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US Intelligence Objectives and Programs in Guatemala
REPORT ON THE GUATEMALA REVIEW
JUNE 28, 1996
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
Anthony S. Harrington, Chairman
General Lew Allen, Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Ann Z. Caracristi
Harold W. Pote
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GUATEMALA REVIEW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
THE CONTEXT: US RELATIONS WITH GUATEMALA
US INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS IN
GUATEMALA
Intelligence objectives and activities
Liaison relationship
Funding issues
ASSET INVOLVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
DO guidance on human rights
Allegations of human rights abuse by assets
ASSET VALIDATION SYSTEM
NOTIFICATION TO POLICY-MAKERS OF ABUSES BY
ASSETS
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Conclusions concerning CIA Congressional notification
Failure to notify Congress on receipt of the Alpirez allegation
Semi-annual CIA human rights reports to Congress
1992 Briefings to oversight committee staff on human rights in
Guatemala
DOD Congressional notification
CRIMES REPORT TO DOJ
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING
Priority and performance in reporting
Perceived loss of objectivity
Source characterization and protection
Dissemination and retrieval of intelligence reports
ALLEGED NSA RECORDS DESTRUCTION
VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA REVIEWED BY
THE IOB
Michael DeVine
Efrain Bamaca Velasquez
Sister Dianna Ortiz
Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis
Peter Wolfe
Janey Skinner and Jennifer Roitman
Meredith Larson
Josh Zinner
Peter Tiscione
Melissa Larsen and June Weinstock
Daniel Callahan
INTELLIGENCE BEARING ON THE MURDER OF MICHAEL
DEVINE
INTELLIGENCE BEARING ON THE FATE OF EFRAIN
BAMACA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 1995, the President directed the Intelligence
Oversight Board (IOB) to conduct a government-wide review
concerning allegations regarding the l990 death of US citizen
Michael DeVine, the 1992 disappearance of Guatemalan guerrilla
leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, and related matters. Under terms
of reference issued on April 7, 1995, the scope of this inquiry
covers any existing intelligence bearing on the torture,
disappearance, or death of US citizens in Guatemala since 1984,
including the cases of Dianna Ortiz, Griffith Davis and Nicholas
Blake. Other cases that have come to our attention and have been
included in our review are those involving Peter Wolfe, Janey
Skinner, Jennifer Roitman, Meredith Larson, June Weinstock, and
Daniel Callahan. Because an investigation of the Dianna Ortiz case
by the Department of Justice is still underway, our comments on
that case will be limited at this time to our review of relevant
intelligence reports. The terms of reference also include the US
intelligence relationship with Guatemala, the coordination of
intelligence and policy, and the asset validation process.
The IOB's charter is to review and report to the President on
intelligence activities that we believe may be unlawful or contrary
to Executive order or Presidential directive. The Board has
previously conducted its investigations and provided reports in a
confidential manner. The Guatemala review is unprecedented as a
publicly announced inquiry.
The Board received reports on the matters under review from the
Inspectors General of the Departments of State and Justice and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and from the Inspector General
and General Counsel of the Department of Defense. These reports
covered those agencies and their subordinate agencies, such as the
National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Over the course of the
review, the IOB has received excellent cooperation from the
inspectors general and their departments and agencies, as well as
from innumerable others both in and out of the government, and
has benefited greatly from the extensive follow-up investigations
conducted by the Department of Justice on certain matters. The
IOB believes that the investigations conducted by the inspectors
general in this review process demonstrate the important, though
often unpopular, roles they play.
The IOB also conducted its own inquiry in evaluating relevant facts
and circumstances in order to reach its own conclusions. In this
inquiry, IOB members and staff interviewed scores of witnesses in
the United States and Guatemala and examined many thousands of
documents. The Board also requested a CIA IG review of all
clandestine assets in Guatemala since 1984 for allegations of
human rights abuse.
The Board would like to note that agencies have already taken
several remedial actions as a result of investigations conducted by
the agency inspectors general, the IOB, and the Congress.
In this report, we provide an executive summary and our
conclusions and recommendations, and we address the following
subjects: the context of US relations with Guatemala, US
intelligence objectives in Guatemala, asset involvement in human
rights violations, the asset validation system, intelligence agencies'
interaction with the policy community, Congressional oversight, a
crimes report to the Department of Justice, human rights reporting,
and intelligence bearing on the cases of victims of violence in
Guatemala reviewed by the IOB.
This public version of the report is essentially the same as the
classified version submitted to the President. This report omits, for
example, some highly sensitive information, such as the identities
of those who came forward with information --individuals whose
lives could be endangered if they were identified.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Policy objectives
US policy objectives in Guatemala from l984 to the present--the
period we reviewed--included supporting the transition to and
strengthening of civilian democratic government, furthering human
rights and the rule of law, supporting economic growth, combating
illegal narcotics trafficking, combating the communist insurgency,
and advancing the current peace process between the government
and the guerrillas.
Intelligence activities
US intelligence officials in Guatemala as well as in Washington
endeavored to support all of these policy objectives. For the CIA,
the principal means to accomplish this consisted of working closely
with Guatemala's security and intelligence services and developing
human sources of intelligence--known as assets. These assets
provided intelligence that assisted officials at the embassy and in
Washington in achieving US policy objectives. The CIA station's
liaison relationships with the security services also benefited US
interests by engendering cooperation in such areas as countering
attempts to overthrow Guatemala's constitutional government,
providing protection to US citizens at risk in Guatemala and
reversing a dramatic early 1990's increase in narcotics
transshipment through Guatemala.
Although the CIA's goals in Guatemala were legitimate, achieving
them and maintaining influence in Guatemala required that the CIA
deal with some unsavory groups and individuals. The human rights
records of the Guatemalan security services were widely known to
be reprehensible, and although the CIA made efforts to improve the
conduct of the services, probably with some limited success,
egregious human rights abuses did not stop.
Our clandestine intelligence capability will clearly remain essential
to our national security. However, although the conduct of
clandestine intelligence collection at times requires dealing with
unsavory individuals and organizations, the value of what we hope
to gain in terms of our national interests must outweigh the costs of
such unseemly relationships and be worth the risks always inherent
in clandestine activity.
The CIA's successes in Guatemala in conjunction with other US
agencies, particularly in uncovering and working to counter coups
and in reducing the narcotics flow, were at times dramatic and very
much in the national interests of both the United States and
Guatemala. We found, however, two areas in which the CIA's
performance was unacceptable. First, until late 1994, insufficient
attention was given to allegations of serious human rights abuse
made against several station assets or liaison contacts. Second, the
CIA failed to provide enough information on this subject to policy-
makers and the Congress to permit proper policy and
Congressional oversight. Other US intelligence agencies also made
valuable contributions to US interests and policy in Guatemala, but
fell short in some areas as noted in our report; we did not find,
however, that the impact of their deficiencies was of the same
magnitude as that of the CIA.
Human rights abuses by assets or liaison contacts
In the course of our review, we found that several CIA assets were
credibly alleged to have ordered, planned, or participated in serious
human rights violations such as assassination, extrajudicial
execution, torture, or kidnapping while they were assets--and that
the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) headquarters was aware
at the time of the allegations. A number of assets were alleged--
with varying levels of credibility--to have been involved in similar
abuses before their CIA asset relationships began; in several other
cases, the alleged abuses occurred or came to light only after the
CIA was no longer in contact with the assets. A few assets were
reportedly present as others engaged in acts of intimidation, and
another engaged in such an act before becoming an asset. A further
asset was the subject of an unspecific allegation of human rights
abuse. Several of the above assets were also involved in covering up
human rights abuses, as was an additional asset. In addition, a
number of the station's liaison contacts--Guatemalan officials with
whom the station worked in an official capacity--were also alleged
to have been involved in human rights abuses or in covering them
up. In many of the cases noted above, however, we learned of the
allegations only by virtue of relationships with other assets or
liaison contacts alleged to have engaged in similar abuses.
None of the assets alleged to have committed serious human rights
abuses now have asset relationships with the CIA. Relationships
with all but a few such assets had been terminated prior to
September 1994 for a variety of reasons. Only one of the
terminations of relationship was principally the result of a human
rights allegation. In September 1994, because of a human rights
issue unrelated to Guatemala, the DO's Latin America Division
conducted a review of its then-current assets throughout Latin
America to determine if any may have violated human rights. As a
result of this review, the CIA in early 1995 terminated relationships
with the few remaining Guatemalan assets alleged to have been
involved in serious abuses such as assassination and kidnapping.
As noted earlier, the IOB believes that US national interests, with
respect to Guatemala and elsewhere, can in some cases justify
relationships with assets and institutions with sordid or even
criminal backgrounds. We believe that a careful balance must be
struck on a case-by-case basis between the value and uniqueness of
contributions from the relationship, on the one hand, and the
seriousness and credibility of the allegations of abuse, on the other.
We note that in carrying out law enforcement activities in the
United States, the FBI, police, and other authorities regularly weigh
such considerations in establishing informant relationships with
persons having criminal backgrounds. Among the potential costs to
be considered, however, in continuing or establishing such
relationships with foreign intelligence assets are: the moral
implications, the damage to US objectives in promoting greater
respect for human rights, the loss of confidence in the intelligence
community by the Congress and the American people, and the
effect of such relationships upon the ethical climate within US
intelligence agencies. In February 1996, largely as a result of the
inquiries related to Guatemala, the CIA issued guidance for dealing
with serious human rights violations or crimes of violence by assets
and liaison services. We believe that this guidance strikes an
appropriate balance: it generally bars such relationships, but it
permits senior CIA officials to authorize them in special cases
when national security interests so warrant. We are disturbed,
however, that until the recent Guatemala inquiries, the CIA had
failed to establish agency-wide written guidance on such an
important issue.
We found no evidence that Guatemala station was a "rogue" station
operating independently of control by its headquarters; it generally
kept the DO headquarters well-informed of developments, negative
or otherwise, including allegations implicating CIA assets as each
allegation surfaced. DO headquarters officials, generally on an ad
hoc basis, provided guidance to Guatemala station in the late 1980's
and early 1990's advising it to avoid assets against whom human
rights violations had been alleged, but the number of such assets
retained or recruited without any evident deliberation suggests that
this guidance was neither strictly enforced by headquarters nor
observed by the station. DO managers rarely focused on specific
allegations and did not systematically review assets in Guatemala
for allegations of human rights abuse until the September 1994
review. Moreover, the balancing of allegations against
contributions, on those occasions it was done, was conducted
exclusively by division-level managers and chiefs of station, whose
performance and rewards systems were principally based on
establishing and maintaining relationships with productive assets
and who had little incentive to give great weight to allegations of
abuse.
Asset validation
The asset validation system, through which the CIA should have
periodically reexamined its relationship with each asset, did not
address human rights allegations against the assets in question.
This validation system, even if it had been functioning as intended,
would not have highlighted human rights issues because it had been
designed to focus almost exclusively upon assets' vulnerability to
counterintelligence and upon dropping non-producing assets from
the payroll. The CIA has recently modified its asset validation
system to take into account all derogatory information on assets,
including allegations of human rights abuse.
