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Open Letter to Veep Al Gore in re New Computer Sta
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Computer underground Digest Sun June 30, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 60
ISSN 1004-042X
Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer ([email protected])
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson
Coptic Idolator: Ephram Shrewdlieu
CONTENTS, #6.60 (Sun, June 30, 1994)
File 1--Open Letter to Veep Al Gore in re New Computer Standard
File 2--PDC'94 CFP-Artifacts session (revised)
File 3--ACM Releases Crypto Study
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 1994 17:12:16 -0500 (CDT)
From: Wade Riddick <[email protected]>
Subject: File 1--Open Letter to Veep Al Gore in re New Computer Standard
An Open Letter To Al Gore,
Vice President of the United States of America
A New Computer Standard: Fixing the Flats on the Information Highway
The U.S. must manage the early adoption of industrywide
standards that render emerging technologies compatible with
each other and speed commercial acceptance. Such standards
make it easier for purchasers to experiment with equipment
embodying new technology and reduce the risk of committing to
a technology that quickly becomes obsolete . . .
In the U.S., technological standards are set with little
regard to such issues. Large companies or government agencies
set de facto standards... Unfortunately, none of these
sources of standards has explicit responsibility for managing
the standards process to best promote a new technology.
- Robert Reich1
One important roadblock often missed by policymakers as they
work to lay the foundations of the information super-highway is the
incompatibility that exists among the operating systems and microchips
that will form the highway's roadbed. When the Clinton Administration
opened the telecommunications industry to competition, its goal was
not to limit consumer choice, but rather to broaden choice by
weakening narrow, monopolistic controls over technology and allowing
small private companies to move technology in many different
directions.
None of this will be possible without a common standard to allow
these diverse innovations to interact. Just as the national economy
needs a common currency and a common language in which to conduct
business, so too does the information superhighway need a standard
through which its components can interact. Since the development of
the U.S. Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network (ARPANET) in the 1960s, the federal government has done an
admirable job establishing network protocols, which are rules needed
for seamless long-distance data transmission between computers.
Without such standards, today's international computer network, known
as the Internet, would not exist.
The U.S. government, however, has not done a good job of
standardizing the basic commands needed to operate computers-the
languages, compilers, operating systems and other instructions
governing the microprocessor (the central processing unit, or CPU,
that is a computer's "brain"). These forms of programming
instructions are the most valuable types of electronic data because
they tell computers how to handle information. If an application
(program) can be transmitted between two different computers but
cannot run on both machines-the current norm in the industry-the
application's value is limited.
Companies like Apple, IBM, Microsoft, Intel and Novell have
little incentive to create truly open or common standards for
operating systems or microchip instructions because each company in
one way or another competes successfully on the basis of differences
in its products. Proprietary standards (where all rights to the
standard are retained by one firm) are one way these companies can
protect their research and development (R&D) costs from reengineering
by competing firms.2
The Problem
Just as the mercantilist nations of the last century forced
their currency on their colonies and used tariff barriers to
discourage trade with other powers, computer makers in the twentieth
century have set standards governing the internal commerce of their
products to the detriment of the competition.3 In the same way that
19th-century Britain bucked the mercantilist trend, maintained a free
trading regime, and lost ground to "freeloading" traders as a result,
IBM defined an open PC standard and bore the costs of maintaining it
while clone makers got a free ride. With no need for heavy R&D
expenses, these companies could undercut IBM prices by a significant
margin.
In the past, proprietary standards have acted as unfair exchange
standards, making it unnecessarily expensive for consumers to move
their investments in data-and particularly software-around from one
platform (operating system) to another. This deters investment, just
as the asset-trapping nature of a command economy or non-convertible
currency was for many years a substantial deterrent to foreign
investment in Eastern Europe.
Consumers have started demanding more compatibility between
systems, but companies have been slow to react. As _The Economist_
put it, "every firm wants a monopoly-and every firm wants to call
it an open standard."4 Recently, corporations have begun
establishing interfirm alliances to allow their systems to support
"multiple personalities" (multiple operating systems). Future IBM
computers will be able to run Mac software, while Apple's new Power PC
will run Windows and OS/2, thanks to the use of translation and
emulation software.5
John Sculley-the ex-CEO of Apple-points out in _Defying Gravity_
that computer designs can no longer be based just on the engineers'
experience of using the system. No one company has the business
expertise to design an entire system in a world where more diverse
products have to be brought to market faster than ever. That speed
requires higher levels of coordination, cooperation and
standardization between companies. The current proliferation of
cross-licensing agreements falls short of a universal standard. The
incentive to sell incompatible platforms is still there; companies
have just decided to rely on translation software that they make,
called microkernels, instead of full-blown operating systems for their
profits. They have failed to break up the operating system into
individual components that can be built by different companies
according to comparative (instead of historical) advantage.
