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CIA General Counsel Nomination Hearing

                     NOMINATION OF SCOTT W. MULLER

TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

OCTOBER 9, 2002

OCTOBER 16, 2002

__________

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/

senate

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 83-725 WASHINGTON : 2003 ___________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

BOB GRAHAM, Florida Chairman

RICHARD SHELBY, Alabama, Vice Chairman

CARL LEVIN, Michigan JON KYL, Arizona JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma Virginia ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California PAT ROBERTS, Kansas RON WYDEN, Oregon MIKE DeWINE, Ohio RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland

Thomas A. Daschle, South Dakota, Ex Officio

Trent Lott, Mississippi, Ex Officio

Alfred Cumming, Staff Director

Bill Duhnke, Minority Staff Director

Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk

C O N T E N T S

----------

Page

Hearing held in Washington, D.C., October 9, 2002................ 1 Statement of: Bond, Hon. Kit, a U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri.... 4 Graham, Hon. Bob, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida... 1 Muller, Scott W., Nominee to be General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency................................ 5 Supplemental Materials: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees........................ 23 Comstock, Amy L., Director, Office of Government Ethics, letter to the Honorable Bob Graham, Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence dated September 6, 2002.......... 69 Financial Disclosure report of Scott W. Muller............... 70 Muller, Scott W., letter dated September 4, 2002............. 91 Rizzo, John A., Designated Agency Ethics Official CIA, letter dated September 5, 2002.......................................... 94 Muller, Scott W., letter dated October 8, 2002............... 96 Hearing held in Washington, D.C., October 16, 2002............... 97

NOMINATION OF SCOTT W. MULLER

TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

----------

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2002

U.S. Senate,

Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, D.C. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Bob Graham (Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) presiding. Committee Members Present: Senators Graham and Rockefeller.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOB GRAHAM

Chairman Graham. The Committee will come to order. Today's hearing of the Select Committee on Intelligence is for the single purpose of receiving testimony from the President's nominee for the position of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Scott W. Muller. Mr. Muller, we welcome you and thank you for coming today, particularly on such short notice. Mr. Muller. Thank you, Senator. Chairman Graham. We also welcome Mr. Muller's wife, Caroline, and two of his three children, Christopher and Pete, as well as his present and former assistants, Anna Corrales, Barbara Doan and Karen Baker, who are all here indicating their support. Would the family please stand and be recognized. Thank you very much. Mr. Muller is currently the managing partner of the Washington, D.C., office of the law firm of Davis, Polk & Wardwell. His law practice has included complex litigation matters that contain securities, antitrust and criminal aspects. Mr. Muller also served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York from 1978-1982. We heard testimony yesterday from Mary Jo White, formerly the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District. This was part of our joint inquiry into the events of September 11. I know that the Southern District prosecutors are among the best and most highly recognized Federal prosecutors in the country. We hope Mr. Muller will elaborate today in his statement and in response to questions from the Members of the Committee on what he has learned in his career that has prepared him to be the General Counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency. If confirmed, Mr. Muller would be only the second CIA General Counsel to go through the confirmation process. Congress amended the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 in 1996 to require that the person to fill this position be selected with the advice and consent of the Senate. This reflects the importance we attribute to the functions performed by the CIA General Counsel. With the critical role played by the agencies of the intelligence community in the war on terrorism and, perhaps soon, the war on Iraq, now more than ever the CIA must have a strong General Counsel. This is, in part, the reason that we are holding this special meeting of the Committee today to hear from Mr. Muller, in hopes that we can expedite this process so that he will be able to assume his position prior to the adjournment of Congress. I am certain that Mr. Muller knows the role of lawyers at the CIA has evolved over the last 25 years. In the early 1970s there were only a handful of lawyers in the CIA. Today there are approximately 100. In the Counterterrorism Center alone the number has gone from one as recently as 1997 to seven today. This growth reflects the fact that after the Pike and Church Committees in the late 1970s completed their review of the performance of the intelligence agencies, intelligence operations became, as has been referred to, a heavily regulated industry. Executive Order 12333, first issued by President Ford in 1976, created a set of guidelines for operations--particularly those against U.S. persons and those conducted inside the United States. The CIA and the FBI have classified regulations that further guide operations. These complex sets of rules need lawyers to interpret and apply them to day-to-day operations--and they must do it quickly, and they must get it right. Officers in the Directorate of Operations need lawyers they trust so that they can go about their business devising and implementing aggressive operations that will help us thwart the terrorists before they can do us harm. On that point, I would like a moment to speak about the issue of cautious lawyering at the CIA. I know from my work on this Committee for the past 10 years that lawyers at CIA sometimes have displayed a risk aversion in the advice they give their clients, particularly some of the lawyers assigned to the posts in the Directorate of Operations. Unfortunately, we are not living in times in which lawyers can say no to an operation just to play it safe. We need excellent, aggressive lawyers who give sound, accurate legal advice, not lawyers who say no to an otherwise legal operation just because it is easier to put on the brakes. I also know that the lawyers assigned to the Directorate of Operations are not always perceived as part of a team by their clients but, rather, a hurdle that must be surmounted before the operators can do their jobs. Team work requires mutual respect and I hope, if confirmed, that you will instill that in your lawyers. The previous General Counsel came before this Committee in a public hearing last year on the U.S.A. Patriot Act intelligence-related provisions and asserted that the officers in the Directorate of Operations needed ``adult supervision'' by their lawyers. As you might imagine, that comment was not well received at the Directorate of Operations. In my opinion, the Directorate of Operations officers are performing the most adult jobs in our Government today. I hope that if you are confirmed, Mr. Muller, you will instill in your lawyers the need to be a team player and to give cutting-edge legal advice that lets the operators do their jobs quickly and aggressively within the confines of law and regulation. We are joined this morning by my good friend and former colleague in the State House, Senator Kit Bond of Missouri. I know the close friendship that he has with Mr. Muller because he's been telling me about it on a daily basis for the last 6 weeks. Senator Bond. [The prepared statement of Senator Bond follows:]