Executive oversight
Out of a general concern for the protection of its sources, out of
neglect, or for other reasons, the CIA informed neither State
Department officials, at the embassy or in Washington, nor
National Security Council officials of alleged abuses by assets
until late l994 and early 1995. Because significant activities and
relationships--such as those involving assets implicated in
assassination, kidnapping, or torture--raised broad policy
considerations, policy officials outside the CIA (such as
representatives of the National Security Council and the
Departments of State and, when appropriate, Justice) should have
been notified promptly.
During the period we reviewed, the DO, from its leadership down
to its case officers, interpreted a 1977 CIA agreement with the
Department of State to obligate the CIA to reveal to ambassadors
the identities of only those assets with whom senior embassy
officers were in high-level official contact. The IOB recommends
that the State-CIA agreement be amended to say explicitly that
ambassadors must be informed of all intelligence activities that
have significant policy implications, including reasonably credible
allegations of asset involvement in the deaths of US citizens or
other serious human rights violations. If there is concern over an
ambassador's handling of such intelligence information, the CIA
should convey the information directly to appropriate senior level
officials at the Department of State.
The Board believes, however, that the system for collecting and
disseminating intelligence information can function properly only
if US executive and legislative branch officials are held accountable
should they compromise or improperly handle classified
information. A lack of accountability puts sources of intelligence at
risk. The effect is to discourage the proper provision of information
by intelligence agencies to intelligence consumers and the oversight
community, and ultimately to jeopardize the ability of the United
States to recruit sources and to collect intelligence in the
furtherance of its national interests around the world. Ample
avenues exist by which well-intentioned officials can raise
grievances concerning intelligence activities--either through the
executive branch to the National Security Advisor or the President,
or through the Congressional oversight committees to the
Congressional leadership--without publicly revealing sensitive
intelligence information.
During this review and others, we have observed a general
atmosphere of distrust between the State Department and the CIA.
We recognize that tension between these entities is to a certain
extent inevitable, given that their different institutional missions
will occasionally come into conflict. We believe, however, that
some of the distrust could be alleviated. We recommend, therefore,
that the State Department, at an appropriately senior level, ensure
that ambassadors devote sufficient time and attention to receiving
detailed initial training and follow-up briefings on intelligence
activities in their countries of posting. The CIA, for its part, must
ensure that these briefings cover all activities and relationships of
policy significance.
Congressional oversight
The IOB concluded that the CIA leadership violated its statutory
obligation to keep the Congressional oversight committees "fully
and currently informed" under Section 413 of Title 50 of the U.S.
Code. Though this statute is not criminal and the standard is too
broad to be fulfilled to the letter, CIA officers--particularly senior
leaders at CIA headquarters--were derelict in failing to provide
information that should have been provided under even the
narrowest reading of the statute. In examining specific instances in
which information was not provided to Congress, the IOB
considered conflicting evidence and judged that CIA officials did
not act with intent to mislead Congress--though they did
intentionally withhold some information, in substantial part
because of concern for the protection of sources.
We found the primary causes for this failure in Congressional
notification to have been the absence of a systematic notification
process and inadequate emphasis from the CIA's leadership. The ad
hoc manner in which notifications were handled, combined with
the DO's predisposition against volunteering sensitive information,
even to authorized recipients, created an environment that bred
notification failures. For this we fault the CIA and DO leadership
back to the 1980 enactment of the oversight statute. Although we
found no failures as significant as those by the CIA, we found that
Department of Defense intelligence agencies also lacked a
systematic process for Congressional notification during the period
we reviewed. The CIA, DIA, and NSA recently instituted processes
designed to implement and document Congressional notification
more systematically.
The IOB found that in the CIA's semi-annual reports to Congress
on its efforts to improve respect for human rights in Guatemala, the
CIA created a misleading impression of the status of human rights
by focusing on positive contributions without mentioning ongoing
abuses by the services with which the station had a liaison
relationship. The IOB believes that despite the narrow language of
the reporting requirement, CIA managers at headquarters should
have recognized this effect and ensured that Congress received,
whether through the reports or other means, an accurate portrayal of
the human rights situation in Guatemala.
In reviewing all of the facts surrounding the CIA's failures in
notifying Congress, the IOB did not find sufficient basis for a
criminal referral to the Attorney General. The Department of Justice
did examine the issue of the CIA's notifications to Congress at the
request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), but
it found that the facts posited by the SSCI did not constitute a
sufficient basis upon which to premise a criminal prosecution.
Pursuant to Executive Order 12863, which governs the IOB, the
Board has notified DOJ of its belief that in the past the CIA
violated Title 50 of the U.S. Code by failing to keep Congress
"fully and currently informed." The Board notes, though, that this
likely violation was not criminal, that the CIA has taken remedial
action, and that there appears to be no threat of a continuing
violation.
CIA funding levels
There have been public allegations that CIA funds were increased
to compensate for the cut-off of almost all overt military aid to
Guatemala in 1990. We did not find this to have been the case. CIA
funding levels to the security services dropped consistently from
about $3.5 million in FY 1989 to about $1 million in 1995.
Human rights reporting
The station was aware of US policy-makers' interest in learning of
human rights violations and it disseminated intelligence reports on
the topic. Although these reports were of varying utility and
reliability, some were instrumental--becoming the bases for
diplomatic protests to the Guatemalan government and contributing
to the decision to suspend overt military assistance in 1990. A
concern for how negative allegations against the Guatemalan
security services would be received, however, appears in a few
instances to have affected how these allegations were reported.
Although intelligence reports with clearly credible allegations seem
generally to have been disseminated appropriately, those of
questionable credibility that were favorable to the liaison services
appear to have been disseminated beyond the DO more often than
similarly dubious unfavorable ones.
Victim cases
The Board found that the widely publicized allegation based on a
CIA intelligence report that US citizen Michael DeVine was killed
in the presence of Guatemalan Colonel Alpirez was, by the clear
preponderance of evidence, not true. We believe that the most
likely scenario is that the soldiers currently imprisoned for the
crime killed DeVine while interrogating him about a missing army
rifle. We believe that their superiors ordered them to recover the
rifle, but we found no persuasive evidence that the orders included
killing Michael DeVine. Colonel Alpirez was, however, involved in
the broad cover-up of Guatemalan army involvement--a cover-up
that we believe involved several CIA assets and liaison contacts.
We have found no indication that CIA officials were in any way
complicitous in the death of DeVine, and no credible evidence that
any CIA assets or liaison contacts ordered or had prior knowledge
of DeVine's death.
The CIA in November 1991 referred the October 1991 allegation of
Colonel Alpirez's involvement in DeVine s death to the Department
of Justice (DOJ). Although the CIA initially conveyed this crimes
report in a manner designed to set it apart from routine reports, the
report apparently was treated as routine by DOJ, which investigated
the allegation, but did not uncover all of the relevant background
information. DOJ did not find US jurisdiction under the anti-
terrorism statute, but never formally closed the case. We found the
performance of both the CIA and DOJ in connection with this
referral to have been less thorough than warranted. DOJ, however,
recently conducted an exhaustive reinvestigation of the DeVine
case in light of all the information now available to the US
government, and again found no adequate basis for US jurisdiction.
DOJ has since implemented new internal procedures in an effort to
ensure that such criminal referrals are handled in a more systematic
manner. DOJ has also recently entered into a new agreement with
the agencies involved in intelligence that is designed to strengthen
the crimes reporting process.
Another widely publicized allegation based on a CIA intelligence
report--that Colonel Alpirez killed guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca
Velasquez--is contradicted by numerous other intelligence reports
and accounts. We conclude, however, that Alpirez participated in at
least part of Bamaca's interrogation. We believe, but lack definitive
proof, that Bamaca's interrogation included torture and that Bamaca
was killed within about a year of being captured. It has not been
possible for us to conclude whether Bamaca was killed at the San
Marcos base near where he was captured or elsewhere, such as in
Guatemala City. We found that no CIA officials were involved in or
were contemporaneously aware of the torture or death of Bamaca.
Some then-active assets or liaison contacts were, however, alleged
in various, often-contradictory accounts to have been involved in or
to have known of Bamaca's interrogation and death. Although the
Board believes that assets or liaison contacts were likely involved
or knowledgeable, it found no indication that the CIA was aware of
these links during the course of its relationships with these
individuals.
Concerning the death, abduction, or torture of other US citizens in
Guatemala since 1984, the Board found no evidence that CIA
assets or liaison contacts were implicated. We also found that--
contrary to what may be publicly supposed--intelligence provides
little insight into the circumstances of these cases. Our intelligence
agencies are not all-knowing. What intelligence we did find is
described in this report and, to the maximum extent appropriate, is
being provided to the victims or their relatives. We may never know
definitively what happened in the cases we reviewed. In one
particular case, Dianna Ortiz has described someone she believes to
be North American who rescued her from her torturers and
appeared to have some authority over them. Ortiz says the person
warned her to tell no one about the incident and told her that he
was taking her to a friend at the US embassy, raising the possibility
that he had some association with the US government. The Ortiz
case is still under investigation by the Department of Justice; the
IOB will accordingly refrain from drawing conclusions on the case
at this time. We found no indication of involvement by CIA or
other US officials in any of the harm that befell the other US
citizens.
Informing families and victims
As intelligence on the cases was reported to US government
officials, very little of it was shared with victims or their surviving
family members. The IOB believes, however, that in such cases the
United States should provide its citizens more information
whenever possible. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
establishes the only legal requirement to provide such information,
yet that process is often an unsatisfactory way through which to
communicate the information to the families and victims. The
redactions necessary to protect sensitive information in documents
released under FOIA naturally give the reader the impression-
usually mistaken--that relevant information is being withheld.
Further, the reader is usually given no indication as to the
reliability of the information. Victims and family members who
seek intelligence information outside the FOIA process, however,
usually find that it is not within the authority of policy agencies,
such as the State Department, to share intelligence originating in
another agency, and that it is not within the intelligence agencies'
charter to communicate directly with victims and families. We
believe the State Department should demonstrate more initiative in
seeking authorization from intelligence producers to share their
intelligence in briefings (oral or written) to family members and
victims. The briefings need not identify that the information came
from intelligence, but they should attempt to convey some
indication of its reliability.
Among the cases of victims in Guatemala we reviewed, in only the
DeVine and Bamaca cases were there numerous intelligence
reports--though they were often conflicting and inconclusive--that
shed light on what happened. In the DeVine case, we believe the
State Department should have given greater consideration to
sharing intelligence-based information with Carole DeVine. In the
Bamaca case, as the State Department went to great lengths in
pressing the Guatemalan government on the issue, it used
intelligence-based information in the process and in briefing
Jennifer Harbury. We found no indication, however, of any request
by the State Department for a search of past intelligence on the case
until October 1994. If it had done so in early 1993, when Jennifer
Harbury first raised the issue of her husband's fate, the Department
might have been able at a much earlier date to provide her with
useful information about her husband's fate--that is, a report that he
had been taken alive.
We also found that the NSA conducted an inadequate search in
response to the Blake family's FOIA request for all documents
related to the 1985 death of Nicholas Blake in Guatemala. NSA's
initial response indicated that there were no relevant documents,
but it had not searched the database that contains its own reporting.
After an appeal, NSA conducted a search of this database and
responded that it had uncovered six relevant documents. The
broader search used in connection with our review identified an
additional sixteen documents that were equally relevant, though
none of them revealed who killed Nicholas Blake or whether the
army was involved. NSA has since notified the Blake family of the
existence of these additional documents. NSA similarly found only
one out of five documents that were covered by the FOIA request
from Meredith Larson, another victim of Guatemalan violence.
