White Paper on Information Dominance

What is Information Dominance?

Information dominance is a delta: the difference between the aggregate of information available to each of two opposing military commanders. But its more than just information: Its the difference in understanding of information in the context of some specific purpose that is the crux of the definition. Information dominance then refers to a difference in what is termed Battlefield Visualization:

"Battlefield visualization is the process whereby the commander develops a clear understanding of his current state in relation to the enemy and environment, envisions a desired end state which represents mission accomplishment and then, subsequently, visualizes the sequence of activity that will move his force from its current state to its end state."

How this delta is achieved will be addressed later in this paper. What's central here is that the commander whose level of battlefield visualization is greater has "information dominance." Like air power, a ground commander can enjoy levels of information dominance ranging from "information supremacy" to "information parity"; an enemy can also achieve information dominance at his expense. Information dominance can change over space and time; it also may vary by echelon. An Army may achieve information dominance at the operational level but lose it tactically.

The notion of information dominance is not new; throughout history, commanders have sought to leverage the temporary opportunity that comes from an information advantage, whether it comes from knowledge of terrain or a satellite image. But understanding this situation awareness in the context of some end state has been largely an intuitive process. Truly exceptional commanders have had it; most haven't. What's changed is that information technologies hold a potential for making this grasp of the battlefield and the inherent opportunities it affords more accessible to every commander, from field army to rifle company.

With enhanced technologies, such as GPS, EPLRS, the tactical internet and computers, the modern commander could gain a real time knowledge of the disposition and capabilities of his force. Raw data concerning his logistics posture and current activities could be translated into projections of capabilities within the framework of his concept of operation. And, these diverse elements of information could be correlated and analyzed in a manner that could permit the planning of branches and sequels in geometrically compressed time.

Concurrently, the commander would be presented a comprehensive view of the enemy. He would see his organizational whole: his patterns of operation and his task organization, echelonment, phasing and tempo. Moreover, by controlling the dimension of information, he could attack an enemy in a manner that would unhinge his organization, perhaps without physically destroying it.

Information Technologies will overlay the relevant friendly and enemy pictures against the backdrop of the operating environment. Topography and weather will be portrayed in either a flat, two- dimensional map display or as an interactive three-dimensional model. A commander would be capable of projecting his current situation through time and space, either to support rehearsals or to explore planning sequels. A reconnaissance would be possible within minutes at levels of resolution never thought possible (and from both a friendly and enemy perspective.)

Information technologies will never afford absolute visibility of the battlefield; but, it will be possible to establish dominance by focusing resources at a time and place of one's choosing. Where information is massed in this manner, it will become a catalyst around which the other operating systems will get; and, it will likely set the tempo of battle.

The effect of these changes will be to move battlefield visualization from an intuitive ability towards science: a deliberate, deductive process based upon building blocks of raw data, parsed and collated by machines and merged into visual patterns that are presented to commanders as opportunities. Additionally, by linking commanders at different echelons, this same technology will permit "shared visualization": a capability that will promote synchronized operational planning. In short, the command will see and think as one.

Information technologies will also work for the enemy. Potential adversaries will mimic or counter our capabilities in this dynamic field with inexpensive, commercially available technologies. They will look to information as both our strength and Achilles Heel. Even if they cannot match us on an global level, they will evolve operational and tactical niche capabilities in which devastating advantage could be achievable. The "delta" then will not be something that the Army can simply design into its force structure and modernization plans. Information dominance must be fought for and won through a deliberate process that is synchronized with the other patterns of operation.

How To Get It?

Information dominance is achieved through a vast range of activities that can be grouped under the rubric of Information Operations. At strategic and operational global information environment, etc. But at the division level, the focus narrows to principally encompass four major activities:

1. Constructing the Information Battle Space

2. Protecting friendly information the C2 system

3. Collecting and producing intelligence

4. Attacking the enemy's C2 system

The Infosphere

It is not feasible for a division to own the spectrum throughout the battlefield: that is, to communicate everywhere with unlimited capacities and with absolute assurance. Where competing armies collide, there are just too many claimants on frequencies and means. But it is reasonable for the commander to expect to dominate information within a specific battle space, if he's willing to allocate resources and synchronize his activities in time and space. The intent will be to construct an "infosphere" around the battlespace (an additional dimension beyond physical volume controlled by weapons effects) where redundant, high capacity communications networks are engineered and protected. From this infosphere there is both a capability to reachback to supporting data bases and staffs around the world and to extend communications to other similar areas where dominance in situation awareness and communications is desired.