Someday, as happened with railroads and automobiles, a standard
for interchangeable software parts will emerge, either through
government intervention or the natural evolution of a monopoly out of
the market.6 This monopoly will, however, require government
regulation at some point to prevent abuse, as was necessary with the
railroad and telephone empires.
It is often forgotten why, how, and at what cost the national
railroads were unified. According to John Browning, "like
railroads, new information networks are increasingly being built in
large, monolithic chunks, starting from the long distance links and
working down to the local one."7 Long distance links were the last
part of the national rail system to be built, because it took an
immense effort to integrate incompatible regional networks-
particularly in the South where there were only spur lines.8 In fact,
railroads, highways and even computers9 to a certain extent have been
built up regionally with government stimulus and later coordinated
through national structures. Regional and local monopolies had to be
granted so that proposed standards would be self-enforcing, since
where there is incentive to compete, there is incentive to deviate
from the standard and affect the distribution of market share.
Railroads were easy to standardize because the tracks were
originally built with iron rails that wore out quickly. Tracks had to
be rebuilt often, so it was not difficult-given adequate financial
incentive-to rebuild the gauges to a particular width.10 The advent
of steel, because of its durability, might actually have threatened
this standardization. Fortunately, just as steel was replacing iron
in the 1870s and '80s, local railroad companies came together in
regional alliances to standardize gauges and policies for
transcontinental shipping, ending decades of chaos in the industry.
These alliances greatly reduced costs to the consumer and spurred
investment in new railroad technology.
Some railroad companies concerned with standardization feared
the emergence of a monopoly and tried to preserve their independence
by confederating. They borrowed from the American federalist model of
government to create their own tripartite government with a
legislative assembly, executive branch, and judiciary for settling
disputes. This structure balanced competing regional interests
against one another and produced an efficient, egalitarian, state-of-
the-art continental transportation system.11 Since the governing
convention created by these small cartels did not include all rail
companies, nor address all of the public interest, it collapsed when
Jay Gould and others began forming large conglomerates. New,
antidemocratic giants emerged, which Congress then stepped in to
regulate.
Either through market evolution or government intervention, such
a standardization of CPUs and operating systems is inevitable.
According to _The Economist_, the computer industry is rapidly
becoming "a commodity business"12 with all the accompanying industry-
wide conventions. This is occurring in an industry producing goods
with the highest intellectual property content in history (hardly
characteristic of most commodities).
It is possible for government to move in now, avoid further
costs of incompatibility and establish a forward-looking, flexible
standard that will preclude the development of a monopoly and will
reshape the way value is created in the software industry. In the
process, the hyper-competitive aspects of the computer industry that
have served society so well could be preserved. As the National
Performance Review prescribes, government can set clear goals and act
as a catalyst while allowing private actors to move the ball down the
field.
Because of the peculiar nature of information, such a standard
need not be autocratic, nor would setting one be risky. The Japanese
and European efforts to set High-Definition Television (HDTV)
standards flopped because they locked industry into analog hardware
before superior digital technology was ready. Immature technologies
have never been successfully pushed on society. The software industry
has almost the opposite problem-not so much inventing the wheel or
prematurely setting it in stone as constantly having to reinvent it
(in order to operate applications under different systems).13
A computer's instructions are vastly different than the regular
objects that come to mind when standards are discussed. The
instructions CPUs use are virtual; they are not materially dependent
on any particular piece of hardware. As symbols, they can always grow
and be reinterpreted, unlike manufactured products such as metal pipe,
whose dimensions cannot be changed once cast. Corporate planners,
long resistant to the adoption of a standardizing framework, are
beginning to see the adaptability of computer code as an advantage
upon which a new standard could be based. As the senior technical
editor of *BYTE* put it, "the battle is no longer about whether to
layer object-oriented services and emulation systems . . . on a small
kernel . . . nor whether to build an operating system in this style
but how to do the job right."14 The remaining problem is one of
coordination between corporations in getting these new systems to work
together.
The Solution
The essential features of such a system are easily described.