None of these documents, however, provided greater insight to the
circumstances and perpetrators of the stabbing attack against her.
NSA has recently made efforts to make its FOIA searches more
responsive, but it faces a special challenge in releasing information
because anything it releases will be known to have come from
signals intelligence. For agencies whose intelligence comes from
human sources, released intelligence could come from a variety of
persons who may have had first-, second-, or third-hand access to
the information. We recommend that appropriate NSC staff study
this problem in an effort to devise a system through which NSA can
release useful information without jeopardizing its sensitive
methods (perhaps, if necessary, by amending the FOIA to permit
the consolidation of DOD or intelligence community responses so
that information is not identified as having come from a particular
agency).
Alleged NSA records destruction
We found no evidence to support the late March 1995 allegation
that NSA and Army officials altered records on Guatemala to
prevent scrutiny in any investigation, and we believe that there is no
foundation to this charge. The allegation, communicated to a
member of Congress in an anonymous letter telecopied to his office
and also communicated to the press, appears to have been
fabricated. Detailed analysis of the relevant databases indicates that
no records on Guatemala were deleted or destroyed. Moreover, the
officials identified in the anonymous letter, Lieutenant General
Paul E. Menoher, Jr., the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, and Colonel Daniel D. Day, an Army officer assigned
to NSA, either did not have or did not utilize the access necessary
to make the alleged alterations. Finally, the anonymous letter,
which purported to be on NSA letterhead, does not match any
letterhead used by NSA in at least the last twenty years. An
investigating US Attorney also found no basis for the allegation.
Document storage and retrieval
The State Department and CIA Inspectors General, respectively,
found shortcomings in the document storage and retrieval systems
of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) and the CIA's Directorate of Operations. In the case of the
State Department, retrieval shortcomings complicated its own IG's
investigation. Within the DO, retrieval shortcomings contributed
directly to DO headquarters' failure to recognize that an asset
whose recruitment it approved was alleged to have planned an
assassination. The DO has been improving its retrieval system and
has corrected the specific deficiency that led to this failure. The
IOB recommends that the DO continue its ongoing modernization
and that the State Department promptly correct its own deficiencies
in this area.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
l. Intelligence activities
The intelligence community carried out activities in support of US
policy objectives. These objectives included supporting the
transition to and strengthening of civilian democratic government in
Guatemala, encouraging respect for human rights, combating illegal
narcotics trafficking, fighting the communist insurgency, and, in
recent years, advancing the peace process.
For its part, CIA established a liaison relationship with Guatemalan
security services widely known to have reprehensible human rights
records, and it continued covert aid after the cutoff of overt military
aid in 1990. This liaison relationship and continued covert aid
occurred with the knowledge of the National Security Council, the
State Department, and the Congressional oversight committees.
Contrary to public allegations, CIA did not increase covert funding
for Guatemala to compensate for the cut-off of military aid in 1990.
2. Relationships with assets who may have violated human rights
Credible allegations of serious human rights abuse were made
against several then-active CIA assets. In addition, allegations of
varying seriousness, specificity, and credibility were made against
persons who later became assets, as well as against a number of
CIA liaison contacts.
Recommendation:
US intelligence agencies should, while maintaining the ability to
use key assets with such histories when national interests warrant,
establish clear guidance on the recruitment and retention of assets
with human rights or criminal allegations.
Actions taken:
Guidance has been recently issued for dealing with serious human
rights violations or crimes of violence by assets and liaison
services. We believe this guidance strikes an appropriate balance by
generally barring such relationships but permitting appropriately
senior officials to authorize them in special cases when national
security interests warrant.
3. Notification of ambassadors and other policy-makers
CIA did not inform ambassadors and other policy-makers before
late l994 of allegations of human rights abuse by Guatemalan assets
as such claims came to light.
Recommendations:
The Department of State and CIA should amend the State-CIA
agreement to ensure that ambassadors and other policy-makers are
informed of station activities and asset and liaison relationships
that have significant policy implications. Notification of such
activities and relationships should, at a minimum, include
reasonably credible allegations of asset or liaison involvement in
assassination, kidnapping, or torture, and particularly any
involvement in the death or abuse of a US citizen.
CIA should provide ambassadors detailed initial and continuing
briefings on intelligence activities in their countries. The
Department of State, at a level of sufficient authority, should
ensure that ambassadors attend such briefings and that they receive
continuing instruction on the importance of protecting intelligence
sources and methods.
Actions taken:
In October 1995, CIA disseminated a guidance cable in an effort to
clarify the State-CIA agreement of 1977. We believe, however, that
a more durable and effective solution would be to amend the
agreement itself.
4. Provision of information to families and survivors
Although none of the intelligence we reviewed conclusively
identified the perpetrators in any of the cases involving American
victims, the State Department should have sought authorization
from intelligence agencies to include in its briefings to family
members or surviving victims more information drawn from
intelligence reports.
NSA's inadequate responses to FOIA requests by the Blake family
and Meredith Larson were the result of data searches that were
overly narrow and the lack of a system that would allow NSA to
provide more information without compromising its sources and
methods.
Recommendations:
The Department of State should implement a program to ensure that
its bureaus consider including appropriate intelligence-based
information in briefings to US citizens (or US relatives of those)
who are killed, abducted, or tortured abroad-perhaps without
identifying the information as being intelligence-based. The
bureaus should work with intelligence agencies to ensure that
sources and methods are not compromised in this process.
NSA, with assistance from DOD and the NSC, should explore how
to develop a system by which information from signals intelligence
can usefully be shared without compromising NSA's sensitive
methods. This could perhaps be achieved by amending the FOIA to
permit the consolidation of DOD or intelligence community
responses so that NSA information can be released without being
identified as signals intelligence.
Actions taken:
An interagency group is now studying ways to improve the
provision of information to US citizens in human rights cases.
The current leadership at NSA has recently improved the agency's
responsiveness to FOIA requests by substantially reducing their
processing time and by attempting to release more useful
information in such responses.
5. Accountability for those who compromise intelligence
information
The system for collecting and disseminating intelligence
information can function properly only if US executive and
legislative branch officials are held accountable should they
compromise or improperly handle classified information. A lack of
accountability puts sources of intelligence at risk. The effect is to
discourage the proper provision of information by intelligence
agencies to intelligence consumers and the oversight community,
and ultimately to jeopardize the ability of the United States to
recruit sources and to collect intelligence in the furtherance of its
national interests around the world. Ample avenues exist by which
well-intentioned officials can raise grievances concerning
intelligence activities--either through the executive branch to the
National Security Advisor or the President, or through the
Congressional oversight committees to the Congressional
leadership--without publicly revealing sensitive intelligence
information.
Recommendation:
The executive and legislative branches should hold accountable any
officials known to have compromised or improperly handled
classified information.
6. Involvement by US officials
Dianna Ortiz has described a man who she believes to be North
American who she said rescued her from her torture but warned her
to tell no one about it and told her that he was taking her to a friend
at the US embassy. This raises the possibility that the man had
some association with the US government. The Ortiz case is still
under investigation by the Department of Justice; the IOB will
accordingly refrain from drawing conclusions on the case at this
time. Subject to resolution of the Ortiz investigation, we uncovered
no indication that US government officials were involved in or had
prior knowledge of the death, torture, or disappearance of US or
Guatemalan citizens.
7. Headquarters knowledge of station activities
We found no evidence that Guatemala station was a "rogue" station
operating independently of control by its headquarters. Rather, the
station generally kept CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO)
headquarters well-informed of all developments, negative or
otherwise, including allegations against assets as they surfaced.
8. Congressional notification
Congress was not appropriately "fully and currently" informed by
the CIA, particularly concerning the death of Michael DeVine.
Though the evidence is conflicting, we do not believe that CIA
officials acted with an intent to mislead Congress. Rather, the
primary reasons for this failure to inform were the absence of a
systematic notification process and inadequate emphasis upon
reporting issues by CIA management.
CIA's semi-annual human rights reports to Congress were
incomplete and created a misleading impression. CIA managers at
headquarters should have recognized this effect and ensured that
Congress received an accurate portrayal of the human rights
situation in Guatemala.
Although we found no failures in Congressional notification by
Department of Defense intelligence agencies as significant as those
by CIA, we did find that during the period we reviewed, DOD
agencies also lacked a systematic notification process.
Recommendation:
CIA and DOD should both implement a systematic process by
which timely decisions on Congressional notification of
intelligence issues are made, carried out, and recorded.
Actions taken:
CIA, DIA, and NSA have implemented new systems to review their
activities to determine which issues should be briefed to Congress.
The information is now usually provided to Congress in written
memoranda, and a record is made of such notifications. We believe
these new systems will improve performance and accountability in
Congressional notification.
9. Referral of Alpirez allegation to DOJ
The performance of both CIA and DOJ was less thorough than was
warranted with regard to the criminal referral of the allegation that
Colonel Alpirez was present at DeVine's death. CIA failed to
communicate information that would have led to a more vigorous
DOJ investigation. We do not believe, however, that this failure
violated the law, nor do we believe that it affected DOJ's ultimate
determination in the case.
Recommendation:
DOJ and the intelligence agencies should institute new internal and
inter-agency procedures to ensure significant criminal referrals
receive appropriate attention.
Actions taken:
DOJ has implemented new internal procedures to improve tracking
of crimes reports that it receives from intelligence agencies, and it
has reached a new Memorandum of Understanding with the
agencies to ensure that significant crime reports receive special
attention. We believe these improvements will reduce the chances
of the sort of breakdown in the process that occurred with regard to
the DeVine crimes report.
10. Asset validation system
In part because performance in asset validation was not
significantly reflected in the CIA DO's promotion and rewards
systems, there was a lack of emphasis on validation at station level.
Even if the asset validation system had been functioning as
intended, however, it would not have highlighted human rights
issues, because this system had been designed to focus almost
exclusively upon assets' vulnerability to counterintelligence and
upon eliminating non-producing assets from the payroll.
Recommendation:
US intelligence agencies should ensure that their asset validation
systems are accorded appropriate weight in internal performance-
appraisal and rewards systems. Additionally, they should ensure
that their validation systems consider not only counterintelligence
and productivity issues, but also derogatory information on assets
(including allegations of human rights abuse) from both
governmental and nongovernmental sources.
Actions taken:
CIA recently expanded its asset validation system to consider
derogatory allegations against assets and increased the importance
of asset validation in performance appraisals.
11. Reliability of allegations against Alpirez
The widely publicized allegation that Guatemalan Colonel Alpirez
directed or was present at the murder of US citizen Michael
DeVine appears to have been based upon information that was
unreliable and was contradicted by other evidence. Alpirez,
however, clearly participated in the cover-up of the military's role in
DeVine's death. Numerous other reports also contradict the
subsequent allegation that Colonel Alpirez killed guerrilla leader
Efrain Bamaca Velasquez or was present at his death. We are
convinced, however, that Alpirez participated in at least part of
Bamaca's interrogation. We believe, but lack definitive proof, that
Bamaca's interrogation included torture and that Bamaca was killed
within about a year of being captured. We believe assets or liaison
contacts were likely involved or knowledgeable, but we found no
indication that the CIA was aware of these links during its
relationships with these individuals.
