About
Community
Bad Ideas
Drugs
Ego
Erotica
Fringe
Society
Technology
Hack
Phreak
Broadcast Technology
Computer Technology
Cryptography
Science & Technology
Space, Astronomy, NASA
Telecommunications
The Internet: Technology of Freedom
Viruses
register | bbs | search | rss | faq | about
meet up | add to del.icio.us | digg it

Text about death of Rocket Science in US - hints a

Rocket Scientists -- A Dead or Dying Breed for the USAF:
and a plan for the future

The Rocket Propulsion Directorate of Phillips Laboratories USAF was initially established in the 19s as the Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory (AFRPL). The location in the California Desert at dads Air Force Base was ideal for a collection of remote test stands. Here experimental tests coul ad id explode safely. The facility did not serve as a classical laboratory; the main function wasto e aremote test site.

Test Site History

A major initial facility use was as a test firing station for the F1 rocket engines used on Apollo ghts. Rocketdyne, Canoga Park, CA made the engines and sent them to AFRPL for testing. Each F1 roce ngine had to fire flawlessly several times at AFRPL before being certified. Thousands of workrswee involved. Rusting large test stands dot the hills today.

Located nearby in both El Segundo (130 miles) and San Bernadino (80 miles) CA were the space and mile arms of the USAF Space And Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO). These were the centers wher h AFRPL could integrate seamlessly into the highest levels of planning for USAF space and missile. newould have expected the AFRPL to have played a strong role in the Air Force Space and Missilesproram.

There was surprisingly little interaction between SAMSO and AFRPL. The Aerospace Corporation, an onte Federally Funded Contract Research Center (FFCRC) provided most of the rocket and missile experieto the USAF/SAMSO. The AFRPL played little role for many years in the mainstream of the USAF. Itwa minly a test center in the remote desert.

The mentality of the AFRPL organization was always very much "hands on". The ordinary slow, logicalinking laboratory mentality was discouraged for "doing something" instead of thinking about it or nlzing it. The urgent- hurry up test stand mentality prevailed.

The laboratory suffered the post Apollo decline in moneys and staff common to the Aerospace indust The decline was injurious to the quality of people surviving.

In the 1970's, survivors say, the intellectual attitude was nearly pure hell. The AFRPL was run by onels as if it was a training facility in contract management for USAF officers. There are few goo tries about that management attitude. In one of the budget cuts, engineering staff actually serve trn doing building and grounds types of work to survive.

In the 1970's, a few individuals in the AFRPL organization are reported to have conceived the MX mile (renamed Peacekeeper). MX was to compete in the cold war missile threat race. Later, the lab bce the approach and obtained considerable credit for it.

Intellectual and Engineering Decline

During the draw down, the analytical thinking people were slashed to the bone; there was the idea t they needed to be only "one deep" in any technical area. Actually, being only "one deep" is a guaate that you will actually accomplish almost nothing. This is indicates not knowing how to do desgnan design studies _ not knowing real propulsion engineering. The mentality of the "Rocket Scientst"as n intellectual never caught on at AFRPL. Instead it was the guy who blew things up in the prcessof mking something work who was the hero. It was the test stand mentality. There was a strong nti- ntellctual bias to the laboratory that has permeated the highest levels (survivors) of today.
As time passed, the lab dropped in size and the staff generally aged. The culture of desert isolatiwas perpetuated and remains today.

Space Defense Initiative _ Ruination of Organization

In the 80's, the Space Defense Initiative (SDI) arrived upon the scene. A former division chief sta that he had felt that he would never rue the day that money was given to the lab. Then he stated htthe SDI money and organization destroyed the laboratory organization. SDI had its choice of peope ndwas alleged to have pulled the best out of any organization that it could. This left impoverihedorgnizations to conduct the traditional business of the lab.

Ineffective Training of New Young Generation

In the late 80's to early 90's, new staffing occurred as senior experienced people were retiring. Te was only small transmission of skills between the senior staff and the new green staff. The new tf have no effective source of training in the history of rocketry and associated technologies. Thy ftn attempt to reinvent things at great taxpayer cost with little success. Rocketry no longer atracs te best and the brightest. The lab has tried to run in-house programs of research and developent o tech (the next generation of "Rocket Scientists") the craft. In general these training effots ar simpe failures. The cost of these failed in-house training programs, including salary and oerhead is pehaps $5 million / year for a total of at least $20 million.

It is alleged that part of the reason for failure is that the senior staff don't share their experie and craft. It is also alleged that another reason is that many of the senior staff actually havefwskills to transmit; there was no history of the AFRPL as a real laboratory. It mostly served asa onracts management center. One talks of a "bimodal age distribution" where people are either senor r vry junior with almost no middle ground.

For the last five years, there has been a program "High Energy Density Materials" for fuels for thext generation of launch vehicles and missiles. Many of the scientists working on the program feel htit will never work _ that the ideas are impractical without any chance of reality. Senior lab angeent are alleged to agree but state that the work should go on because "It has a goal and it isa canc to publish some good scientific work for the Air Force, which is our job". This task costs erhas $6million / year (contracts, salaries, overhead, capital equipment,...) for $25 million or mre toal.

What is described here is a long term destruction of rocket propulsion skills and failure to retra A waste of money and opportunity exists in trying to train young staff in rocket propulsion skils n addition to this $20 million, there is perhaps $25 million or so in the high energy fuels resarh f dubious value.

What Future Roles Can Be Filled?