The system could be called DNA, after its biological counterpart which
binds all organic matter into the same competitive framework. While
object orientation15-the way in which commonly used types of data are
paired with the instructions needed to manipulate that data-makes data
transportable and software highly extensible *within* a platform, DNA
would make that operating system and processor object oriented so that
both data *and* software would be transportable across platforms. In
other words, when a processor receives a standard DNA message telling
it to do something like add two numbers or draw a line, it will have a
library available to translate the instruction into the host language
of that particular processor.
Under this system, it would be up to the CPU's manufacturer to
supply the most basic translation libraries, but other firms could
supply add-ons or extensions for functions too complex for the CPU to
execute. This way, market competition could be used to set standards
for new forms of data, instead of having the government mandate
standards for immature technologies. A company marketing a product
which uses a completely novel form of data-say a device for producing
certain odors16-would have an opportunity to create its own standard
for data by marketing a new extension for the DNA system. A
competitor might also market a similar plug-in, and both companies
could compete to gain supporters for their mini-standard. In the end,
the best solution would likely win out. Companies would not have to
worry about maintaining compatibility with an existing base because no
previous software could produce odors.
The uniform interface of DNA would allow individual firms to use
their expertise to replace inefficient system components easily,
thereby broadening the market for their products. If DNA contained a
standard driver for reading keyboard input, for example, and someone
wanted to market a new voice recognition device that would be
compatible with past software, that company could make a substitute
for the keyboard interface that instead uses the firm's voice
recognition hardware. DNA would increase the marketability of the
voice recognition device, because customers could buy the physical
device without having to upgrade their entire software library.
According to *The Economist*, "today all firms need a niche"17
in the computer market-and universal standards can provide the
necessary framework. DNA would not pick winners, but would instead
make it easier for winners to emerge. Systems would be built
component by component on the basis of efficiency, rather than through
political or alliance considerations.
Much DNA code may have to be interpreted on each platform, but
with a common object code standard each platform would be able to do
this in the most efficient manner. If this standard's basic design is
flawed or technology passes it by (since technology moves faster than
anyone's capacity to plan ahead), certain instructions could be
reserved in advance to switch to a completely new, but as yet
unspecified standard.
In the past, companies have objected to the slight performance
degradation caused by interpretation. The Macintosh has been
successful precisely because of the huge "toolbox"18 of standard
commands it makes available to applications. Because programs "call"
these functions in the system, instead of in the application itself,
Apple has managed to reduce program size and smoothly maintain the
system's evolutionary growth path.
Apple's new PowerPC is the first example of a "multiple
personality" PC capable of running under more than one operating
system. The PowerPC uses a new platform and microprocessor, the 601.
To run the old software, which is written for a 68000 microprocessor,
the PowerPC interprets and translates that code to the 601.
Reinterpreting the old 68000 instructions slows things down, but by
rewriting the toolbox to run on the faster new 601, Apple makes up for
that loss. Users see no performance degradation with old software and
see tremendous gains with new software. Most of Apple's competitors
are planning similar interpretation schemes for their new systems.
Since an open standard requires some sort of monopolistic
power, it is clear that if DNA is implemented, companies will no
longer profit from the creation of monolithic operating systems. The
way value is created in the software and hardware industries would be
radically altered under DNA, as shown in Figure 1, but who wants to
make money reinventing the wheel? Real money is made on the cutting
edges of technology, and this technological advancement should
continue to be driven by the free market.
U.S. policymakers must think seriously now about how to keep
American industries globally competitive for the next fifty years. By
2040, no software power will make money reinventing the wheel. In a
world where microprocessor architectures are proliferating instead of
unifying and where technical progress is speeding up in all areas of
science, a DNA-type standard is needed, if for no other reason than to
coordinate the diffusion of technical expertise. Only by making new
technology generic, so that a user can plug it in and go, will the
learning curve needed to use new technologies efficiently be
conquered.
Technology transfer needs to become more automatic. Many
writers, James Dearing among them, have thought of technology transfer
as a "difference-reduction"19 problem-one of trying to get users and
inventors to share the same knowledge about an invention so that the
person in the field knows how to apply it as well as the inventor. In
fact, really useful technology gets put to uses never dreamed of by
its inventors. The problem is how to insulate the information needed
to use new technology from the knowledge of how it works-which
confuses most consumers.
The historical trend in U.S. technological development is clear;
either government or industry will eventually take steps to stop this
continual rebuilding of operating systems from the ground up. The
real issue to be decided in the telecommunications debate is not over
who owns the virtual asphalt or builds the on-ramps. The question is
who will own the resulting computer standard governing the packaging
of information. Any firm which wins control will have a power not
unlike the government's ability to print money: the firm will control
the currency of day-to-day electronic transactions. This fact is
becoming increasingly apparent and important to policymakers.