Prepared Statement of Senator Bond

Good Morning Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity this morning to appear before the Intelligence Committee on behalf of Mr. Scott Muller. President Bush's nomination of Mr. Muller to the position of General Counsel of the CIA reflects careful deliberation and consideration on the part of the President for this important position. The Central Intelligence Agency, in addition to the entire Intelligence Community, now more than ever, faces the daunting and paramount task of gathering effective and reliable intelligence as we conduct the war on terror. Currently, in an effort to fulfill this paramount task, the relationships and interactions between the various entities within the Intelligence Community are being reexamined and restructured in an effort to facilitate more effective and reliable intelligence gathering. Throughout this reexamination, the CIA General Counsel will need to have an understanding of the laws governing these relationships. In addition, the CIA Counsel will need to be capable of carrying out careful and thorough analysis of all the legal ramifications of intelligence and law enforcement collaboration. I am convinced Scott Muller's extensive legal experience and training will afford him the ability to provide proactive, timely, objective and independent advice to the agency and the Intelligence Community, consistent with the laws and the Constitution of the United States. Scott began his higher education at my alma mater, Princeton University, graduating cum laude with a Bachelors degree in 1971. From there, he went on to Georgetown University Law Center earning his J.D., making Law Review and Law Review Executive Board. Since that time, Scott has distinguished himself amongst his colleagues in the legal community. For the past 24 years, he has been a litigator at Davis Polk & Wardel specializing in representing Fortune 100-sized companies conducting what can best be described as ``crisis management.'' Scott is no stranger to being thrown into high-pressure, high-stakes legal arenas that have put his legal and managerial abilities to the test. His ability to assimilate quickly and then master new and multiple subject matters would serve the CIA and Intelligence Community well as it attempts to reexamine and restructure its collaborative sharing and intelligence gathering abilities. Among Scott's many honors and awards, he has received: FBI Commendation and Department of Agriculture Commendations One of New York Law Journal's ``Rising Stars in 13 of New York's Largest and Most Prestigious Law Firms'' Included in ``Guide to The World's Leading White Collar Crime Lawyers'' International Who's Who of Business Crime Lawyers Scott's interest in national security can be traced back to the mid-1980s when he served as a member of the Arms Control and National Security Affairs Committee of the Association of the Bar of New York City. He has over 25 years of experience with the Federal Criminal Law Enforcement process as a prosecutor, teacher, and defense lawyer and has worked extensively with general counsels of large organizations. After serving with the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, he: Clerked in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York from 1978 to 1982 Served as the Vice Chairman of the American Bar Association's White Collar Crime Committee Was Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center where he taught an advanced course in Federal Law Enforcement. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is for all of the aforementioned reasons in my statement this morning that I am confident my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will approve the nomination of Scott Muller to the position of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. The emerging challenges before the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities that will surface throughout their reexamination and restructuring will necessitate the talents and legal expertise of folks like Scott. Thank you again Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KIT BOND

Senator Bond. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your very thoughtful and carefully worded guidance to the General Counsel's position. Most of all, thank you for conducting this hearing so promptly. I know the President and the Administration are very grateful that you are moving expeditiously because, as you indicated, this is a position of paramount importance given the challenges we face in the international and national arena today. In the interest of full disclosure, I will tell you that even though Mr. Muller lives in Maryland and practices in New York and Washington, D.C., I am here as a Senator from Missouri to offer my highest commendations. His son and my son were in high school together and now in college together and furthermore my wife has known him longer than I have, and I would say on behalf of Linda and Sam, he has their highest endorsement, and that's just one of the reasons I'm here today. The most important reason, obviously, is that President Bush's nomination of Mr. Muller to the position of General Counsel reflects, I think, careful deliberation and consideration on the part of the President for this important position. As you have indicated, Mr. Chairman, the Central Intelligence Agency, in addition to the entire intelligence community, now more than ever faces the daunting and paramount task of gathering effective and reliable intelligence as we conduct the war on terror. I have many more things to say about Mr. Muller that I will submit for the record because of the time constraints, but I think you've indicated that the CIA General Counsel will need to have an understanding of the laws governing these relationships, and the Counsel will need to be capable of carrying out careful and thorough analysis of all the legal ramifications of intelligence and law enforcement collaboration, not simply being the abominable no-man, but providing the best advice on how to comply with all the laws to get the job done. I'm convinced that Scott Muller's extensive legal experience and training will afford him the ability to provide proactive, timely, objective and independent advice to the Agency and the Intelligence Community consistent with the laws and the Constitution of the United States. Scott began his higher education at Princeton University, graduating cum laude in 1971, and from there he went to Georgetown University Law Center, earning his J.D., where he served on the Law Review and the Executive Board of the Law Review. Since that time he has distinguished himself among his colleagues in the legal community, for the past 24 years as a litigator at Davis Polk & Wardwell. He has received the FBI commendation, the Department of Agriculture commendations. His interest in national security can be traced back to the 1980s, when he served as a member of the Arms Control and National Security Affairs Committee of the Association of the Bar of New York City. He has also clerked in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and, as you indicated, was an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, for all the aforementioned reasons I am confident my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will consider this nomination carefully and approve the nomination of Scott Muller to be the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. I again offer my sincere thanks to the Committee for the expeditious hearing, and I offer any assistance I can in moving this nomination forward. Again, Mr. Chairman, my sincere thanks. Chairman Graham. Thank you very much, Senator. We are being joined by Senator Rockefeller. Senator Rockefeller, Senator Bond has just introduced Mr. Muller, and we are prepared to turn to his statement unless you would like to make an opening statement. Senator Rockefeller. No. Chairman Graham. Mr. Muller.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT W. MULLER, GENERAL COUNSEL-DESIGNATE,