12. Alleged NSA document destruction
The allegation that NSA and Army officials destroyed records
related to the activity of US intelligence agencies in Guatemala
(which was communicated to a member of Congress purportedly on
NSA letterhead) appears to have been fabricated. An investigating
US Attorney has also found no basis for the charge.
13. Storage and retrieval of intelligence information
The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
lacked--and still lacks--an adequate capability for document storage
and for the retrieval of intelligence information from its electronic
database.
CIA's Directorate of Operations records system was inadequate and
degraded the ability of headquarters and station officers to have
access to all relevant and available information.
Recommendation:
The State Department and CIA should promptly examine and
remedy the shortcomings in their systems for storing and retrieving
intelligence information.
Actions taken:
The DO has improved its records system to facilitate more thorough
searches of its database and is currently working to digitize all of
its nonelectronic holdings.
14. Follow-up evaluation of implementation
Recommendation:
Agency inspectors general should evaluate the implementation of
these recommendations and any actions taken thereupon, and
should report the results of their evaluations to the IOB within one
year of the date of this report.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE CONTEXT: US RELATIONS WITH GUATEMALA
In 1954, as the communist party gained increasing influence in the
Guatemalan government headed by President Jacobo Arbenz, the
US assisted in the overthrow of the Arbenz government. Following
this coup, the US was closely allied to successive Guatemalan
governments. In the 1960's, a left-wing guerrilla movement with ties
to Cuba emerged in Guatemala and carried out violent attacks,
including the 1968 assassination of the US ambassador. This
insurgency continued throughout the 1960's and intensified in the
late 1970's.
Relations between the US and Guatemalan governments came
under strain in 1977, when the Carter administration issued its first
annual human rights report on Guatemala. The Guatemalan
government rejected that report's negative assessment and refused
US military aid. The human rights situation deteriorated further in
the late 1970's and early 1980's, as the Guatemalan army--in which
the intelligence and security services played a central role--waged a
ruthless scorched-earth campaign against the communist guerrillas
as well as noncombatants. In the course of this campaign in a
country with a population that has never been more than
approximately 10 million, more than 100,000 Guatemalans died.
Through the 1980's and into the 1990's, the human rights situation
gradually improved as the insurgency waned, but successive
Department of State human rights reports continued to document
egregious violations, including murders of political opponents.
Relations between the two countries warmed in the mid-1980's with
gradual improvements in human rights and the Reagan
administration's emphasis on curbing the spread of communism in
Central America. After a civilian government under President
Cerezo was elected in 1985, overt non-lethal US military aid to
Guatemala resumed. In December 1990, however, largely as a result
of the killing of US citizen Michael DeVine by members of the
Guatemalan army, the Bush administration suspended almost all
overt military aid.
Guatemala inaugurated a new democratically-elected president,
Jorge Serrano, in January 1991. In May 1993, however, President
Serrano, claiming to be frustrated by congressional corruption,
illegally dissolved the congress and supreme court and tried to
restrict civil freedoms. In the face of strong protests by Guatemalan
citizens and the international community (including the United
States) and--most importantly--in the face of the Guatemalan army's
refusal to support him, President Serrano's Fujimori-style "auto-
coup" failed. In June l993, following President Serrano's flight
from the country, the Guatemalan congress elected the human rights
ombudsman, Ramiro De Leon Carpio, to be president.
The US worked with the De Leon government in attempting to
strengthen democracy and human rights. Both governments also
cooperated in the fight against the transnational shipment of illegal
narcotics, which had become a major problem in Guatemala in the
early 1990's. The US also joined the "Group of Friends of the Peace
Process," which continues to work to bring an end to Guatemala's
35-year-old internal conflict. In January 1996, Guatemalans elected
a new President, Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen.
There has been some improvement over time in the Guatemalan
military's accountability with regard to human rights violations.
Whereas in the 1980's the army acted with total impunity, in the
1990's military personnel were for the first time charged, convicted,
and imprisoned for some of their crimes. Senior officers, however,
are still rarely charged for their roles in ordering or covering up
such crimes. Human rights problems, including cases involving US
citizens, remain a serious concern in US-Guatemalan relations.
US policy objectives in Guatemala since 1984 have included
supporting the transition to and strengthening of civilian
democratic government, encouraging respect for human rights and
the rule of law, supporting economic growth, combating illegal
narcotics trafficking, fighting the communist insurgency, and, in
recent years, advancing the peace process.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
US INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS IN
GUATEMALA
Intelligence objectives and activities
US intelligence officials in Guatemala and Washington worked to
support overall US policy objectives in Guatemala. For the CIA in
particular these objectives entailed recruiting human sources of
intelligence, called "assets," and developing a close liaison
relationship with the Guatemalan security services.
The station's traditional foreign intelligence collection activities
continued fundamentally unchanged over the period we examined.
The intelligence produced by the station (as well as by other
collectors) proved valuable at times to the embassy and other policy
makers. In particular, these intelligence consumers found some of
the reporting helpful in providing information not available to
embassy political officers. Several reports on human rights
violations also served as the bases for US diplomatic protests and
other diplomatic actions.
Liaison relationship
The close liaison relationship the CIA maintained with the
Guatemalan security services helped to counter the communist
insurgency in Guatemala and to combat the flow of illegal narcotics
through Guatemala to the United States. For example, cooperation
between the Guatemalans, the CIA, and the Drug Enforcement
Administration resulted in the seizure of forty-eight metric tons of
cocaine from 1990 through 1993 as it was being shipped through
Guatemala to the United States by Colombian drug cartels. After
these seizures, the amount of narcotics transiting Guatemala
appears to have dropped dramatically. The CIA's liaison
relationship with the Guatemalan services also benefited US
interests by enlisting the assistance of Guatemala's primary
intelligence and security service--the army's directorate of
intelligence (D-2)--in areas such as reversing the "auto-coup" of
1993 and protecting US citizens at risk, including the 1994 rescue
of a kidnapped American girl. Because the D-2 was widely
considered to be the elite within the Guatemalan military and
government, the station also often requested and received
administrative and logistical assistance from the D-2 on behalf of
the embassy.
The human rights records of the Guatemalan security services--the
D-2 and the Department of Presidential Security (known informally
as "Archivos," after one of its predecessor organizations)--were
generally known to have been reprehensible by all who were
familiar with Guatemala. US policy-makers knew of both the CIA's
liaison with them and the services' unsavory reputations. The CIA
endeavored to improve the behavior of the Guatemalan services
through frequent and close contact and by stressing the importance
of human rights -- insisting, for example, that Guatemalan military
intelligence training include human rights instruction. The station
officers assigned to Guatemala and the CIA headquarters officials
whom we interviewed believe that the CIA's contact with the
Guatemalan services helped improve attitudes towards human
rights. Several indices of human rights observance indeed reflected
improvement--whether or not this was due to CIA efforts--but
egregious violations continued, and some of the station's closest
contacts in the security services remained a part of the problem.
The end of the Cold War gradually led to lower funding levels for
the station, but had only a limited effect upon the mechanics of
how the CIA carried out its business and upon the mind-set of the
CIA officers dealing with Guatemala. Station officers continued to
view the communist insurgents--who seemed to threaten a more
democratic government--as the primary enemy, and they viewed the
Guatemalan government and security services as partners in the
fight against this common foe and against new threats such as
narcotics and illegal alien smuggling.
Funding issues
The funds the CIA provided to the Guatemalan liaison services
were vital to the D-2 and Archivos. This funding was seen as
necessary to make these services more capable partners with the
station, particularly in pursuing anti-communist and
counternarcotics objectives. The CIA, with the knowledge of
ambassadors and other State Department and National Security
Council officials, as well as the Congress, continued this aid after
the termination of overt military assistance in l990.
There have been public allegations that CIA funds were increased
to compensate for the cutoff of military aid in 1990. We did not
find this to have been the case. Overall CIA funding levels to the
Guatemalan services dropped consistently from about $3.5 million
in FY 1989 to about l million in l995.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASSET INVOLVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
DO Guidance on Human Rights
The CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) and Guatemala station
were clearly aware of the potential for human rights violations by
assets and liaison contacts. In November 1988, the DO's Latin
America (LA) division provided a guidance cable to its Central
American stations, in which it noted that human rights violations
were being used politically by Washington opponents of CIA
programs in Central America, but went on to state:
Point we would like to make is that we must all become sensitized
to the importance of respecting human rights, and we must ensure
that those assets and resources we direct and/or fund are equally
sensitive. The issue will only become more important, and we serve
our objectives best if we remember that if we ignore the importance
of the human rights issue in the final analysis we do great damage
to our mission. We are under great scrutiny.
Finally, aside from the legal and policy considerations which are
constant in any allegations concerning violation's [sic] of human
rights we also recognize a basic moral obligation. We are
Americans and we must reflect American values in the conduct of
our business. We are all inherently opposed to the violation of
human rights. Those who work with us in one capacity or another
must also respect these values.
DO instructions on warning targets of assassination issued in
September 1989 stated, "Participation of an asset in an
assassination may constitute a violation of US law or regulations
and is grounds for immediate termination of the Agency's
relationship with the asset. Thus, complete information of any such
incident should be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible."
In 1990, the LA division chief warned the Guatemala chief of
station (COS) that human rights performance was high on the
agenda for the executive and legislative branches, with Guatemala
seen as second only to El Salvador among human rights violators in
the region.
In August 1992, the Latin American division chief provided
guidance to his stations to check all new liaison contacts carefully
for possible human rights violations. The guidance cable also
directed stations to follow up on all accusations of human rights
violations in order to corroborate or refute them.
In May l993, the Guatemala COS initiated a review of many of his
assets "to ensure that no station unilateral asset is, or has been
involved in human rights violations." The station started by
questioning some of its assets and planned to polygraph them. No
station personnel recall, however, what prompted this review or
why it was apparently never completed. It may have been overtaken
by Serrano's "auto-coup" later that month and by the COS's
departure soon thereafter.
In September 1994, because of a human rights issue unrelated to
Guatemala, the LA division directed all of its stations to review
their current assets for human rights violations. In Guatemala, this
review ultimately identified a few asset relationships for
termination. All but one of these terminations of relationship were
carried out in early 1995--before this IOB review had been ordered-
-and the last occurred soon thereafter. Relationships with a few
more assets identified as possible human rights abusers had already
been ended prior to September 1994 for various reasons.
Apart from the guidance to Guatemala station and other Latin
American stations that is described above, there was no CIA-wide
policy before 1995 that spelled out in detail the danger of human
rights abuse by assets and what specific actions were to be taken by
the stations and at CIA headquarters in such circumstances.
Allegations of human rights abuse by assets
In the course of our review, we learned that in the period since
1984, several CIA assets were credibly alleged to have ordered,
planned, or participated in serious human rights violations such as
assassination, extrajudicial execution, torture, or kidnapping while
they were assets--and that the CIA was contemporaneously aware
of many of the allegations. A number of assets were alleged--
though with varying degrees of reliability--to have been involved in
similar abuses before their CIA asset relationships began. In several
other cases, the alleged abuses occurred or came to light only after
the CIA was no longer in contact with the asset. A few assets were
reportedly present while non-assets engaged in acts of intimidation,
and another engaged in such an act before becoming an asset.