There has been much debate of the future of US space launch technologies. USAF General Mooreman isd a Congressional mandated report on the options of reusable rocket propulsion systems e.g. the SigeStage To Orbit (SSTO) and new expendable launch vehicles. Since NASA and the USAF have failed tocopeate for decades, the SSTO effort went to NASA and the expendable launch vehicle work to DoD, hilipsLaboratory.

NASA has problems of organization that inhibit running of large programs. However, NASA has a largtaff, with good education, with some good work experiences and with fairly good laboratories aroun h country. There are allegations of poor management and deep bureaucracy mentality that inhibit biit to conduct a major new project. Nevertheless the technical skills should be present to be assmbld ito a useful team. NASA has not suffered as a rotation tour stop for military career paths; i hasremaned technically oriented.

In the DoD effort, there simply aren't useful skills of adequate depth from which to form a technicteam chartered to develop the next generation of highly advanced expendable launch vehicles. The sno people aren't there. The junior people have virtually no useful technical skills. They have falenino a less productive mode tolerated and encouraged by the senior staff. These young people havepraticlly recreated the "hands on" mentality that prevailed in the 1960's at the laboratory. This entaity hat cannot be exploited for dramatic new rocket propulsion engineering. The mentality is nt modrn da engineering; it is merely engineering by trial and error as in the 1960's rocket test sand sese.

Over the years, the United States has thrown away it's real expertise in rocket propulsion. Today wre paying the price from loss of lead in space launch capabilities. Tomorrow we will continue to pyte price should we staff our "catch up" efforts with relatively inexperienced and untrained youn saf. The best and brightest are not in rocketry today and often are not in science or technology t al.

This situation needs careful attention. It could well be a setup for failure for the DoD side of ttask. The DoD, through Phillips Lab - Propulsion Directorate, is not currently so staffed or capabeo carrying out the task of developing or evaluating new expendable space launch vehicles. There il b continued waste of taxpayer dollars, perhaps great waste, should this occur without experiencd, oldand insightful oversight.

The DoD may attempt to build from this organization the Nation's future in space _ based upon expable launch vehicle technology. The organization seems not capable of such accomplishment. While tewste of money is considerable, we will never have another chance to develop expendable launch vehcls hould this chance fail. The skills simply aren't there. Aerospace rocketry is not a respected arer otion forthe brightest young engineers.

If we do this as a Nation, we must do it in a more logical skills based manner. There must be a ber way. We paid dearly once to develop space launch technology from scratch. We shouldn't pay for ieprienced organizations and staff to try for a second time.

A National Center Approach

These are times which call for termination of an organization and structuring some new concept, espally one modeled after domestic and foreign successes. The French rocket propulsion technology orgnztion is of a different model than that for the US. There are 1) government agencies, 2) companie jinly owned by the French government and industry and 3) industrial companies working in collabortio. Tey are a major threat to both the US rocket launch industry and to the domestic aircraft indstry Thee is a success there which will be valuable to implement in an appropriate domestic fashio.

For years, the US semiconductor industry faced the Asian threat of production takeover. The foreignvantage included a higher percentage of R&D to sales from subsidies from Asian government agencies Te eventual domestic response was forming a joint US government / industry semiconductor procesin rsearch center known as SEMATECH. This has been an effective appropriate domestic response. Itsomwha resenbles the above French approach.

We cannot develop internationally competitive rocket propulsion technologies by the use of the old60's management model of many domestic competing propulsion companies and rich funding sources. Thtaazing time is long dead and over, never to return.

The NASA part of the problem could possibly be solved by massive and strict reorganization, someth like the painful reorganization that IBM has been forced to take. NASA and IBM are both big enoug ht inside of them are the people and resources to be a platform for a future large success. But lckofsize, depth and real existing inner capability force other thinking onto solving the DoD futur spce aunch problem.

There is no logical comparison of NASA and the Phillips Laboratory Rocket Propulsion Directorate _ les and oranges may not be nearly adequate differentiation. The scales, sizes and goals are so difeet that no comparison should be attempted. One solution is to simply give the entire space launch tskto a reorganized NASA, close the DoD facilities and transfer handfuls of productive DoD peopl totheNASA task.

Other alternatives for the DoD space launch efforts include a mimic of the foreign success in rocke and aircraft and a mimic of domestic success in the semiconductor field.

The strongest recommendation for the low cost / low risk / high payoff for space propulsion and traortation is the discontinuation of the existing inadequate DoD effort and organization and replaceetwith a joint industry / government collaboration modeled after something successful such as SEMAEC. We can and should copy the best of the proven foreign accomplishments and the best of proven dmesic uccesses. We should not fool ourselves into bandaging inadequately staffed and trained organzatins. or the DoD, we must reformulate the entire space launch engineering and management approac. We eed t gather the real expertise, which has always been with the industry.

We need to escape from a dismal past. This requires a fresh start and new leadership or the new Dopace launch money becomes merely a new waste.
Rocket Scientists -- A Dead or Dying Breed for the USAF:
and a plan for the future
 
To the best of our knowledge, the text on this page may be freely reproduced and distributed.
If you have any questions about this, please check out our Copyright Policy.

 

totse.com certificate signatures
 
 
About | Advertise | Bad Ideas | Community | Contact Us | Copyright Policy | Drugs | Ego | Erotica
FAQ | Fringe | Link to totse.com | Search | Society | Submissions | Technology
Hot Topics
here is a fun question to think about...
Miscibility
Possible proof that we came from apes.
speed of light problem
Absolute Zero: Why won't it work?
Why did love evolve?
Capacitators
Intersection of two quads
 
Sponsored Links
 
Ads presented by the
AdBrite Ad Network

 

TSHIRT HELL T-SHIRTS