PS Sadie:
I encourage you to think about that statement in further detail... Pascal's (yes, this statement is a paraphrase on one made centuries ago by a French mathematician) argument is only so effective as one's assumption of what is "better."
It can be quickly torn apart when one considers that others might not think it "better" to have disbelieved and turned out wrong. Perhaps to some people this is actually better than its opposite: believing and being right.
It actually implies a fair amount of luck. One wagers that God will honor belief, without knowing that he actually will, in contradistinction to those who wager the opposite... What if one didn't want to "play dice" with one's soul, even if it meant forsaking the benefits of doing otherwise?
What if one couldn't respect a God who only honored those lucky individuals to have "placed the right bets"?
With that in mind, Pascal's argument is easily proved false because it implies assumptions about The Good that aren't necessarily true.
I mean, Plato spends so much time trying to define "the good"--I don't see how Pascal can just skip over it in a heartbeat, thinking it already perfectly clear!
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