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Muller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Rockefeller. Let me start, Mr. Chairman, by thanking you and the distinguished Members of this Committee for giving me this opportunity to appear before you and to make this introductory statement. I am honored that the President has nominated me to the position of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. The privilege I feel in being asked to serve is particularly great because this is an extremely challenging time for the Agency, the Intelligence Community, and the Nation as a whole. The laws governing the relationships between the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities and the practices of those communities are undergoing rapid and substantial change. A new and fresh perspective is being brought to balancing the need for collaboration and the simultaneous need to respect constitutional values and, in particular, the Intelligence Community is being asked to coordinate more closely than ever with criminal investigators and prosecutors on the domestic side and overseas. This re-examination is taking place in a real-time crisis situation where there are continuing, simultaneous demands on a number of fronts and a critical need for judgment, management skill and a collaborative spirit in the Office of General Counsel. For 24 years, I have been a litigator at Davis Polk & Wardwell specializing in representing Fortune 100-size companies and others at times when they were immersed in crisis and felt that they were under siege. A major part of my practice and experience can best be described as crisis management. I have frequently been asked to walk into fast- moving, high-pressure, high-profile legal disaster areas, to assemble and manage large teams of lawyers and other experts, to work within new and complex institutional structures, to collaborate, as appropriate, with those representing diverse interests and to guide my clients' responses on multiple fronts simultaneously. I've had the opportunity to engage and, I trust, to master new subject matters, often extremely complex and usually technical, if not arcane, and to do so under severe time constraints. I've also had the opportunity to advise numerous large institutions on the establishment of legal compliance programs designed to avoid violations of law while at the same time giving business executives the tools they need to perform their jobs effectively. To add a word here, I might say that it's not cautious advice that's part of that; it's careful and timely advice. That's the critical element. The central part of my practice for the last 25 years has been Federal criminal law and enforcement, and my experience in that area is current and extensive. After serving with the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, I clerked in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. I was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York from 1978 to 1982. I served as the vice chairman of the American Bar Association's White Collar Crime Committee and as an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, where I taught an advanced course in Federal law enforcement. More importantly, the vast majority of my cases have involved Federal criminal law and interaction with Federal prosecutors and other Federal regulators at all levels. I believe that the job of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency is to provide timely, objective and independent advice to assist the DCI, the Agency and the community as a whole in accomplishing their missions effectively and doing so in a way that is fully consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States. I view a critical part of that job as working with this Committee and its House counterpart as you fulfill your important oversight responsibilities. I am enthusiastic about the opportunity to serve. I look forward to answering your questions and providing whatever information you feel may be necessary or that you may find useful as you consider my nomination. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you on the important matters that face the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence community, this Committee and its House counterpart, and as I said before, the Nation as a whole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm prepared to answer any questions you may have. Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Muller. We will proceed with questions on a 5-minute rotating basis. As I indicated to you in our remarks before the hearing commenced, I was very impressed with the file that I had the opportunity to review. You have an impressive background. One question that would be raised in reviewing that is the fact that you have not had much previous experience in intelligence or intelligence-related activities. Could you tell us what you think in your background has best prepared you to assume this responsibility? Mr. Muller. Yes, Senator. I think that's a fair and appropriate question and I thank you for asking it. To start, I have no direct intelligence or national security experience. I have in the vast majority of my cases, however, specialized in mastering new subjects--often extremely complex subjects--in very short periods of time. That has been the essence of my practice over the past 25 years, and the range of subjects has been quite broad. In addition to that, as I said in my opening statement, I have come to specialize over time in what, as I've said, can best be described as crisis management, which essentially has meant going into very difficult situations with multiple challenges at the same time. Often I'll have the media, Federal investigators, Securities and Exchange Commission or civil anti-trust authorities, foreign investigators--every kind of possible challenge to an entity--all at the same time, all happening sometimes with lightening speed and be called in to try to marshal the resources necessary to deal with that problem. Often that involves hiring multiple law firms-- literally organizing and managing hundreds of lawyers--and then in a very brief time understanding the facts, and often brand new law, in a way which I can then advise on how best to respond on those fronts at the same time. Finally, and I think perhaps most importantly given the changes that are underway in the Intelligence Community, and as we re-examine the national security organization generally, I have an extensive experience in law enforcement--both as a former prosecutor, but again, most recently and more importantly, as a defense lawyer. I am fully conversant with the way the Federal investigative system works with FBI agents. I think I would have a credibility in dealing with them and understanding their problems and the interactions in a way which, while not unique, will be of extraordinary importance. Let me say as well that I asked myself this question when I was first approached about the possibility of serving as General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, and I asked it on a number of occasions through the process in which I was interviewed. I've spoken now to four former General Counsels of the--and did speak prior to accepting the nomination--four prior General Counsels of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Acting General Counsel now. I spoke to two of the witnesses you had here before you yesterday, both of whom are my friends, Louis Freeh and Mary Jo White. I spoke to a former head of the Central Intelligence Agency and I spoke to the gentleman who is now the General Counsel for the National Security Council. Each and every one of them told me--and also a former Attorney General who is a friend--each and every one of them told me that in their view the most important requirement for the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency is judgment and maturity and the ability to make decisions quickly but properly. I have no illusions about how much there is to learn. Clearly it's a lot. I also have no doubt that I can do it and do it well. Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Muller. That was very reassuring statement. You are going to face a number of challenging legal issues should you be confirmed. One of those that has been discussed repeatedly, including yesterday by former FBI Director Louis Freeh and former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, has to do with the wall between law enforcement and intelligence. We have found instances where that wall has been so impenetrable as to keep information that would have been valuable, potentially even change the course of events, from passing in one direction or the other. There were some significant changes made in the law as part of the U.S.A. Patriot Act that was adopted in October of last year. At this stage, do you have any comments to make, including from your experience as a U.S. Attorney, as to how that wall of separation should be either modified, dismantled, strengthened? Mr. Muller. Well, let me start, Senator, by saying that I think the changes that were made in the U.S.A. Patriot Act were clearly necessary in light of the events of September 11 and I think have gone a long way toward creating at the operational level the kind of sharing and collaboration that this Committee and the Intelligence Community and the Bureau and law enforcement think need to occur. There's a lot of work left to be done. The wall that originally existed obviously had its basis in experience. The concept essentially was that to the extent there was a merger of foreign intelligence and law enforcement there would be both the incentive and the opportunity for abuse. But we now live in a world that's different than when that wall was first erected. First, unlike the days prior to the Church and Pike investigations, there is now Congressional oversight that is effective and extensive. In addition to that, the nature of the threat has changed dramatically. The distinction between domestic and foreign is difficult to apply in a world where the threats are truly transnational, just as the distinction between law enforcement and intelligence is difficult to sustain when the line between war and peace has essentially been eroded in the way that it has. Obviously, it's going to be a critical issue going forward to continually re-examine the relationship between domestic law enforcement and domestic activities on the one hand and foreign on the other. There are clearly things that can be done now, some of the issues relating to the FISA that are being litigated before the court that need to be examined, but as a general matter, while keeping an eye on the reasons why the wall was essentially erected in the first place, clearly we're moving toward other ways of achieving the goals of protecting U.S. civil liberties interest while getting the job done. Chairman Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Muller. Senator Rockefeller. Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I bid you a good day. Mr. Muller, a couple of things. I think that essentially in life people have two parts to them. You get this all for free. Mr. Muller. My children are getting it, too. Chairman Graham. Senator Rockefeller might charge tuition for your children--always mindful of the family treasury. Senator Rockefeller. That's right. Always looking for more. [Laughter.] Senator Rockefeller. In other words, the skill sets that they're trained with and then sort of the way they adapt to how life puts them into a different circumstance. Skill sets--this is still a continuation of the Chairman's question--skill sets are powerful. Now, as Senators we have to manage time and all kinds of things. Lots of people have to do that. When a lawyer says I can manage time, get a hundred lawyers together, react to a crisis, and walk into a situation and master it, that's important. It was reassuring to the Chairman and it doesn't un- reassure me, but I want to probe a little bit further. If you don't know about a subject, there is a price. I'll just pick an example out of the air. You can have mastery of the history of China, for example, but if you don't speak Chinese or if you don't speak several of its dialects, talking about this Agency, you're disadvantaged. Because it means that Mao Tse-dong, for example, could never, was never understood by more than one-third of the people of China because of the dialect and the province that he came from when he spoke. So for a lawyer for the CIA, General Counsel for the CIA, the skill set has to be, I think, quite broad. In your case it's a set of instincts as to how to gather together the threads needed to use, as you say, good judgment, common sense, as the others said, good judgment and common sense. I'm not questioning whether that's enough, but I'll just give you an example then, ask you to respond. I've used this several times before. We had here in open session not long ago a Minneapolis FBI agent and he had been dealing with the Moussaoui case. He had two choices. Moussaoui was working under an expired French visa, of that nature. Thus, he had broken the law and, therefore, law enforcement said, ``you go get that person.'' Now there was another choice he could have made, which was to say, I know that this person, I suspect that this person has terrorist ties and, therefore, rather than nailing him for what I know I can get him on, wouldn't it be more useful for me to surveil him, to see who he has lunch with--to figure out, just to watch over a period of months what his interaction is and who he sees. In fact, this gets more and more important as we get more into all of this. He clearly, resolutely, proudly, definitively picked the first course and rejected the second, in his testimony to us. It's that I think that the Chairman and I are thinking about. Mastery--you've got to speak the language. You can go to the country, but you've got to speak the language. So with that kind of alliteration, I want you to expand more on just that good judgment is enough. Because it's like why Mormons are so important to the Agency because they get their language training for 2 years and then they go out and they go in the street. So they learn not just the dialect, which they've already learned, but they learn the colloquial language. Then some of them go to the Agency where they do unbelievably helpful things. But if they didn't have that, they couldn't do that. Now, you have this whole, huge field to survey. Mr. Muller. I understand your question, Senator. First, let me say, obviously, I agree with you. In order to do the job or understand China, you ultimately need to learn Chinese, and you need to learn it pretty fast. I will not know Chinese the day I arrive. I will be able to rely on people in the Agency and in the General Counsel's office for the time that it takes me to learn for a period of time. But I will need to learn fast, and I have no illusions about that. It is also true that this is a highly specialized area. It's not much you read about in books. You have to go out and actually spend some time and understand the business of what is done at the Agency. There is, of course, the legal part--the law--and, as I said, I have learned extraordinarily arcane areas of law and have done it fast. The more difficult part, and I think you're right, is to learn the business of the Agency---- Senator Rockefeller. The instinct which pulls you back to one or another place. Mr. Muller. You're talking about the two choices, you mean. Senator Rockefeller. I just use that as an example. The question of the instinct. Where do you go? You get the information, but then where does it take you? Mr. Muller. It's hard to answer a question about instinct in the abstract. Let me say this and then I'll sort of venture into, as best I can, to try to answer that. I think one of the reasons why I have been lucky enough to have success going from one crisis management situation to another--why I get asked by different clients to do it is because I'm willing to make judgments. I'm willing to take risks when they have been carefully calculated. I'm willing to act with the speed that's required by the clients and the circumstances. As well, I think I've been able to show a number of clients that I can learn Chinese. If I may, I'll give you a brief example. I represented--one of the most arcane parts of the securities business is the loaning and borrowing of securities back and forth between firms. There are a handful of firms in the country and, indeed, in the world who do it. They make vast sums of money doing it. Two firms ran an operation together for a period of years and then had a dispute about how to account for the proceeds of it because their system seemed to be giving them results that weren't intuitively right. They interviewed a number of lawyers