Another asset was the subject of an unspecified allegation of
human rights abuse. Several of the above assets were also involved
in covering up human rights abuses, as was one additional asset. In
addition, a number of the station's liaison contacts--Guatemalan
officials with whom the station worked in an official capacity--were
also alleged to have been involved in human rights abuses or in
covering them up.
In many of these cases, however, US intelligence learned of the
allegations only by virtue of reports from other assets who were
themselves alleged to have engaged in similar abuses. Some of
these sources, though, had grudges against those about whom they
reported and thus may have had an incentive to fabricate or
exaggerate allegations.
The IOB notes that US national interests, with respect to
Guatemala and elsewhere, can in some cases justify relationships
with assets who have sordid or even criminal backgrounds,
including human rights violations. In fact, it will often be the case
that the best placed sources of information on nefarious activities
are not entirely clean themselves. There should be, however, an
effort explicitly to balance the value and uniqueness of an asset's
contributions against the seriousness and reliability of any
allegations against him. We believe it critical that this balancing
process take place in the context of broad US interests. It should be
noted that, in carrying out domestic law enforcement activities, US
authorities regularly weigh such considerations in entering into
informant relationships with persons who have criminal
backgrounds. Among the potential costs to be considered in
establishing or continuing such relationships with foreign
intelligence assets are: their moral implications, the damage to US
objectives in promoting greater respect for human rights, the loss of
confidence in the intelligence community among members of the
Congress and the public, and the effect of such relationships on the
ethical climate within US intelligence agencies. In February 1996,
largely as a result of the inquiries related to Guatemala, the CIA did
issue guidance for dealing with allegations of serious human rights
violations or crimes of violence by assets and liaison services. We
believe this new policy strikes an appropriate balance: it generally
bars such relationships, but it permits senior CIA officials to
authorize them in special cases when national interests so warrant,
We are disturbed, however, that until the recent Guatemala
inquiries, the CIA had failed to establish agency-wide written
guidance on such an important issue.
Among the most serious examples of credible allegations against a
then-active CIA asset were those involving an asset who was the
subject of allegations that in multiple instances he ordered and
planned assassinations of political opponents and extrajudicial
killings of criminals, as well as other, less specific allegations of
unlawful activities. Although some of these allegations were from
sources of undetermined or suspect reliability, one was from a
source considered credible by the station at the time. Another asset
was alleged to have planned or to have had prior knowledge of
multiple separate assassinations or assassination attempts before
and during his asset relationship. A third asset has been alleged to
have participated in assassination, extrajudicial killing, and
kidnapping during and before his time as an asset.
The station informed DO headquarters through intelligence reports
or operational cables of those allegations against its assets and
liaison contacts of which it was aware. (In one significant instance,
though, when the station requested authority to recruit a particular
asset, it failed to remind headquarters of an assassination allegation
previously made against him.) DO headquarters, however, appeared
in practice to attach too little weight to human rights issues and
reacted contemporaneously to human rights allegations against only
a few of the assets. This conduct was probably the predictable
result of an arrangement in which the necessary balancing, when
done, was conducted informally, and was done exclusively by CIA
DO division-level managers and chiefs of station--whose
performance and awards systems emphasized recruiting and
maintaining productive intelligence assets.
Of great concern to the IOB is the apparent lack of sensitivity
before September 1994 by DO headquarters or the station to the
series of allegations against a particular asset, especially in light of
a reliable report that he was directly involved in an assassination.
No CIA officials we interviewed recalled this asset as having
presented a human rights problem, nor could any officials provide
an explanation for the absence of an reaction to the allegations. We
found no cable traffic or other written record of deliberation
concerning the asset prior to late 1994. The CIA maintained its
relationship with the asset despite his egregious record of human
rights abuse allegations until the relationship was finally
terminated as part of the September 1994 review.
Of those assets alleged to have committed serious human rights
violations, relationships with all but a few were terminated prior to
September 1994 for a variety of reasons; of these, only one
relationship was ended principally because of a human rights
allegation. After the September 1994 review of Latin American
assets, relationships with the few remaining such assets were
terminated because of allegations of human rights abuse such as
assassinations and kidnapping.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASSET VALIDATION SYSTEM
In analyzing the apparent breakdown of the process for identifying
assets against whom allegations of human rights abuse had been
made we reviewed the functioning of the "asset validation system."
CIA's Directorate of Operations instituted this system in 1989 in
order to advance two primary objectives unrelated to human rights:
to cut ties to assets believed to be counterintelligence risks and to
end relationships with assets whose information production was
not worth the payments they received. Stations were directed to test
and to polygraph assets continually and to analyze their likely
intelligence contributions. This process was to be completed for
existing assets within two years of the system's implementation, but
in practice the process usually took much longer or was never
completed.
We found that the CIA showed an inadequate commitment to the
asset validation system. Although we understand that validating
assets will never take on the same cachet as recruiting new ones, we
believe it requires greater emphasis in the field. Despite repeated
statements by DO managers on the importance of asset validation, a
1994 survey by the CIA Inspector General found that only 9 percent
of DO personnel surveyed believed that promotion panels rewarded
quality work in asset validation. Even when one makes allowances
for the amount of time it takes to validate new assets and the
difficulties of validating tenuously controlled assets by excluding
such assets from the pool of unvalidated assets, only two-thirds of
the assets in Guatemala had been "validated" by late 1994.
Because the validation system's nearly exclusive focus, at that time,
was upon counterintelligence concerns and the purging of non-
performing assets, even more vigorous asset validation would not
have identified those assets involved in human rights abuses. The
asset validation system has recently been changed to take into
consideration all derogatory allegations against assets, including
allegations of human rights abuse. With this change, it will be
important for the DO to review all sources of derogatory
information, including reporting from the embassy, other agencies,
the press, and human rights groups.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTIFICATION TO POLICY-MAKERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES BY ASSETS
Although National Security Council officials and State Department
officials at the embassy and in Washington were generally aware of
the CIA's activities and liaison relationships in Guatemala, the CIA
did not inform these officials until the end of 1994 and early 1995
that any of its assets or contacts were alleged to have committed
human rights abuses. These policy officials were thus denied
information relevant to their decision-making and lost any
opportunity to express possible concerns that such asset
relationships undermined US policy on human rights.
The rules for information-sharing between station and embassy are
set forth in a 1977 State-CIA agreement, which states that chiefs of
station should keep ambassadors "fully and currently informed
about all CIA programs and activities," but also that the chief of
station is responsible, at the same time, "for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Concerning
the disclosure of asset identities in particular, the agreement states
that the COS will "identify to the chief of mission individuals and
organizations within the host country with which CIA maintains
covert relationships and with which he and senior embassy officers
that he may designate have official contacts." CIA officers we
interviewed, from former DDOs down to case officers in
Guatemala, uniformly expressed the view that the l977 agreement
called upon them to inform ambassadors of asset identities only
when assets were cabinet level officials or otherwise in frequent
contact with the ambassador. State Department officials have told
us, however, that they understood ambassadors would be informed
of asset identities in cases of frequent contact or if the asset
relationship was of "policy" or "political" significance.
In the case of Guatemala, based on the CIA's understanding of the
1977 agreement and despite knowing about the high emphasis
policy-making officials placed on human rights, the COS chose not
to inform the ambassador or other policy makers of relationships
with assets alleged to have been involved in significant human
rights abuses. Given ambassadors' positions as the President's
personal representatives and their need to be aware of US
government activities that have significant policy ramifications, the
IOB strongly believes that the State-CIA agreement should be
amended to state explicitly that ambassadors will be informed of
intelligence activities, including asset and liaison relationships
(including, when appropriate, the names of the assets or contacts in
question) that have significant policy implications. The
determination of policy significance will require judgment by CIA
officials, but at a minimum notification should be made in
instances of reasonably credible allegations of involvement by CIA
assets in the death or abuse of US citizens or in incidents of
assassination, kidnapping, or torture. If there is concern over an
ambassador's handling of intelligence information, the CIA should
convey the information to the appropriate senior officials at the
Department of State. Policy officials in Washington, such as
representatives of the National Security Council, the Department of
State (and when appropriate) the Department of Justice, should be
similarly notified.
Although ambassadors and other senior policy-makers are often
pressed by heavy workloads, it must be their responsibility to
devote appropriate time to receiving intelligence briefings. Prior to
and during their postings, all ambassadors should receive
mandatory briefings on intelligence programs in their countries.
The IOB believes that high level State Department emphasis will be
required to ensure that all ambassadors attend such briefings and
receive adequate initial and recurring training on intelligence
activities and on the importance of safeguarding intelligence
sources and methods. At the same time, CIA must ensure that
ambassadors receive in these briefings all appropriate information
on CIA activities and relationships in their countries.
The system for collecting and disseminating intelligence
information can function properly, however, only if US executive
and legislative branch officials are held accountable should they
compromise or improperly handle classified information. A lack of
accountability puts sources of intelligence at risk. The effect is to
discourage the proper provision of information by intelligence
agencies to intelligence consumers and the oversight community,
and ultimately to jeopardize the ability of the United States to
recruit sources and to collect intelligence in the furtherance of its
national interests around the world. Ample avenues exist by which
well-intentioned officials can raise grievances concerning
intelligence activities-either through the executive branch to the
National Security Advisor or the President, or through the
Congressional oversight committees to the Congressional
leadership--without publicly revealing sensitive intelligence
information.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Conclusions concerning CIA Congressional notification
The IOB found the CIA's performance in notifying Congress to
have been inadequate. Specifically, the IOB concluded that the CIA
leadership violated its statutory obligation to keep the
Congressional oversight committees fully and currently informed
under Section 413 of Title 50 of the U.S. Code. Though this statute
is not criminal and the standard is too broad to be fulfilled to the
letter, CIA officers, particularly senior leaders at CIA headquarters,
were derelict in failing to provide information they should have
provided under even the narrowest reading of the statute. In
examining specific instances in which information was not
provided to Congress, the IOB considered the available evidence
and, on balance, judged that CIA officials did not act with intent to
mislead Congress--though they did intentionally withhold some
information, in substantial part due to concerns for the protection
of sources.
We found the primary causes of this failure in Congressional
notification to have been the absence of a systematic notification
process and inadequate emphasis from the CIA's leadership. The ad
hoc manner in which Congressional notifications were handled--
combined with the DO's general disinclination to volunteer
sensitive information even to authorized recipients--created an
environment that bred notification failures. For this we fault the
CIA and DO leadership back to the enactment of the oversight
statute in 1980. The CIA has recently instituted a new system to
review its activities for issues that should be briefed to Congress.
Such information is now usually provided to Congress in written
memoranda, and a record is made of such notifications. This new
system should improve performance and accountability in
Congressional notification.
The IOB also found that semi-annual reports from the CIA to
Congress on what the CIA was doing to improve respect for human
rights in Guatemala created a misleading impression on the status
of human rights by focusing exclusively on positive contributions.
The IOB believes CIA headquarters managers should have
recognized this effect and ensured, whether through the reports or
through other means, that Congress received an accurate portrayal
of the human rights situation.
With respect to criminal liability concerning these CIA
nondisclosures, we have found no adequate basis to conclude that
the conduct of any of the relevant CIA officials violated any
criminal statute. First, the statute requiring "full and current"
disclosure is not a criminal statute.