According to Admiral Bobby Inman and Daniel Burton, "arcane topics
like technical standards . . . that once were viewed as the
responsibility of obscure bureaucrats will increasingly engage public
officials at the highest levels."20
There is already a consensus in the industry as to what features
computers will incorporate in the next decade. It is also clear that
some sort of standard for object code will emerge as well.
Government, though, has several options for the role it can play in
this process: (1) the Commerce Department, perhaps with some
authorizing legislation, could call industry heads together and order
them to set a common object code standard; (2) Commerce could accept
bids from various companies and groups for such a standard; or (3)
finally, the federal government could itself craft a standard with the
help of qualified but disinterested engineers, and then try to force
it upon the industry through the use of government procurement rules,
control over the flow of research and development money or other
economic levers. The recent victory of Microsoft in its case against
Stac Electronics over protecting its operating system indicates that
some reform of the intellectual property laws may be needed as well.
Given the acrimony in the current debate over the definition of
a much-needed encryption (data security) standard, it is difficult to
identify the most politically feasible path for policymakers to follow
in developing common object code standards. There is enough of a
consensus in the industry and among users now to begin the search for
a solution. A serious effort should also be made to reach a consensus
with other industrialized nations, for computers are globally
interconnected to a degree that no other mass consumer product has
been.
Government can prevent a monopoly if it moves now. The unique
nature of information technology would allow a common standard to
develop without locking the industry into risky, immature technologies
and would accelerate rather than hinder innovation. According to
Nicholas Negroponte, director of MIT's Media Lab, "an open systems
approach is likely to foster the most creative energies for new
services and be a vehicle for the most rapid change and evolution."21
Such an approach would simply provide a stable framework within
which businesses could compete on the basis of their expertise and not
on their historical advantage. This is what America's founding
fathers designed federalism to do from the start: balance competing
sectoral and regional interests against one another to spur
competition and development for the benefit of all.
By Wade Riddick
Author Biography
Wade Riddick is a graduate student and National Science Foundation
Fellow in the Department of Government at the University of Texas. He
received his B.A. in English from Louisiana State University. He can
be reached at [email protected].
Figure 1
Traditional
Microsoft Windows -> Disk / Screen / Memory / Audio / ... -> User
IBM OS/2 -> Disk / Screen / Memory / Audio / ... -> User
Apple Macintosh -> Disk / Screen / Memory / Audio / ... -> User
Currently users have to pick one complete operating system to run.
__________________________________________________________________
New Systems
- Microsoft Windows
/
Microsoft Windows NT -> kernel -- IBM OS/2 - User
\
- Apple Macintosh
- Microsoft Windows
/
Apple/IBM PowerPC -> kernel -- IBM OS/2 -> User
\
- Apple Macintosh
In systems being introduced this year, users have to pick one
company's kernel and then another company's operating system(s).
___________________________________________________________________
DNA Common Standard
Microsoft Apple IBM
( ( )
) ) (
Disk + Screen + Memory + ..... -> User
Under DNA, no one company will make *the* operating system.
___________________________________________________________________
Notes
1 Robert Reich, "The Quiet Path to Technological Preeminence,"
*Scientific American*, vol. 261, no. 4, (October, 1989), p. 45.
2 There are many different ways to accomplish the same task.
Reengineering allows one firm to copy the functionality of another
firm's design without exactly copying the design itself and infringing
on the patent. If a plumber could not find 1" aluminum pipes at the
hardware store, but had the proper connectors, he might instead use 2"
pipes; this is essentially what computer engineers do.
Most successful companies do not mind that others clone their
products, because the technological frontier expands so quickly. One
generation of chips may have a heyday of only two years. After that,
a better chip appears that can do what the old one does and much more.
Intel, for example, makes its money on the cutting edge of technology
by selling new chips like the Pentium (i.e., P5) and does not mind
that Advanced Micro Devices sells a clone of the older (P4) chip.
Since it is Intel's chip family, users trust only Intel to release the
next generation standard. If AMD tried to release a P6 first, no one
would buy it because it might not be compatible with the P6 Intel
releases.