to try to find one who could come in and understand what was going on, and they gave that lawyer--and I was among a group of lawyers who were interviewed about doing it; I'd had no prior experience in the area at all and, indeed, relatively little in the way of accounting background. I knew nothing about the business; I had never heard of it. I had a month to do this because it was actually a dispute. I was being hired by one side. I went in with the people who had actually put the system together, and we took it apart, piece by piece. I learned the business. Not only that, I found imbedded in the assumptions--in one of the assumptions that underlay their system--a system that they had created and which they had looked at--and this particular issue they'd looked at over and over again, they had missed it. I ended up taking the system apart. I ended up putting their system back together. That system, the system that I created essentially for them, is now being used by that particular firm for hundreds of millions of dollars every year. That was Chinese--or Greek in that case. I learned it, and I was able to be helpful and fast. Now in terms of instinct, to come back to what I think is the core of your question, it's hard to answer again in the abstract. I have had, albeit awhile ago, the choices that you asked between does one act now to stop a particular individual or does one, in effect, let the chips ride to see what additional gains can be made. Those are judgments which can only be made on the basis of all the facts at the time. As a lawyer, I will not be making them in the first instance. Instead, I'll largely be advising as to what I perceive the risks are. I'll come, if I can, one further point. Senator Graham in his opening statement referred to a prior General Counsel who talked about the need for adult supervision--who had used the word adult supervision. I obviously and clearly do not view that as my role. I view the lawyer more as a navigator who will help the captains of the ship steer it as best they can as so it's not to hit shoals, to tell them where the water is deep and where it is shallow, and to give them their best judgment-- my best judgment as to how the ship will fare in particular seas. But I will not be running it. I will not be the captain. I will be advising as best I can on how to navigate. Senator Rockefeller. I'll wait for the second round. Thank you. Chairman Graham. I'd like to follow up on Senator Rockefeller's questions by posing, as one might in a law school classroom, a couple of hypotheticals. Mr. Muller. Sure. Chairman Graham. We don't expect a master's paper on this, but in 2 or 3 minutes, if you can sort of give us an idea of how your mind works, how you would go about approaching these issues. First, one of the most vexatious issues that we've been dealing with is the so-called leaks problem. We have an elaborate system by which information is classified, which means that its release to the public is restricted, and we have laws to protect that classification system, many of which point directly at the Director of Central Intelligence, who has specific legal responsibility, if he becomes aware of an inappropriate release of classified information, to take actions, including forwarding cases to the Department of Justice. The fact is, this system, from my information, has not resulted in a successful prosecution in some two or three decades. The number of leaks are rampant. You could probably pick up today's New York Times and Washington Post and find several of them on the front page. I've described we now are not dealing with leaks; we're dealing with dam breaks where big surges of information such as the Department of Defense battle plans for Iraq get released inappropriately. If during your third week on the job Director Tenet should come in to you and say that he shares this concern and clearly the current system is not functioning either as a deterrent or as a punishment system, how would you go through the process of approaching that problem? With whom would you consult? What would be your analytical steps, et cetera? I might say I hope this hypothetical issue becomes a real issue soon. Mr. Muller. Well, Senator, I think you are right. The issue of leaks is an extraordinarily important one. The damage that is done by leaks is no different than the damage done by a spy. The fact that it's done for, you know, what the leaker may view as appropriate reasons is absolutely no excuse given the horrendous damage that can occur. I think I would approach-- leaving aside for the moment the question of who I would consult--my mind wraps itself around the problem in the following way. The first question I ask myself is what are the legal authorities and what are the statutes that apply and are they adequate? In the case of leaks, I know that there are espionage statutes which relate to the leak problem. I also suspect that there is a certain amount of disinclination on the part of the Federal prosecutors to want to use the word espionage to deal with the problem of--with an issue of a U.S. person who is leaking as opposed to spying. So the first question I would ask is to find out what the statutes are, to find out whether they're adequate and, to the extent that they're inadequate, an issue which I think I would clearly address with the Department of Justice, the Criminal Division, and others, I would ask that question first. The most difficult question with respect to leaks has to do with actually investigating and finding them. In order to do that, you would want to have a specific case where it came to you or, to the extent that you could, you would want to put in place systems which would actually allow you to find them before they occurred or as they were occurring. More than anything else, you want to find a case that you can bring. You want to find a case that you can bring and bring successfully. You'd have to navigate your way through the problem of the threat of exposure of national security secrets as you do it. So to answer the question, again, I would first analyze what are the legal authorities and, most importantly, I would try to find a way--pro-actively rather than reactively--to, whether it's set a trap, or set up a system where I could actually come up with a way to do it. It's a very difficult problem. I think the reason why, at least to my knowledge, there haven't been leak prosecutions--leaving aside the issue of to what extent can we actually go to the media in order to deal with this--a highly sensitive question and one which the Department of Justice I know has thought about extensively--but if one is limited to looking internally, that's one of the great problems, is actually finding it. Chairman Graham. Thank you. Senator Rockefeller. Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to still go back to the first question. This is not unfriendly questioning. You recognize that there is this gap and you say that you can overcome it and it is our duty to try to make our best judgment that you are right about that. Mr. Muller. As I said Senator, I view it as a fair and appropriate question and I continue to. Senator Rockefeller Yes, you did and you are very forthcoming about that. There is an agency that used to be called HCFA--which is the Health Care Financing---- Mr. Muller. I had a case involving them. Senator Rockefeller. You are involved with them? Mr. Muller. I had a case involving them. I had to learn something about them, yes. Senator Rockefeller. I think it takes somebody about 12 years--it is my judgment--to learn health care, public policy, in and out. You can do it through the master's thing. You can do it through a Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins or wherever, but then you've got to practice it. Then the real world comes in on you and then you have the political process that comes in on you, and then OMB that comes in on you. President Bush's head of HCFA is a fellow named Tom Scully, who knows health care cold. That's what he's done. He's a lawyer. But he brings more to it than the law. He brings to it just flat out knowledge and the battle scars of what went wrong as he applied legal instincts versus the practical problems of a recalcitrant HHS Secretary or President or OMB or whatever. Am I justified in saying that fast learning skills--and then shoot me right down if you think I am wrong--that it really isn't just a matter of collating