Second, it appears that section 1505 of Title 18 of the US Code,
the statute that criminalizes the obstruction of a Congressional
"inquiry or investigation," was not violated. It is doubtful that an
"inquiry or investigation" within the meaning of the statute was
underway during the period of time at issue. It also appears that, at
least within the D.C. Circuit, this statute is violated only if an
official encouraged, influenced, or conspired with another to
mislead Congress, see United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369,
385 (D.C. Cir. 1991 ); we have found no persuasive evidence of
this element and believe none can be found.
Third, the false statement statute, section 1001 of Title 18, is likely
inapplicable because a recent Supreme Court decision strongly
suggests that statements to Congress are outside the statute's
coverage, see Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1765
(1995). In addition, we note that, as a general proposition,
"knowingly" withholding information from a congressional
committee is not sufficient to establish the mental state necessary
to constitute the criminal offense of misleading Congress. Rather,
the action must also be "willful." Thus, even if the false statement
and obstruction of Congress statutes were available in this context,
both would require that the defendant acted "knowingly"--that is,
voluntarily and purposely and not because of mistake, inadvertence,
or accident. Both would also require that the defendant acted
"willfully"--that is, with the intent to bring about a particular result
or to do something that the law forbids. The Board does not believe
that the available facts are sufficient to constitute a violation of
either of these statutes.
Fourth, we have concluded that there is an insufficient basis to
believe that a violation of section 371 of Title 18 occurred. Section
371, as construed by the federal courts, proscribes, among other
things, conspiracies to interfere with a governmental function by
dishonest means. An agreement to defeat or interfere with the
congressional intelligence oversight process by lying to or
misleading the Congress, or by withholding information without
statutory justification, could, under certain circumstances, amount
to a criminal conspiracy. Under the circumstances we examined,
however, we do not believe it likely that an offense occurred. In
particular, there is no evidence that information was withheld from
the Congress as a result of the concerted effort or agreement to
interfere with the congressional oversight process. Even though
there was an affirmative obligation to disclose the particular
information not provided to Congress, and the incomplete briefings
and reports provided to committee staffs over the years had the
effect of misleading them and interfering with the oversight
process, we do not believe that there is sufficient evidence to
establish that this conduct was the result of any agreement.
For these reasons, the IOB has not found sufficient basis for a
criminal referral to the Attorney General of this failure in
disclosure to the Congress. The Department of Justice also
considered this issue at the request of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence (SSCI) and found that the facts posited by the SSCI
did not constitute a sufficient basis upon which to premise a
criminal prosecution. However, pursuant to Executive Order 12863,
which governs the IOB, the Board has notified DOJ of its belief
that in the past the CIA has violated Title 50 of the U.S. Code by
failing to keep the Congress "fully and currently informed." The
Board notes, however, that this violation was not criminal, that the
CIA has taken remedial action, and that there appears to be no
threat of a continuing violation.
Failure to notify Congress on receipt of the Alpirez allegation
Although we now consider the allegation to have been inaccurate,
the significance of the October 1991 claim of Colonel Alpirez's
presence at the death of US citizen Michael DeVine leaves no
doubt that the oversight committees should have been notified at
the time. Indeed, none of the CIA officials involved dispute that
this allegation should have been briefed to Congress. There is no
record that the CIA notified Congress of the allegation of Alpirez's
involvement in DeVine's death until after the January 1995
allegation that Alpirez killed guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca
Velasquez; none of the officials with whom responsibility lay can
recall any earlier notification. Thus the issue becomes: was this
failure to notify intentional or was it unintentional? Unfortunately,
we have found no record that definitively answers this question,
and there are facts that support both possibilities.
Among the evidence that the CIA intended to notify Congress was
the inclusion of a note on a question and answer (Q&A) page in the
acting DCI's October 1991 briefing book indicating that CIA was
trying to brief the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) regarding the Alpirez allegation. The acting
DCI believes he saw the Q&A, but that, given the assertion in the
Q&A that arrangements to brief the HPSCI were then under way,
he probably assumed that they were already being carried out. The
Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) recalls that he too saw the
Q&A and that the allegation of Alpirez's involvement in the death
of a US citizen was the reason for the DO's action to notify DOJ
and the basis upon which the DO intended to notify Congress. The
CIA's decision to refer the allegation to DOJ, while not directly
indicating an intent to notify Congress, does indicate that there was
no intent to try to keep the allegation within the CIA. Moreover, a
lawyer from the CIA Office of General Counsel assigned to the
Latin America division ended his notes on a November 18,199l
meeting with DOJ on this subject with "Brief committees on this."
The lawyer does not recall, however, whether this reflected the
discussion or merely his own thoughts. Finally, we found no
evidence of any instructions or conspiracy to withhold the Alpirez
information.
On the other hand, the LA Central America branch chief recalled
that he and others in the division realized in November or
December l991 that Congress had not yet been notified of the
Alpirez allegation. (The General Counsel official's November 18
note to "Brief committees on this" suggests that he too believed in
mid-November that the matter had not yet been briefed.) The lack
of action upon this realization leaves open the possibility that these
officials may have consciously delayed notification. Numerous
events brought the Alpirez allegation to the attention of relevant
CIA branch, group, and division managers over the next several
months. Significant among these are: the referral of the matter to
DOJ (including a November 18 meeting with DOJ officials to
discuss the report, which was attended by the deputy Central
America branch chief); two or three instances recalled by the group
chief at which he asked the lawyer assigned to LA division to check
on the status of DOJ s deliberations; the April 15, 1992 CIA semi-
annual human rights report to Congress on Guatemala, which
mentioned the DeVine case, was edited by the deputy branch chief,
and was reviewed by the rest of branch, group, division, and
directorate management; the May 19, 1992 meeting with SSCI staff
at which the Guatemala chief of station discussed the DeVine case;
and the discussion of the DeVine case that occurred during a June
26 meeting with the SSCI staff attended by the Assistant Deputy
Director for Operations (ADDO), LA division chief, and Guatemala
COS. Each of these events brought the Alpirez-DeVine issue to the
minds of CIA officials, though these events may not necessarily
have reminded them that Congress had not yet been notified.
Because of the contradictory indicators of intent, conflicting and
vague recollections, and a paucity of documentary evidence, no
one, we believe, can conclude with certainty whether the failure to
notify Congress of Alpirez's alleged presence at DeVine's murder
was intentional or unintentional. After careful consideration,
however, we have concluded that the failure was most likely
unintentional. We believe that, among other things, the decision to
refer the allegation to DOJ and the inclusion of the above-
mentioned note in the acting Director's Congressional briefing
materials stating that CIA officers were attempting to notify
Congress of the allegation against Alpirez make it unlikely that the
failure to provide the information to Congress in 1991 was
intentional.
The question of intent aside, however, the CIA's performance in
this area reflects a dereliction of responsibility and a violation of its
statutory obligation to keep its oversight committees "fully and
currently informed" of all intelligence activities as required under
Title 50 of the U.S. Code. The failure to notify Congress of
Alpirez's alleged presence at DeVine's death would not have
occurred had CIA managers and officers attached the required
importance to Congressional notification. Proper attention to
notification responsibilities by the DCI, DDO, and ADDO should
have resulted in the establishment of a systematic process by which
notification decisions were considered, made, carried out, and
recorded.
Semi-annual CIA human rights reports to Congress
Between 1989 and 1994, the DCI was required to report to the
intelligence and appropriations committees on how programs in
Guatemala had been used "to further the objective of greater respect
for human rights and what specific action will be taken in the
ensuing period to further that objective." The requirement's
language did not call explicitly for reporting on human rights
abuses by the Guatemalan security services; nor did it call for a
comprehensive report on the status of human rights in the country--
in contrast, for example, to the requirement for the annual State
Department human rights report. The CIA's semi-annual reports
appear to have satisfied the letter of the requirement to report on
how the program had been used "to further the objectives of greater
respect for human rights." For CIA officials, the emphasis was
clearly to be on the positive contributions of their activities. As
several CIA officers have noted, in fact, the requirement to report
was perceived to be an opportunity for the CIA to put its best foot
forward. The officers preparing the reports believed, and still
believe, that the program was a positive force for human rights in
Guatemala and that the human rights situation had improved. The
reports offered examples to support both convictions, such as the
new human rights instruction offered at the Guatemalan
intelligence school and the D-2's investigatory role in the
unprecedented arrest of a senior naval officer for human rights
violations.
The semi-annual reports did not include information in the
possession of the CIA concerning significant allegations of human
rights abuses by the D-2 and Archivos. The omission of some of
this information in reports that repeatedly referred to the security
services roles in protecting human rights painted an incomplete
picture of the Guatemalan security services. Although several of the
reports, particularly before 1992, acknowledged significant
continuing human rights violations, there was only one explicit
reference in all the reports to an alleged violation by the D-2 or
Archivos--and this reference dismissed the allegation in question.
The station and DO were aware of a number of other allegations
against the D-2 and Archivos from 1989 to 1994 that were not
mentioned in the semi-annual reports.
We conclude that the semi-annual reports' emphasis upon the
program's positive contributions and their exclusion of much
negative information were intentional and resulted from a number
of factors. Principal among these were: the narrow language of the
reporting requirement, the DO officers' perception that the
requirement was an opportunity to emphasize the positive, the DO's
general predisposition to supply only specifically-requested
information, and the erroneous belief expressed by station officers
that the oversight committees were receiving the full picture
through other channels. These factors were exacerbated by the
station's faulty discounting of some allegations out of a loss of
objectivity towards its liaison services, a human inclination to
focus upon the positive, and the lack of priority the CIA gave its
semi-annual reports. (One of the cables from DO headquarters to
the station demonstrated this lack of priority by stating, "We regret
to inform you that it is once again time for the update for the SSCI
on the effect of the . . . program on the human rights attitudes of the
. . . [government of Guatemala]. . . . Apparently since there was no
'ending date' in the FY 90 budget approval that started this
requirement, we are forced to carry it on forever.")
We believe that, through a pattern of omissions and hyperbole,
those responsible for the reports did present Congress with reports
that were not comprehensive and balanced--and that were therefore
misleading. However, given the narrow requirement from the
Congress, we do not find an adequate basis to conclude that CIA
officials intentionally sought to mislead Congress. Those drafting
and reviewing the reports believed the program was a positive force
for human rights in Guatemala, and they saw that as the issue raised
by the requirement. We would view this issue differently if the
Congressional requirement had asked for reporting on activities of
or allegations against the Guatemalan security services, or if we had
found CIA officials to have knowingly lied in the reports.
(Although the SSCI staff appeared to have had different
expectations, one of the principal recipients and readers of the
reports then on the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) staff has told us that he understood at the
time that these reports were to focus on the positive contributions
and were not expected to present a balanced picture of human
rights in Guatemala.) We fault CIA managers, specifically
including former DCIs, DDOs, and ADDOs, for not recognizing
the misleading impression their reports gave, for not ensuring that
this impression was balanced by other reporting, and for not giving
the reports the attention they warranted.
1992 Briefings to oversight committee staff on human rights in
Guatemala
A series of meetings occurred between CIA officers and the
oversight committees in 1992 concerning Guatemalan human rights.
In the course of these meetings, CIA briefers failed to provide some
clearly relevant information. In some cases we believe the
withholding was unintentional; in others we believe it was
intentional. In at least one of the intentional cases notification
subsequently occurred, but in others it did not.