3 Computer instructions can be thought of as forms of money
because they control specific system resources. Just as societies
accept the convention that a piece of paper with symbols has monetary
value and can be exchanged for something tangible like a candy bar,
computer makers decide that certain numbered instructions mean certain
things and perform certain physical tasks on the computer. Operating
systems are like political regimes because they set the rules for
using resources and determine what types of money are permissible.
Just as businesses in America will not take British pound notes
because different symbols are printed on the bill, incompatible
computers do not recognize each other's basic commands because
different numbers code for different instructions-even though all
computers can perform the same logical tasks. Unlike nations, though,
assets cannot be moved across computer families because no convention
for exchanging currencies exists.
4 "The Computer Industry: Do It My Way," *The Economist*, vol.
326, no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 11.
5 For a detailed description of this technology, see *BYTE*'s
January 1994 issue.
6 The most likely stimulus for a desktop PC standard will come
from interactive TV manufacturers whose profits are not made selling
operating systems but rather set-top boxes.
7 "Get on Track: There Will Be No Info Highway," *Wired
Magazine*, vol. 2, no. 2, (February, 1994), p. 65.
8 *The Economist* compared the development of the information
superhighway to the "the railway free-for-all of the 19th century."
See "America's Information Highway," *The Economist*, vol. 329, no.
7843, (December 25, 1993), p. 35.
9 If one thinks of the fragmentation as sectoral instead of
regional (e.g., IBM mainframes in banking, Macintoshes in publishing
and so on).
10 Companies used non-standard widths to force customers to use
their railcars and prevent them from riding through their network
without paying. The cost to efficiency was high, because
transcontinental cargo had to be loaded and unloaded several times.
11 For an account of this standardization process see Alfred
Chandler's *The Visible Hand* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1977), esp. pp. 130-142. Because these small firms had
monopolies in their local markets, they had an interest in adhering to
and maintaining rail gauge and coupler standards. In essence, they
created one big monopoly, but one whose ownership and profits were
evenly distributed across the countryside.
12 "The Computer Industry: Reboot System and Start Again," *The
Economist*, vol. 326, no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 4.
13 Object-oriented programming seeks to solve part of this
problem by permitting code reuse on particular platforms, but it has
no standard and does not address the problem of microprocessor Babel,
so objects cannot easily work across platforms.
14 John Udell, "The Great OS Debate," *BYTE*, vol. 19, no. 1,
(January, 1994), p. 117.
15 Objects are ways of pairing commonly used types ("classes") of
data with the instructions needed to manipulate them ("methods").
Programs then perform their tasks by creating or using existing
objects and sending "messages" to the objects to tell them what to do.
For instance, a line object might hold two values and a program could
send it messages creating a new line, changing its location, or
deleting it.
This approach cuts down on redundant code. The programs that
draw lines can share the same line object. Small objects can be
easily combined into more complex systems. A square could be a
combination of four lines. When a program sends a "create" message to
the square, the square sends four "create" messages to the line
object.
16 Presumably for virtual reality or pharmaceutical research.
17 "The Computer Industry: Harsh New World," *The Economist*,
vol. 326, no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 7.
18 Toolboxes are large sets of functions provided by the
operating system to applications. On the Mac, for instance, the
toolbox draws windows and plays sounds. Programmers do not need to
write their own code to do these things because they are provided by
the system. Since all programs use these standard services,
applications can be written faster and appear the same to users, so
the learning curve for using Mac programs is much shorter.
Other companies have adopted this approach and now provide
extensive services through what they call an API (Application Program
Interface).
19 James Dearing, "Rethinking Technology Transfer,"
*International Journal of Technology Management*, vol. 8, pp. 1-8.
20 Bobby Inman and Ray Burton, "Technology and Competitiveness,"
*Scientific American*, vol. 269, no. 1 (January 1991), p. 126.
21 Nicholas Negroponte, "Set-Top Box As Electronic Toll Booth:
Why We Need Open-Architecture TV," *Wired*, vol. 1, no. 4 (Sept/Oct,
1993), p. 120.
1 Robert Reich, The Quiet Path to Technological Preeminence,
Scientific American, vol. 261, no. 4, (October, 1989), p. 45.
2 There are many different ways to accomplish the same task.
Reengineering allows one firm to copy the functionality of another
firm's design without exactly copying the design itself and infringing
on the patent. If a plumber could not find 1" aluminum pipes at the
hardware store, but had the proper connectors, he might instead use 2"
pipes; this is essentially what computer engineers do.
Most successful companies do not mind that others clone their
products, because the technological frontier expands so quickly. One
generation of chips may have a heyday of only two years. After that,
a better chip appears that can do what the old one does and much more.