lawyers and learning quickly, but that instincts are not learned quickly. They come from experience. It's like an agent who has served overseas and does human intelligence. I mean, you don't just go get trained for it. It takes years to develop the instincts that allow you to know what you are doing--which is right, which is smart, that you should have done this or that. Now how do you help me? Mr. Muller. I understand your question. Let me first say instincts, I don't think, are learned. You have them, you develop them in whatever field you have over time. You then take those instincts and you apply them to whatever set of facts or area you are put into. That's what I do. There have been three prior General Counsels---- Senator Rockefeller. Where do you get the instincts from? Mr. Muller. Your experience. Senator Rockefeller. But your experience isn't in this. Mr. Muller. No. But you don't need to have--with respect, Senator, I don't believe you need to have your instincts honed in this particular area. I think you need to have your instincts honed in the fight, in the well, in places where there are multiple people with different views where you have to navigate through them and where you have a sense of where a common sense good judgment would put you in the choices between letting someone stay out in the field so you can follow where they go and find the terrorist's co-conspirator, letting them have one more phone call, or instead taking the risk that they are going to do something. You simply look at all the facts and circumstances and you bring to it the best judgment you have. I have spent the last 25 years essentially making precisely those kinds of judgments in varying fields. In particular, I have made them in the law enforcement area for only 4 years as a prosecutor, although we ran undercover operations, we ran a sting operation and in one case in which I can't talk about here, we actually had a person who was in organized crime who was out on the edge of doing things with organized crime to keep his credibility going. I have lived those, albeit when I was younger. I have spent the rest of my career dealing, watching prosecutors having made the same decisions sometimes representing on the defense side. There have been three prior General Counsels of the Central Intelligence Agency who came to that job without intelligence experience. The first, named Tony Latham, came from Shea and Gardener. Russ Bremer came from Wilmer Cutler, and Stanley Sporkin from the SEC. Without knowing the ins and outs of how well they performed in your eyes Senator, I know from the people I have talked to in the Agency that several of those performed very well. I could add as well that I asked this question and I was-- as I said to a person from people who know this community and know me--said, ``don't worry about this. You will be able to do it. It will come naturally to you because of your experience and because of the amount of law that is involved is relatively speaking not the body of HCFA law.'' Would I know health care policy the way the gentleman you described? No. Do I think that my instincts and experience are such that I can add real value and help make sure that the lawyers are part of the team and not viewed as--and don't view themselves as--adult supervisors? Yes. The delivery of legal advice, working as a team, avoiding us versus them kinds of cultures, that's what I do. Senator Rockefeller. I thank you and I'll have the third round if you don't mind, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator. I'd like to raise a second issue. The Intelligence Community is organized theoretically under the general supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence. By tradition and history, the Director of Central Intelligence also has served as the head of the CIA, one of the constituent agencies that make up the Intelligence Community. In your position, you are going to serve as the General Counsel to both of those positions--to both in his directorate of the whole community as well as his specific responsibilities at the CIA. One of the other agencies that's in that constellation of intelligence agencies is that part of the FBI which is involved in intelligence. This multiple responsibility creates the potential of conflicts of interest, as we have learned in our hearings. Not infrequently the FBI and the CIA have different views of the same matter which have resulted in patterns of action, including one ignoring the other. Think about and tell us how you would approach these multiple responsibilities and particularly how you would see, from your position as General Counsel, dealing with the conflicts between the FBI's intelligence responsibilities, the CIA's virtually total intelligence responsibilities, and the DCI's overview of all of the agencies of the agencies of the Intelligence Community. Mr. Muller. I think there are--I'll try to divide that question into a couple of parts if I can. One part has to do with the relationship and possible conflict between the FBI counterintelligence and domestic responsibilities and the CIA's foreign both counterintelligence and intelligence activities. The second question I think has to do with the role of the DCI as head of the community and what conflicts may exist both because of his dual capacity as head of the CIA and head of the community and, as a corollary to that, whatever conflicts I may have as General Counsel to him in those capacities. Let me address the first question first. The message of the U.S.A. Patriot Act and the lesson of 9/11, subject of course to the correct oversight, is that the parts of the FBI and the CIA need to work, and the Justice Department, fully hand-in-hand in the investigative stage, in the stage where they are trying to determine ways in which they can disrupt and detect terrorists and other threats. There is now increasing and should be full field-to-field coordination. It's precisely now--and just as in the past in espionage cases choices have had to be made along the lines of the choice that you referred to earlier, Senator Rockefeller, about when to bring a case and when not to bring a case, when to let one ride and when not to let one ride. Those choices will increasingly need to be made as those teams work together. They are also going to have significant issues to work on together as to whether or not cases are brought and where they are brought, what obligations will be under Brady against Maryland and a variety of related questions. There is no substitute for not only having the field agents working together but actually having the lawyers work together as well, the prosecutors, as they are now doing in the counterterrorist cases where, as I understand it, there is and has been an extraordinarily good relationship between the Federal prosecutors and the Southern District of New York and the Eastern District of Virginia, the FBI agents, and the CIA agents all working together. I would envision that there would be, over time, an extensive exchange not only of information but of personnel, hopefully even between the offices, so as to make that--and ultimately when the systems are pulled together in a way which I understand they are not now, then the walls should ultimately be transparent and then choices can then be made as to when cases should be brought, what the costs will be, where they will be. With respect to the second question having to do with the DCI's role, obviously that has been an issue not only for this Committee, but really for the Nation, most recently, but over time. It is one that when one looks at--every time I look at it and think through a possible solution to how the national security apparatus ought to be organized differently I see both advantages and disadvantages to it and there are obviously a host of proposals. In the current system, as General Counsel I would view myself as having those responsibilities which the DCI gives me with respect to the community. I have no question but that a significant amount of coordinating work can and should be done. There are lawyers from the General Counsel's office that are deployed to most of the other elements of the community, or can be--I think NSA may be an exception--but I would envision working very closely with the other General Counsels. I don't perceive a conflict. I have frequently represented multiple clients, to the extent that one can view this as a multiple client. My