Information Protection

It's yet to be proved that a digitized force "glows in the dark." But, the vulnerability of such a force to attack, disruption, and intrusion, in an era rapidly expanding information technologies, must be considered a given. Most of the technical measures necessary to protect the Army's information capabilities will occur at echelons far above division and long before the battle is joined. But, within a specific battle space, the commander must undertake deliberate and coordinated activities to protect his decision cycle and execution. Traditional INFOSEC and COMSEC measures are, of course, central to this effort, as are counterintelligence, counterreconnaissance and security. But in the future, the potential threat mandates that four relatively new capabilities come into play. First, is mirror imaging, a dedicated effort must be undertaken that continuously looks at every course of action from the perspective of red information attack. Second, the vulnerability, that is inherent in the use of situation awareness-producing technologies, compels the user toward an accelerated OPTEMPO. Speed in decision-making and execution is the best form of information protection. Third, while the division relies upon other agencies for the technical security of its information systems, it must be prepared to deal with the calamity that could be wreaked by a virus. The sophistication that has already been demonstrated with this new form of combat, will elevate COMPUSEC from a prudent measure to a division METL; reconstitution of the division's information system. Finally, the commander must develop reactive drills that will permit him to break contact when and where he discovers that the enemy has achieved information dominance.

Intelligence

The intelligence area of interest of the Force XXI division should be identical to that of the Corps; furthermore, the area of influence can now be defined by the reach of the division's Apache attack aviation and Block II ATACMS--about 300 Kms. this means that the division is a key user not just of the Corps' capabilities, but of national and theater intelligence systems (e.g. JSTARS). It is also a contender in the joint intelligence process that allocates these resources within the theater, (albeit at the bottom end of the "intelligence food-chain"). To leverage this process requires more than just a PIR statement; requirements are successfully brokered through the joint environment because commanders are able to link them to specific battlefield outcomes.

Top Down Intelligence is typically wide-area in focus. For tactical users, its primary conduit is the intelligence broadcast; the transmission of data from multiple producers to a large audience over communications media. A user requires a small grouping of MI soldiers and specialized equipment to access, filter, focus and interpret the broadcast to fit his specific battle space. The proliferation and qualitative improvement in the precision and timeliness of broadcast intelligence makes its use both feasible and essential at brigade level.

Perhaps the most difficult feature of top down intelligence is the task of melding it with organic, bottom-up capabilities. This is particularly important because of the rapid expansion of sensors across all the BOS (tanks, airplanes, even minefields have become sensors). The mix of organic intelligence and RSTA must compliment the broadcast feeds, providing the responsiveness and fidelity necessary for the close fight. As bottom up and top-down tend to report differently in terms of their focus, timeliness, and footprint, it's possible to lose something in the transition. A clear and consistent view of the enemy requires a process of synchronization of these sensors and integrated analysis of their produce at both division and brigade level.

C2W Attack

Seeing and understanding the enemy's organizational whole, affords an enhanced potential to attack in a manner that decouples his ability to organize and focus combat power. Commanders will shape the battle space by attacking, not just the traditional target set (e.g., tanks, artillery pieces) but, the more discrete aspects of command and control that facilitate echelonment, grouping, tempo and synchronization. Lethal fires and raids can be focused on these specific targets. Battle management systems, data networks, intelligence/RSTA means and logistics management systems will fall prey to an increasingly sophisticated arsenal of C2W soft kill systems. But, successful C2W attack is not a blunt instrument. Precise target identification and timing are fundamental to success. For this reason, the division must possess an organic C2W Attack capability. This guarantees responsiveness and supports the combined arms training and battle drills that are critical to synchronized execution

Conclusion

Information dominance, is a temporary tactical condition achievable through a deliberate process. It entails the construction and protection of information battle space, intelligence collection, processing and dissemination and focused attack against both the enemy's C2 and his eyes and ears. It will facilitate superiority in battlefield visualization at a specific time and place. But this is only a window of opportunity...temporal at best; the commander must seize the advantage through effective Battle Command. Two features are essential to this process. The first is CCIR. The commander must control information, less is dominate him. CCIR can control the glut of information and separate the true signals from the noise, but it can't be a fixed concept. Like IPB, it must be precise to ensure responsiveness and dynamic to survive first contact. Second, is tempo. The time devoted to the tactical decision-making process and execution must be dramatically compressed. But, because the information dominance delta is achievable through deliberate action with a specific battle space, battle command can be better synchronized, resulting in the creation of opportunities that presage success.

* Information dominance is the degree of information superiority that allows the possessor to use information systems and capabilities to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to control the situation in operations short of war, while denying those capabilities to the adversary.