One instance of intentional withholding that was followed by
timely notification resulted from meetings between CIA officers
and HPSCI staff on August 5 and SSCI staff on August 7,1992.
Briefers from the DO (the branch chief and division chief,
respectively) deliberately declined to identify an asset despite
specific requests by the staff directors. The briefers did so because
CIA policy (which we consider appropriate) limited authority for
such disclosures to the DCI and DDO. The briefers did, however,
alert their superiors, and ADDO Price then notified at least the
SSCI.
A probable example of intentional withholding that was not
followed by notification occurred when the Guatemala COS
intentionally, we believe, did not mention Colonel Alpirez's alleged
involvement in the death of Michael DeVine when he discussed the
DeVine case with the SSCI staff in a May 19 meeting (and possibly
also in a June 26 meeting). We believe it improbable that he could
have forgotten the Alpirez-DeVine linkage, since his headquarters
had reminded him of it in a cable he received only a week earlier.
He apparently did not alert his superiors to the omission from his
briefing and did not feel it his responsibility to do so. Although
responsibility for notifying the committees rests with headquarters-
-not chiefs of station--we believe that, by participating in the
meeting, he incurred an obligation to inform his superiors.
In the other instances we examined in which information was not
provided to committee staff during the meetings, we believe that the
failures were likely unintentional. Intent, however, is not required
for the withholding of information to have been a violation of the
CIA's obligation to keep the oversight committees "fully and
currently informed" under Section 413 of Title 50 of the U.S. Code.
DOD Congressional notification
In the course of our review, we uncovered no significant
developments related to the Department of Defense's intelligence
collection in Guatemala that were not briefed to the Congressional
oversight committees. Congress was also notified of the l991
discovery by DOD that the School of the Americas and Southern
Command had used improper instruction materials in training Latin
American officers, including Guatemalans, from 1982 to 1991.
These materials had never received proper DOD review, and certain
passages appeared to condone (or could have been interpreted to
condone) practices such as executions of guerrillas, extortion,
physical abuse, coercion, and false imprisonment. On discovery of
the error, DOD replaced and modified the materials, and instructed
its representatives in the affected countries to retrieve all copies of
the materials from their foreign counterparts and to explain that
some of the contents violated US policy.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRIMES REPORT TO DOJ
Upon learning of the allegation of Colonel Alpirez's involvement in
the death of Michael DeVine, CIA officials within the DO and the
Office of General Counsel agreed that the matter should be referred
to DOJ. This was done on November 18, 1991. Although the CIA
initially conveyed the crimes report in a manner designed to set it
apart from the routine, the report apparently was considered routine
by the Department of Justice. DOJ investigated the allegation, but
did not uncover all of the relevant background information. DOJ
did not find the matter to fall within US jurisdiction, though it
never formally closed the case. We find the performance of both the
CIA and DOJ to have been less thorough than warranted. In
particular, we believe that the CIA failed to communicate
information that would have led to a more vigorous DOJ
investigation, though we believe that this failure did not violate a
legal obligation, nor do we believe that it affected DOJ's ultimate
determination in the case. As a result of its Inspector General's
investigation, DOJ has implemented new internal procedures to
track crimes reports better and has entered into a new Memorandum
of Understanding with the intelligence agencies to ensure that
significant crimes reports receive special attention in the future.
DOJ has also thoroughly reinvestigated the DeVine case and found
no basis for US jurisdiction.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING
Priority and performance in reporting
The intelligence community realized the importance its consumers
placed on human rights reporting and treated the issue as one of its
top priorities over the period we reviewed. Our interviews with
intelligence officers and our review of cables confirmed that
intelligence on human rights violations by the Guatemalan
government had been considered a particularly high priority by US
intelligence collectors since 1984. Intelligence officers noted that
some assets feared the consequences if the US government learned
of human rights abuses and that these fears made it difficult for the
assets to discuss such matters candidly. Many of the reports of
human rights abuses that intelligence officers did receive were
second- or thirdhand, and some of the sources were known to have
grudges against those about whom they reported. Nevertheless,
assets were often the only sources capable of learning the details of
abuses.
Several of these reports, however, proved valuable to the embassy
and served as the bases for diplomatic protests to the Guatemalan
government. Among these were a report confirming that
Guatemalan soldiers had killed Michael DeVine and that the
government was engaged in a cover-up. A subsequent report
corroborated the embassy's suspicions that the government had still
not undertaken an earnest investigation six months after the murder
and that the government did not intend to do so. This contributed to
the ambassador's recommendation that resulted in the termination
of almost all US military aid to Guatemala in December 1990. In
1994 and 1995, clandestine reporting served as the bases for
protests over the reported illegal detention of guerrilla leader Efrain
Bamaca Velasquez after his apparent capture.
Other reports now appear to have been inaccurate--most
prominently the October 1991 report that DeVine s interrogation
and death took place on Colonel Alpirez's base and that Alpirez
was himself present. The evidence uncovered by Mrs. DeVine's
private investigator at the time and by a US Attorney recently
reinvestigating the case indicates that DeVine was killed away from
the base and that Alpirez was probably not present.
Perceived loss of objectivity
With the benefit of hindsight, the IOB has reviewed the facts
available to the station and to headquarters and believes that in
certain instances station and headquarters judgments were affected
by a loss of objectivity. This was not a uniform problem; many of
the same officers in other instances warned headquarters of the
self-serving nature of some sources' information. It would not be
fair to say that the station was unquestioning in its support of the
liaison services. Nevertheless, news that reflected negatively on the
services was clearly seen as bad news. As such, there was a natural
tendency to scrutinize such news more carefully than reports that
exonerated the Guatemalan services. This is a tendency to which all
overseas missions--whether diplomatic, military, or clandestine--
must be alert.
The station did report human rights violations by the Guatemalan
liaison services, even though it knew that this reporting could
complicate the station's relationships with these services and hence
the station's ability to accomplish its missions, particularly in
gathering intelligence and fighting narcotics trafficking. DO
headquarters at times commended the station for such reporting and
requested more. We found that when clear and reliable allegations
of abuse by the Guatemalan services or assets were received, the
station almost always appropriately forwarded the information to
its headquarters for dissemination in intelligence reports to
consumers throughout the executive branch. In one significant
exception, however, the CIA IG concluded in 1994 that the COS
had delayed, diluted, and suppressed some reports because he
feared they would hurt the reputation of the Guatemalan security
services and his ability to work with them. The chief of station was
subsequently reprimanded for these actions. It is worth noting,
however, that the CIA IG investigation was triggered by a complaint
from station officers who were alarmed by the COS's actions.
In the cases of reports that were of questionable reliability, we
found that more searching scrutiny was given to reports unfavorable
to the security services than to favorable ones and that favorable
reports were more likely to be disseminated beyond the DO. There
was often also a failure to follow up on unfavorable reports by
seeking out corroborating information or by polygraphing the
sources.
Perhaps the clearest example of apparently giving inappropriate
weight to favorable over unfavorable information was the way in
which the station and DO headquarters handled reporting on the
July 1992 politically motivated kidnapping of Maritza Urrutia, the
former common law wife of a guerrilla. In October and November
1992, the station reported in two operations cables to DO
headquarters that the D-2 was alleged to have been involved in this
kidnapping. Later in November 1992, the station learned of rumors
that Urrutia had been "voluntarily sequestered" and had willingly
made propaganda tapes while under detention. The station reported
this to CIA headquarters as a clarification of what had happened to
Urrutia and used it as the basis for an intelligence report
disseminated to executive branch agencies. The intelligence report
mentioned the earlier allegations but substituted the word
"detention" for "kidnapping," rendering them compatible with the
more benign account. A headquarters officer in a March 1993 semi-
annual report to Congress apparently drew on this watered-down
version in writing that "The [Central Intelligence] Agency
investigated the [Maritza Urrutia] situation immediately and based
on well-sourced unilateral reporting, concluded that the D-2 had
not acted improperly." Subsequent intelligence disseminated in
November 1994, however, further corroborated the original
allegation that it had indeed been a kidnapping.
Source characterization and protection
Another factor that affected some human rights reporting was the
occasional omission--driven by the need to protect intelligence
sources--of relevant information about sources or about those cited
in the reports. In some cases the source's identity was clearly
relevant to any assessment of the report's credibility. The Board
recognizes that the DO must regularly make difficult decisions in
balancing the need to protect sources against the need to share
more meaningful information with intelligence consumers. Based
on the evidence we reviewed, we found no significant examples in
which the motivation for withholding information seems to have
been to downplay "bad news" rather than to protect source
identities.
Dissemination and retrieval of intelligence reports
Concerns for source protection also led the DO to restrict the
dissemination of some reports to a very limited number of
recipients at the Department of State and other agencies. This at
times denied lower-level officers access to important information
affecting issues on which they were working. Some of the DO's
concerns over the State Department's handling of intelligence
appeared, however, to be well-founded. One former ambassador
had been cited often for not appropriately safeguarding classified
documents; he had also relayed sensitive intelligence to the State
Department via an unauthorized cable channel--but there is no
indication that these lapses resulted in the compromise of any
intelligence sources or methods. A State IG investigation of another
State Department official, however, found that he had passed
Guatemala-related classified information to a member of Congress
without proper authorization, may have also provided- classified
information to members of the press, and had prepared classified
documents on his home computer that he then telecopied over
unsecure telephone lines.
DIA overly restricted the dissemination of some reports, apparently
unintentionally. Twenty reports related to Guatemala with special
handling classification were not sent to the State Department or
CIA headquarters because of a mistaken assumption that reports
transmitted to DIA headquarters would automatically be
readdressed to other agencies. All of the reports, however, were
shared with embassy and station officers in Guatemala. DIA now
checks the proper dissemination of specially handled reports daily.
The computer retrieval systems at three agencies also posed
problems at times. When the DO conducted a records search on a
potential asset, it failed to uncover an earlier intelligence report
alleging that the individual in question had been involved in a
serious abuse of human rights. This apparently occurred because
intelligence reports were not normally retrievable in a standard DO
record search unless the originator had "indexed" the report with
the names of those mentioned in it. The station had failed to do so
for the report in question. The DO has since upgraded its retrieval
system to search the full texts of intelligence reports rather than
just indexed terms and is now working to digitize all nonelectronic
holdings.
At the State Department, the Inspector General noted that the
department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) lacked a
systematic method for document storage and for the retrieval of
intelligence information. The IG noted that this complicated its
own investigations for this review, because INR repeatedly failed to
retrieve relevant documents from its electronic database. The IOB
recommends that the State Department promptly examine and
correct this shortcoming.