client is the mission. My client is the President and the Executive branch subject to this Committee's oversight. Actions speak louder than words. I think to the extent that there is a perception of a conflict it can be eliminated. To the extent that there is a conflict, I'll be the first to say so. I doubt it'll occur. Chairman Graham. Senator Rockefeller, could I ask two favors. First, could I ask a followup question beyond my 5 minutes and then, second, I am going to have to leave. Could you continue the hearing and then conclude it when you have completed your questions? You're a scholar and occasionally a gentleman. We have had issues where, because of what now is agreed to have been erroneous legal advice, important decisions were either made or not made. The most prominent example is in this so-called Moussaoui case that Senator Rockefeller referred to in his questioning, where the field agent in Minneapolis was berating the central office here in Washington to seek a FISA in order to get information. The persons making the decision here in Washington, by all now agreement, were misapplying the law and denying this request, and then shortly after 9/11, when they did get access, found information that could have been very significant had it been available earlier. How do you see your responsibility in terms of the legal community which advises all of the agencies that make up the Intelligence Community, so that on something such as what are the rules for a FISA, that the information is uniformly disseminated, updates of change in the law are promulgated, and some degree of oversight to assure that the legal officers are applying the appropriate standard, that we have a continent of law and not a series of individual islands which may be drifting away from each other. Mr. Muller. I think within the Agency, to answer that question there first, what you have identified I think is one of the most important things that the General Counsel is responsible for ensuring. There needs to be careful management and coordination among all the lawyers giving advice within the Agency to assure that it is, A, uniform, B, correct, and, C, that it is not driven by concerns of caution not required by the law, and similarly that it is not--that it doesn't fail to take into account and raise to the appropriate levels any issues where the risks seem to be extreme. It also has to be client-driven. By that I mean it is imperative in the delivery of legal advice that the lawyer earn the trust of the client. You won't be asked back a second time, you won't be consulted when you need to be consulted unless you earn that trust. You earn that trust by doing everything you can to work with them to be part of the solution to the extent there's a problem, by being clear and simple about the rules that guide, to be clear and simple about the difference between law and policy, and to be sure as well, because you are with them in recognizing that the risk of illegal action in the environment that we are operating in is no different and no greater than the risk of inaction. Chairman Graham. Mr. Muller, thank you very much. I apologize that I have got to go to a 10:30 meeting. I thank you very much for the candor and the thoughtfulness of your responses and wish you and your family well. We will be attentive to moving this nomination as expeditiously as we can. Mr. Muller. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling the hearing. I know you all have been very busy doing very important work and I thank you. Chairman Graham. Senator. Senator Rockefeller. One of the interesting--well, not interesting--well it is interesting, but it is slightly depressing--facts is that there is a large and growing distrust between the executive branch and the legislative branch. It is often said--and this is not political because I think all Presidents are guilty of this or we are guilty of it--it really doesn't make any difference--there is quite a lot of disdain for oversight committees now. There is a great deal of disdain within the Intelligence Community for Oversight Committees--the Intelligence Committees in both Houses. That has been proven many, many times in the last number of weeks as we have been trying to carry on this 9/11 investigation and deadlines and postponements and we'll have it for you in 24 hours and then it's we're OK with it, but we've got to take it over to the FBI or NSC and then it comes back and we end up getting it at 10 o'clock or at 9:55 and the hearing begins at 10 o'clock. That makes us--it means we can't read it, we can't read anything. That's deliberate or it's inadvertent. But in any event there is this disdain. I understand that because there are people putting their lives on the line out in the world and here these Congresspeople, who unfortunately have come on and off the Committee too quickly--but it comes at great cost. It comes at great cost. It causes us to do the one thing that I don't want to see happen as between oversight and the Intelligence Community, and that is the blame game. The blame game can come from two sources. One is that we get angry because we feel we are being looked down on and, you know, that we get sent second- and third-line people, and then sometimes we fail to recognize that the first-line people may have obligations they have to meet. But whatever it is, just accept what I say as being true, if you will. So then there comes a question of timely reports. There are timely reports on annual or one-time basis that the Congress requires and is owed which is frequently not met. That brings then the question of a General Counsel advising a Director of Central Intelligence about what to do about that. That is where you run into potentially the politics or we don't want them to know or why are they doing this to us or this is taking all of our time and I've got more important things to do than sit and answer questions. But the fact is that we do appropriate the money. We do represent the people. You work for the President and, more importantly, you work for the people who we also represent in smaller sections than obviously the President does. So my question is this. Are you the kind of personality, and if you are, I'd like to know--I want you to sort of prove it to me, give me an example--where you go in and you say to your boss you've got to do this and you are going to do it. You are going to do it. You don't want to do it and I understand that, but you are going to do it because it is the law, because it is required, because it is your instinct that it needs to be done, because these relations have to be good because if we don't then we just play gotcha all the time. That is human nature and it is bad human nature. But how can I have a sense that you are not just a skilled collator of facts and information leading you to, as you say, the right kinds of intuitions but that you'll also take on the person to whom you report and threaten to resign, if necessary, if the issue is important enough. What aspect of your personality should give me confidence? Mr. Muller. Good question. I am going to try to answer with a specific example. I am going to be a little bit opaque because I want to be careful about privilege. But I will give you a specific one and one which one of your witnesses from yesterday would be able to tell you more about from the government's perspective if it ever became appropriate. My firm represented and represents many financial institutions. I was called into a case on what was then not yet a case actually on a Wednesday to give advice to this financial institution about a Federal Reserve examination which was to begin the following Monday. I gave some advice with respect to what that client could do or not do in connection with preparing for that examination. It ended up taking the matter first to the CEO, from there to the board of directors, and ultimately, in a personal conversation with the chairman of the board when the advice was not taken, I told him that I was going to be consulting my firm. We withdrew from the representation of that client on a Sunday evening at about 11 o'clock. The Federal examination went forward. Two-and-a-half years later that client was indicted. It was indicted in connection with the matter that had been a part of the discussion that we had had. There is nothing more important to me than my credibility. There is nothing more important to me than my reputation. I