Intel, for example, makes its money on the cutting edge of technology
by selling new chips like the Pentium (i.e., P5) and does not mind
that Advanced Micro Devices sells a clone of the older (P4) chip.
Since it is Intel's chip family, users trust only Intel to release the
next generation standard. If AMD tried to release a P6 first, no one
would buy it because it might not be compatible with the P6 Intel
releases.
3 Computer instructions can be thought of as forms of money
because they control specific system resources. Just as societies
accept the convention that a piece of paper with symbols has monetary
value and can be exchanged for something tangible like a candy bar,
computer makers decide that certain numbered instructions mean certain
things and perform certain physical tasks on the computer. Operating
systems are like political regimes because they set the rules for
using resources and determine what types of money are permissible.
Just as businesses in America will not take British pound notes
because different symbols are printed on the bill, incompatible
computers do not recognize each other's basic commands because
different numbers code for different instructions even though all
computers can perform the same logical tasks. Unlike nations, though,
assets cannot be moved across computer families because no convention
for exchanging currencies exists.
4 The Computer Industry: Do It My Way, The Economist, vol. 326,
no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 11.
5 For a detailed description of this technology, see BYTE's
January 1994 issue.
6 The most likely stimulus for a desktop PC standard will come
from interactive TV manufacturers whose profits are not made selling
operating systems but rather set-top boxes.
7 Get on Track: There Will Be No Info Highway, Wired, vol. 2,
no. 2, (February, 1994), p. 65.
8 The Economist compared the development of the information
superhighway to the the railway free-for-all of the 19th century.
See America's Information Highway, The Economist, vol. 329, no.
7843, (December 25, 1993), p. 35.
9 If one thinks of the fragmentation as sectoral instead of
regional (e.g., IBM mainframes in banking, Macintoshes in publishing
and so on).
10 Companies used non-standard widths to force customers to use
their railcars and prevent them from riding through their network
without paying. The cost to efficiency was high, because
transcontinental cargo had to be loaded and unloaded several times.
11 For an account of this standardization process see Alfred
Chandler's The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1977), esp. pp. 130-142. Because these small firms had
monopolies in their local markets, they had an interest in adhering to
and maintaining rail gauge and coupler standards. In essence, they
created one big monopoly, but one whose ownership and profits were
evenly distributed across the countryside.
12 The Computer Industry: Reboot System and Start Again, The
Economist, vol. 326, no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 4.
13 Object-oriented programming seeks to solve part of this problem
by permitting code reuse on particular platforms, but it has no
standard and does not address the problem of microprocessor Babel, so
objects cannot easily work across platforms.
14 John Udell, The Great OS Debate, BYTE, vol. 19, no. 1,
(January, 1994), p. 117.
15 Objects are ways of pairing commonly used types (classes) of
data with the instructions needed to manipulate them (methods).
Programs then perform their tasks by creating or using existing
objects and sending messages to the objects to tell them what to do.
For instance, a line object might hold two values and a program could
send it messages creating a new line, changing its location, or
deleting it.
This approach cuts down on redundant code. The programs that
draw lines can share the same line object. Small objects can be
easily combined into more complex systems. A square could be a
combination of four lines. When a program sends a create message to
the square, the square sends four create messages to the line
object.
16 Presumably for virtual reality or pharmaceutical research.
17 The Computer Industry: Harsh New World, The Economist, vol.
326, no. 7800, (February 27th, 1993), p. 7.
18 Toolboxes are large sets of functions provided by the operating
system to applications. On the Mac, for instance, the toolbox draws
windows and plays sounds. Programmers do not need to write their own
code to do these things because they are provided by the system.
Since all programs use these standard services, applications can be
written faster and appear the same to users, so the learning curve for
using Mac programs is much shorter.
Other companies have adopted this approach and now provide
extensive services through what they call an API (Application Program
Interface).
19 James Dearing, Rethinking Technology Transfer, International
Journal of Technology Management, vol. 8, pp. 1-8.
20 Bobby Inman and Ray Burton, Technology and Competitiveness,
Scientific American, vol. 269, no. 1 (January 1991), p. 126.
21 Nicholas Negroponte, Set-Top Box As Electronic Toll Booth: Why
We Need Open-Architecture TV, Wired, vol. 1, no. 4 (Sept/Oct, 1993),
p. 120.
