Export Development Corporation (EDC)
151 O'connor Street
Ottawa K1A 1K3
Tel: +1 613 598.2500
Fax: + 1 613 237.2690
E-mail: [email protected]
Web site: www.edc.ca
DENMARK
Eksport Kredit Fonden (EKF)
P.O. Box 80 80
Tagensvej 137
2000 Copenhagen
Tel: +45 35 86 80 80
Fax: +45 35 86 85 77
FINLAND
FINNVERA plc
Vuorimiehekatu 1
00140 Helsinki
Tel: +358 105 2171
Fax: +358 105 217 220
Web site: www.finnvera.fi
FRANCE
COFACE
12 Cours Michelet
92065 Paris La Defense Cedex
Tel: +33 1.49.02.20.00
Fax: +33 1.49.02.27.41
E-mail: [email protected]
Web site: www.coface.com
GERMANY
Hermes Kreditversicherung-AG (Hermes)
Friedensallee 254
22763 Hamburg
Mailing Address: PO Box 22746 Hamburg
Tel: +49 40.8834.1055
Fax: +49 40.8834.1059
KfW
Palmengartenstrasse 5-9
60325 Frankfurt am Main
Tel: +49 (0)69 74 31-0
Fax: +49 (0)69 74 31 29 44
E-mail: [email protected]
Web site: www.kfw.de/EN/Inhalt.jsp
ITALY
Sezione Speciale Per l'Assicurazione Del Credito All'Esportazione (SACE)
37 Piazza Poli
00187 Rome
Tel: +39 (0) 6.673.6255/6228
Fax: +39 (0) 6.678.9835
Web site: www.ntt.it/sace
JAPAN
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)/International Financial Corporation
(formerly JEXIM)
Press and External Affairs Division
Ms. Kayo Murata
1-4-1, Ohtemachi, Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo 100-8144
Tel: +81. 3.5218.3100
Fax: +81.3..5218.3956
E-mail: [email protected]
web site: www.jbic.go.jp
Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI)
Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
Mr. Hiroyuki Ochiai
1-3-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo 100-8901
Tel: +81 3 3501 1664
Fax: +81 3 3501 5912
E-mail: [email protected]
Web site: www.nexi.go.jp, www.meti.go.jp
THE NETHERLANDS
Nederlandsche Credietverzekering Maatschappij NV (NCM)
Keizershracht 281
Amsterdam
Tel: +31 (0) 20 5539111
Fax: +31 (0) 20 5532811
NORWAY
Guarantee Institute for Export Credits (GEIK)
Dronning Maudsgate 15
0250 Oslo
Tel: +47 22 876200
Fax: +47 22 832445
Web site: www.giek.no
SPAIN
Compañia Española de Seguros de Crédito a la Exportación, SA (SESCE)
Compañia Española de Seguros y Reaseguros
C/Velázquez 74
28001 Madrid
Tel: +34 1 557 60 66/77
Fax: +34 1 576 51 40
Web site: www.cesce.es
Compañia Española de Seguros y Reaseguros de Crédito y Caución, SA (CESCC)
Paseo de la Castellana 4
E-28046 Madrid
Tel: +34 1 432 6300
Fax: +34 1 432 6511
Web site: www.creditoycaucion
SWEDEN
Exportkreditnämnden (EKN)
Kungsgatan 36
Stockholm
Tel: +46 8 701 00 00
Fax: +46 8 411 81 49
SWITZERLAND
Geschäftsstelle für die Exportrisikogarantie (ERG)
Kirchenweg 8
CH-8032 Zürich
Tel: +41 1 384 47 77
Fax: +41 1 384 47 87
Web site: www.swiss-erg.com
UNITED KINGDOM
Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD)
2 Exchange Tower
Harbour Exchange Square
London E14 9GS
Tel: +44 (0) 171.512.7000
Fax: +44 (0) 171.512.7649
E-mail: [email protected]
Web site: www.ecgd.gov.uk
UNITED STATES
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
1100 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20527
Tel: +1 202.336.8400
Fax: +1 202.408. 9859
Web site: www.opic.gov
Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank)
811 Vermont Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20571
Tel: +1 202.565.3946
Fax: +1 202.565.3380
Web site: www.exim.gov
Non-OECD Member ECAs:
ARGENTINA
Compañia Argentina de Seguros de Crédito a la Exportación SA (CASC)
Av, Corrientes 345 7mo Piso
1043 - Buenos Aires - Argentina
Tel: (54-11) 4313-3048/3403/4362/5071
Fax: (54-11) 4313-2919
Web site: www.casc.com.ar/
HONG KONG, CHINA
Hong Kong Credit Insurance Corporation (HKEC)
2/F., Tower 1, South Seas Centre, 75 Mody Road,
Tsimshatsui East, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Tel: 2723 3883
Fax: 2722 6277
Web site: www.hkecic.com
INDIA
Export-Import Bank of India
Centre One Building, Floor 21,
World Trade Centre Complex,
Cuffe Parade, Mumbai 400 005.
Tel: 2218 5272,
Fax: 2218 2572
Web site: www.eximbankindia.com/
ISREAL
Israel Foreign Trade Risks Insurance Corporation (IFTRIC)
Web site: www.iftric.co.il/
MALAYSIA
Malaysia Export Credit Insurance Berhad (32522-U)
Level 17, Bangunan Bank Industri, Bandar Wawasan, No 1016, Jalan Sultan Ismail,
P.O Box 11048, 50734 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Tel: (+603) 2691 0677
Fax: (+603) 2691 0353
Web site: www.mecib.com.my
SINGAPORE
ECICS Credit Insurance Ltd (ECICS)
7 Temasek Boulavard #11-01, Suntek Tower One
Singapore, 038987
Fax: 65-6338 9267
Web site: www.ecics.com.sg/
SLOVENIA
Slovene Export Corporation (SEC)
Ulica Josipine Turnograjske 6, 1000 Ljubljana
Tel: 01/200 75 00
Fax: 01/200 75 75
Web site: www.sid.si/sidang.nsf
SOUTH AFRICA
Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation of Africa (CGIC)
31 Dover Street
Randburg P.O. Box 125
Randburg
2125
Tel: (011) 889-7000
Fax: (011) 886-1027
Web site: www.creditguarantee.co.za/
TAIWAN
The Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China
Web site: www.eximbank.com.tw
notes:
[i]Killing Secrets: ECGD, The Export Credit Guarantee Department, Killing Secrets, 1998.
[ii]OECD Development Assistance Task Force Report: Coherence in Environmental Assessment Practical Guidance on Environmental Assessment for Development Co-operation Projects, May 1996).
[iii] Source: High Level Panel of the Trans-Atlantic Environmental Dialogue, Brussels, May 2000.
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