will risk, indeed give up, the financial benefits of my practice for this job, but I will never do anything that would in any way call that into question and there is nothing that--I would never have any hesitation to give the advice that I think is correct. In fact, the people in the General Counsel's office already know I expect push-back when I come up with a view. I give push-back. I think that is my job. I am not sure I answered the entirety of your question, as I think back on it now. I was giving the example. Senator Rockefeller Could you give me some more then? Mr. Muller. Well, I am trying to remember now if--you asked for an example--I am trying to remember now the general context in which I gave you the example. I remember the point of it. But the question was essentially whether I'd have any hesitation in effect in telling the DCI what he needed to do-- oh, I know. The context of the question had to do with the relationship between the Intelligence Community and the CIA on the one hand and this Committee on the other. Many of the crisis kinds of cases that I came into didn't need to be crises when they started. They became that because of the way in which the client dealt with the regulator or the U.S. Attorney or others, unnecessarily so. Whether the reason for the mistrust was inadvertence or deliberate is really irrelevant, because from the point of view of the regulator the result is the same and the two are indistinguishable. There have been a number of cases, and I am trying to think of any that are public, where we have come in and my approach has always been the same. There is no excuse for being anything other than forthright with your regulator. I have an expression which I sometimes give to clients, particularly in the criminal arena. I tell them you can try to punch the big bear in the nose or you can smile and try to work with it. The latter is generally the better course, particularly in an industry where you have no choice but to deal with that regulator. There may be times when in response to a subpoena or otherwise it is impossible or difficult to meet the deadline. You never let it pass. You talk about it. You do everything within your power to meet it. I read the report that accompanied this Committee's authorization bill this year which described the performance on congressionally-demanded reports as dismal. I looked at the statistics as well. I immediately asked to understand those facts. I understand that work is being done on it now, but I also fully understand why this Committee would be, and was and is upset about that. I can tell you that from my perspective there is nothing more important than full candor. I can't promise that without knowing particular facts that every question you ask I'll be able to answer. I can promise that if I can't answer those questions or if there is a reason why for one reason, legitimate reason, or another legitimate reason there is something that can't be done, you'll be told. You'll be told the reason so that there is transparency with that regard. Senator Rockefeller. Thank you. The final question I would have would be your transition assuming this all works out. One way of asking that would be what have you done to prepare. You have obviously just read something which I wouldn't have guessed you would have read, but you did and you know you had a reaction to that from that. There have been all kinds of reports that have been done over the last many years on the reorganization of the Intelligence Community. Those reports are always dead on arrival. It is sort of fated, but it doesn't mean that they are wrong. It is been really stunning, I think, to those of us on this Committee to see the lack of coordination and the turf nature of the Intelligence Community, in the case of the FBI because in the case of the lawyer he doesn't want to give up information because it might jeopardize his case and that's understandable. You put in the Intelligence Community and that information doesn't go to somebody else who needs to have it because they're surveilling and that is a fine line. But what have you done to prepare yourself to learn the so- called Chinese language and what is your approach, given the ferocity of the pace at which everything is moving, to preparing yourself for the nuances that don't fall specifically under knowing the law? Mr. Muller. As you know I have had a practice of law, but I have also done what I think I could do up until now to begin to prepare. I didn't obviously want to pre-judge the conclusion of this Committee. But first, with respect to the reorganization, I have asked for--although not received--the Scowcroft report. I have clearances, but so far I think, understandably I am cleared up to only a certain level. I have not yet printed or gotten the report for Zoe Baird's group, but I obviously will read that. I have read a fairly thick set of materials that I have was given by John Rizzo and Fred Manget at the Agency to read to sort of get a general sense of the law. I have read and have the kind of understanding one gets without having a specific matter in front of you, you know, all of the statutes and Executive orders. I have read the authorization bills and then I have asked for and so far had briefings, again up to the secret level, from the heads of each of the groups within the General Counsel's office. I have read 1-page biographies of each of the lawyers in that office and I have given them--I guess I haven't given them yet--I have given orally and they have a longer list of things that I have asked for--things that come to the top of my head. With respect to that I have asked for an index of all of the IG reports for the last 10 years. I have asked for copies of each of the IG reports that relate to the General Counsel's office. I have asked for a collection of the findings in effect. I have asked for a variety of materials like that--a list and a compilation of the congressional prohibitions, whether precatory or otherwise that are still current. My plan, subject to the DCI, of course, and conversations with the deputies who are experienced in the office--and we had a brief conversation about this yesterday--is to spend a significant amount of time walking the building, meeting with the clients and learning the business. There is no way to give intelligent and sound advice without understanding the business and, of equal importance, without the client believing that you understand the business. So I would expect to spend a significant amount of the first at least 4 weeks trying to avoid the incoming while I go and learn what the battlefield looks like. Senator Rockefeller. I don't want this to sound wrong, but I just want to ask you for my own information. How much traveling have you done in the world? In the Middle East? In South and Southeast Asia? Mr. Muller. I spent two summers in Europe. I spent 6-- almost 4 months in the Middle East and Africa. In 1971 and 1972 I was the--mostly by accident of fate--became the manager of Middle East and African sales for Harper and Row publishers. My job was to travel to meet booksellers and go to universities throughout the Middle East and Africa. I spent 2\1/2\ weeks in Lebanon at that time, well before the war--it was a beautiful place--and throughout Africa. I've been to Europe a number of times. I have never been to South America. In my work at Davis Polk I have had a number of European clients and spent a significant amount of time in Switzerland, in Spain, investigating and doing cases there, in Germany. I traveled in Eastern Europe on two occasions during summers, spent 2\1/2\ weeks in East Germany when I was 17. At one time, I had passable German and passable French--no longer. Senator Rockefeller. OK, Mr. Muller, I thank you. You understand the nature of our questions. Mr. Muller. Of course. Senator Rockefeller. They are the questions, as you indicated, that we should be asking. I am also very impressed, as Senator Graham is, by your candor and your composure and I think sense of precision and confidence, which is important. So I draw this hearing to a close and repeat what he says, that we'll do this as expeditiously as possible. The Agency needs a General Counsel and we want it to work. Mr. Muller. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, sir. [Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the hearing adjourned.]

 
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