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 1994 15:41:54 -0700
From: email list server <[email protected]>
Subject: File 2--PDC'94 CFP-Artifacts session (revised)
==================================================================
CALL FOR PARTICIPATION-Artifacts session
PDC'94
Third Biennial Conference on Participatory Design
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
October 27-28, 1994
Sponsored by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
==================================================================
In the last few years, participatory approaches to design have gained
adherents around the world. Participatory design approaches have at
their core the involvement of workers in the design and development of
new technologies and work practices that have the potential of
improving their work lives. Collaborative design projects combine the
skills and knowledge of workers who will use or are using the
technology, with the technological and organizational expertise of
those involved in its development.
The first Participatory Design conference explored the historical roots
of this way of working, by bringing European practitioners together
with American researchers and industry developers. By the second
conference, PDC'92, participatory approaches to design had taken root
in the US, not only in research environments, but also at several
commercial firms. The goal at that time was to take a further step
towards defining and nurturing participatory design. In PDC `94, we
would like both to consider our ways of working and to foster a
substantial dialog among practitioners. The conference is an
international forum where this emerging community can meet, exchange
ideas and experiences, and investigate the incorporation of
participatory design approaches in new areas such as: product
development, long-term system maintenance and redesign, and settings in
the developing world.
We encourage the participation of all those interested in learning
about participatory design and in trying it in their own settings, as
well as those currently employing participatory approaches to design
(possibly under other names).
==================================================================
Artifacts submissions
(including posters and demonstrations)
The Artifacts program brings together representations, techniques,
methodologies and technologies developed for or through participatory
design. (A representation may take the form of documents and other
objects that reflect work practices, designs, and associated materials,
and should include both the artifact itself and how it is used in the
work situation.)
A contribution to the Artifacts program should be intended to be shown
or demonstrated informally at a booth. The Artifacts program will take
place in conjunction with the conference dinner and thus will not
overlap with the papers/panels/workshops tracks.
Submission Requirements:
Description and motivation of the artifact and how it is used in
practice (5 copies, maximum 3 pages). Include non-textual materials
like photographs, videotapes, sketches, etc., if appropriate (only one
copy of a videotape is required, and photographs may be provided in
photocopied form). Be sure to describe any plans to engage conference
participants directly in using the artifact.
Each accepted artifact will be represented by a one-page, published
short paper in the PDC'94 Proceedings. Please contact Michael Muller
at the addresses given below to obtain a copy of the author's kit or
consult the format/guidelines available through cpsr.org. The
one-page short paper MUST be received in camera-ready format as
part of the submission, due 15 July 1994.
Brief description of artifact presenter's relevant experience and
background.
Any special equipment or power requirements.
Submissions and requests for information to: Michael Muller, PDC'94
Artifacts Co-Chair U S WEST Advanced Technologies
4001 Discovery Drive / Suite 280
Boulder CO 80303 USA
tel: +1 303 541 6564
fax: +1 303 541 6003
email: [email protected]
==================================================================
IMPORTANT DATES (in 1994)
July 15: Artifacts proposals received
August 1: Final versions of papers/panels/workshops received for
proceedings
August 15: Acceptance notifications to artifact presenters
==================================================================
Accepted submissions and proposals from all categories will appear in a
proceedings distributed to conference participants. We look forward to
seeing you in North Carolina in the Fall of 1994.
Sincerely,
PDC '94 Conference Committee
Bill Anderson Conference Chair
Susan Suchman & David Bellin Local Co-chairs
Susan Irwin Anderson & Randall Trigg Program Co-chairs
Andrew Clement Panels Chair
Finn Kensing Workshops Chair
Annette Adler & Michael Muller Artifacts Co-chairs
Elizabeth Erickson Proceedings Chair
Erran Carmel Treasurer
Barbara Katzenberg & Peter Piela Publicity Co-chairs
=================================================================
PDC '94 Program Committee
Annette Adler (Artifacts Co-Chair), Xerox Corporate Architecture
Susan Irwin Anderson (Program Co-Chair)
Susanne Bodker, Aarhus University
Tone Bratteteig, University of Oslo, Norway
Andrew Clement (Panels Chair), University of Toronto
Yrjo Engestrom, University of California, San Diego
Christiane Floyd, University of Hamburg
Joan Greenbaum, LaGuardia College, City University of New York
Judith Gregory, University of California, San Diego
Kaj Gronbaek, Aarhus University, Denmark
Jonathan Grudin, University of California, Irvine
Mike Hales, University of Brighton, United Kingdom
Karen Holtzblatt, InContext Enterprises
Finn Kensing (Workshops Chair), Roskilde University Center, Denmark
Sarah Kuhn, University of Massachusetts, Lowell
Michael Muller (Artifacts Co-Chair), US West Advanced Technologies
Charley Richardson, University of Massachusetts, Lowell
Patricia Sachs, NYNEX Science and Technology
Randall Trigg (Program Co-Chair), Xerox Palo Alto Research Center
Eline Vedel, The National Bank of Norway
Ina Wagner, Technical University, Vienna
Terry Winograd, Stanford University / Interval Research
==================================================================
For registration information write c/o Information Foundation, 46
Oakwood Dr., Chapel Hill, NC, 27514 or send electronic mail to
[email protected].
For program information write William L. Anderson, Xerox Corp. 817-
02B, 295 Woodcliff Drive Fairport, NY 14450 USA
email:[email protected] tel: (716)-383-7983
==================================================================
Conference information is also available via the World Wide Web at
http://cpsr.org/cpsr/conferences/pdc94 or via anonymous ftp at
ftp.cpsr.org in the /cpsr/conferences/pdc94 directory.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 30 Jun 1994 16:34:47 +0000
From: "US ACM, DC Office" <[email protected]>
Subject: File 3--ACM Releases Crypto Study
Association for Computing Machinery
PRESS RELEASE
__________________________________________________
Thursday, June 30, 1994
Contact:
Joseph DeBlasi, ACM Executive Director (212) 869-7440
Dr. Stephen Kent, Panel Chair (617) 873-3988
Dr. Susan Landau, Panel Staff (413) 545-0263
COMPUTING SOCIETY RELEASES REPORT ON ENCRYPTION POLICY
"CLIPPER CHIP" CONTROVERSY EXPLORED BY EXPERT PANEL
WASHINGTON, DC - A panel of experts convened by the nation's
foremost computing society today released a comprehensive report
on U.S. cryptography policy. The report, "Codes, Keys and
Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy," is the culmination of a
ten-month review conducted by the panel of representatives of the
computer industry and academia, government officials, and
attorneys. The 50-page document explores the complex technical
and social issues underlying the current debate over the Clipper
Chip and the export control of information security technology.
"With the development of the information superhighway,
cryptography has become a hotly debated policy issue," according
to Joseph DeBlasi, Executive Director of the Association for
Computing Machinery (ACM), which convened the expert panel. "The
ACM believes that this report is a significant contribution to the
ongoing debate on the Clipper Chip and encryption policy. It cuts
through the rhetoric and lays out the facts."
Dr. Stephen Kent, Chief Scientist for Security Technology
with the firm of Bolt Beranek and Newman, said that he was
pleased with the final report. "It provides a very balanced
discussion of many of the issues that surround the debate on
crypto policy, and we hope that it will serve as a foundation for
further public debate on this topic."
The ACM report addresses the competing interests of the
various stakeholders in the encryption debate -- law
enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, industry and
users of communications services. It reviews the recent history
of U.S. cryptography policy and identifies key questions that
policymakers must resolve as they grapple with this controversial
issue.
The ACM cryptography panel was chaired by Dr. Stephen Kent.
Dr. Susan Landau, Research Associate Professor in Computer Science
at the University of Massachusetts, co-ordinated the work of the
panel and did most of the writing. Other panel members were Dr.
Clinton Brooks, Advisor to the Director, National Security Agency;
Scott Charney, Chief of the Computer Crime Unit, Criminal
Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Dr. Dorothy Denning,
Computer Science Chair, Georgetown University; Dr. Whitfield
Diffie, Distinguished Engineer, Sun Microsystems; Dr. Anthony
Lauck, Corporate Consulting Engineer, Digital Equipment
Corporation; Douglas Miller, Government Affairs Manager, Software
Publishers Association; Dr. Peter Neumann, Principal Scientist,
SRI International; and David Sobel, Legal Counsel, Electronic
Privacy Information Center. Funding for the cryptography study
was provided in part by the National Science Foundation.
The ACM, founded in 1947, is a 85,000 member non-profit
educational and scientific society dedicated to the development
and use of information technology, and to addressing the impact of
that technology on the world's major social challenges. For
general information, contact ACM, 1515 Broadway, New York, NY
10036. (212) 869-7440 (tel), (212) 869-0481 (fax).
Information on accessing the report electronically will be
posted soon in this newsgroup.
------------------------------
------------------------------
End of Computer Underground Digest #6.60
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