At the Department of Justice, intelligence relevant to the
investigation of the DeVine murder was not uncovered despite
being available in DOJ records. The attorney investigating the case
in 1991 requested information from the FBI, but there is no
evidence that the FBI ever checked its own computerized files. The
DOJ attorney did not seek information on DeVine from any other
DOJ elements, such as the Office of International Affairs, which
had relevant information in its files. The Department of Justice has
since implemented a new system to track classified documents
received by DOJ and has requested that the FBI take appropriate
action to ensure better responsiveness to inquiries from DOJ
attorneys for information within FBI files. In addition, as noted
above, DOJ has recently completed a second investigation into the
DeVine case that incorporated the information not located in its
initial investigation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALLEGED NSA RECORDS DESTRUCTION
We found no evidence to support the March 1995 allegation that
NSA and Army officials altered records pertaining to Guatemala in
order to prevent scrutiny in any investigation, and we believe that
there is no foundation to the charge. The allegation, communicated
to a member of Congress in an anonymous letter telecopied to his
office and also communicated to the press, appears to have been
fabricated. Detailed analysis of the relevant databases indicates that
no records on Guatemala were deleted or destroyed. Moreover, the
officials identified in the anonymous letter, Lieutenant General
Paul E. Menoher, Jr., the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, and Colonel Daniel D. Day, an Army officer assigned
to NSA, either did not have or did not utilize the access necessary
to make the alleged alterations. Finally, the anonymous letter,
which purported to be on NSA letterhead, does not match any
letterhead used by NSA within at least the last twenty years. An
investigating US Attorney also found no basis for the allegation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA REVIEWED BY
THE IOB
The IOB was asked to review the cases of Michael DeVine and
Efrain Bamaca Velasquez (a Guatemalan citizen) and intelligence
bearing on the torture, disappearance, or death of other US citizens
in Guatemala since 1984, including Sister Dianna Ortiz, Griffith
Davis, and Nicholas Blake. In addition to these specified
individuals, the IOB examined nine other instances of unusual
deaths or assaults involving US citizens that have occurred in
Guatemala since 1984: Peter Wolfe, Janey Skinner, Jennifer
Roitman, Meredith Larson, Josh Zinner, Peter Tiscione, Melissa
Larsen, June Weinstock, and Daniel Callahan. Because an
investigation of the Dianna Ortiz case by the Department of Justice
is still underway, we will not draw conclusions on that case at this
time. Our charter was to review intelligence bearing on these cases,
not to solve them. Where our study of the intelligence allows us to
provide helpful insight, however, we do offer our conclusions. At
the IOB's request, the Inspectors General of the Departments of
State, Defense, Justice, and the CIA examined their respective
agencies for any information pertaining to the above-named cases
and provided that information for this review.
Dianna Ortiz has described a man she believes to have been a North
American who rescued her from torture but warned her to tell no
one about it and told her that he was taking her to a friend at the
US embassy. This raises the possibility that this person had some
association with the US government. Subject to resolution of the
Ortiz investigation, we found no indication, however, that any US
officials were involved in or had prior knowledge of the harm that
befell these US citizens or the Guatemalan guerrilla leader Bamaca.
Other than allegations related to the DeVine and Bamaca cases,
which are discussed below, we found no allegations or evidence
that US intelligence assets or liaison contacts were responsible for
or had prior knowledge of the attacks against the Americans whose
cases we reviewed.
As intelligence on these cases was reported to US government
officials, very little of it was shared with victims or their surviving
family members. In most cases, this was because there was no
intelligence or the intelligence was conflicting and inconclusive.
The IOB believes, however, that in such cases the United States
should provide its citizens more information whenever possible.
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) establishes the only legal
requirement to provide such information, yet that process is often
an unsatisfactory way through which to communicate the
information to the families and victims. The redactions necessary to
protect sensitive information in documents released under FOIA
naturally give the reader the impression--usually mistaken--that
relevant information is being withheld. Further, the reader is
usually given no indication as to the reliability of the information.
Victims and family members who seek intelligence information
outside the FOIA process, however, usually find that it is not
within the authority of policy agencies, such as the State
Department, to share intelligence originating in another agency, and
that it is not within the intelligence agencies' charters to
communicate directly with victims and families. We believe the
State Department should demonstrate more initiative in seeking
authorization from intelligence producers to share their intelligence
in briefings (oral or written) to family members and victims. The
briefings need not identify that the information came from
intelligence, but they should attempt to convey some indication of
its reliability.
Michael DeVine
Michael DeVine was an expatriate US citizen who had lived in
Guatemala since 1977, running an inn, restaurant, and farm until he
was murdered on June 8, 1990, near his property. Largely through
the work of Carl West, a private investigator hired by Michael's
wife, Carole DeVine, six Guatemalan army enlisted men were
convicted of Michael DeVine's murder and are in prison. Their
direct superior, Captain Hugo Contreras, was convicted on May 13,
1993, but escaped the same day and is still at large.
Significant intelligence bearing on the murder of Michael DeVine:
More than forty reports from intelligence sources relate directly to
the DeVine murder. These reports contain varying and even
conflicting accounts of the incident. We have included descriptions
of most of this reporting in Appendix A. Three of the reports,
described below, were of particular significance because they
provided new information and prompted US government actions.
In August 1990, the CIA station disseminated its first intelligence
report on the murder from a source who reported that Colonel
Garcia Catalan, the military zone commander, had ordered the
surveillance of DeVine and that it was carried out by five enlisted
men. The source added that the Ministry of Defense was engaged in
a cover-up, which included the destruction of a white Toyota
pickup used to conduct the surveillance. (By the time of this report,
the embassy, through Carl West's investigation, already strongly
suspected that members of the army killed DeVine.)
In December I990, the station disseminated an intelligence report
from a source who stated that he believed that Captain Bohr
Avendano and all but perhaps one of the arrested soldiers were
innocent, and that those who had actually killed DeVine had not
acted under official orders. (All but one of the soldiers in fact
appear to have been innocent; in February 1991, they identified the
soldiers later convicted of the murder.)
The source also reported that the Minister of Defense, against the
advice of the Army Chief of Staff, was an obstacle to a proper
investigation. (This intelligence contributed to the US ambassador's
recommendation that almost all military aid to Guatemala be
suspended; this suspension was implemented almost immediately.)
In October 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report
from a source stating that Colonel Alpirez, who commanded the
Kaibil training base near DeVine's farm, had been present when
DeVine died during interrogation conducted by Captain Contreras
at the base. Colonel Garcia Catalan had reportedly ordered
Contreras to recover a missing rifle believed to be in DeVine's
possession. Another source reported at the same time that Alpirez
was an extremely violent man and had exhibited bizarre behavior.
(The CIA passed this information to the DOJ to determine if the
crime fell under US jurisdiction. The handling of that crimes report
by the CIA and DOJ, and the CIA's failure to notify the
ambassador, other policymakers, and the Congressional oversight
committees of this allegation were described earlier in this report.)
Many other reports offered conflicting accounts of various aspects
of DeVine's death. They suggest several possible motives, but the
most frequently cited was that the murder occurred during an
attempt to recover one or two missing army rifles. Different reports
identified numerous officers as the intellectual authors of the
murder, as other reports cleared the same officers. Several of the
reports stated that the enlisted men convicted of the crime gad not
been under orders to kill DeVine. The only respect in which the
reporting was generally consistent came in its frequent
corroboration of the military cover-up.
IOB conclusions:
During the IOB's review, the Department of Justice undertook an
extensive reinvestigation of the DeVine case in order to determine
whether US jurisdiction existed. In June 1996, DOJ determined
that there was no basis for jurisdiction under the anti-terrorism
statute or any other US law. DOJ determined that (1) the murder
most likely occurred as the later-convicted enlisted men
interrogated DeVine over a missing rifle (or rifles), and (2) there is
insufficient evidence to conclude that the killing had been ordered,
but that (3) the Guatemalan military launched a massive cover-up of
its role in the affair. The IOB has found no reason to question these
DOJ findings.
The widely publicized October 1991 allegation that DeVine was
killed on Colonel Alpirez's base and that Alpirez was present runs
counter to the substantial evidence gathered by Carl West and by
DOJ. We note, however, that there is no doubt that Alpirez
participated in the Guatemalan army's broad cover-up of the
murder--a cover-up that also involved several CIA assets and liaison
contacts.
Provision of intelligence to the DeVine family:
Although embassy officers met frequently with Mrs. DeVine,
essentially no intelligence information was shared with her.
Embassy officers state that Mrs. DeVine had access, through her
private investigator, to more detailed information than did the
embassy, and hence information more often flowed from her to the
embassy than in the other direction. Nonetheless, we believe that
the State Department should have given greater consideration to
sharing intelligence-based information with Mrs. DeVine.
Efrain Bamaca Velasquez
Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, also known as "Commandante
Everardo," was a Guatemalan guerrilla leader and the husband of
Jennifer Harbury, a US citizen. Bamaca disappeared in a battle with
the Guatemalan army on March 12, 1992. He was presumed to have
died in combat until Santiago Cabrera Lopez--a captured guerrilla
who had been forced to work for the army before escaping in
December 1992--testified in early 1993 that he had seen Bamaca
being interrogated by Colonel Alpirez and others between March
and July 1992.
Significant intelligence bearing on the disappearance of Efrain
Bamaca:
More than fifty reports from intelligence sources pertain to
Bamaca's disappearance, but they offer greatly differing accounts of
what happened. We have included descriptions of most of this
reporting in Appendix B. About half of these reports stated that
Bamaca was captured; several claimed that he had died in combat
or committed suicide to avoid capture, and the balance did not
specify what had happened. In the reports that claimed Bamaca was
captured, there were various accounts of his subsequent fate.
Several reports stated that he later died of his wounds, that he was
taken to Guatemala City, that he was taken to an unspecified
location, that he was killed by Alpirez, that he was killed on the
slopes of a volcano, or that he was executed in unspecified
circumstances. A number of reports indicated that Alpirez was
involved in or supervised questioning of Bamaca.
Among the many reports on Bamaca's fate, we believe six were
especially significant because of the information they provided at
the time. Because some of these accounts are contradictory--
particularly with respect to Alpirez's role in Bamaca's death--they
cannot all be accurate.
In March 1992, the station disseminated an intelligence report
based on a source's information that on March 12, 1992, the
Guatemalan army had captured "Everardo," the commander of the
Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) Luis
Ixmata Battalion, in an ambush near San Marcos. The source said
that Everardo, although lightly wounded in the arm, was in good
condition, being well treated by the army, and cooperating fully
with his captors. According to this source, the news of Everardo's
capture had not been publicized and would probably be kept secret,
or even concealed by a claim that he had been killed, in order to
maximize his intelligence value. The source also stated that
Everardo had told his captors that Cuba was providing training and
weapons to his guerrillas, and that the latest weapons shipment had
come six months earlier. (There was no mention in the report of
Everardo's actual name, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, and thus this
report apparently received little or no attention until it was
rediscovered in early November 1994.)
In May 1993, the station learned from a source recounting the
apparent accuracy of the stories being told by "Willy" and "Carlos"
(escaped guerrillas Jaime Adalberto Augustin Recinos and Santiago
Cabrera Lopez) regarding captured guerrillas being held in
clandestine prison cells by the Guatemalan military, including their
descriptions of particular captured insurgents--including Bamaca.
The source reported an allegation that Bamaca was alive, but he
could neither confirm nor refute the allegation.
In May 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a
source who claimed that unidentified D-2 officers took Bamaca
away shortly after his capture and that this was the last the source
had heard anything about Bamaca's whereabouts or status. The
source had also suggested that Bamaca had been in good health at
the time. In early November 1994, DOD disseminated an
intelligence report saying that Bamaca had reportedly received a
relatively minor wound in the arm in a firefight near Retalhuleu,
was captured, and was interrogated at Retalhuleu and later at San
Marcos. Because of Bamaca's importance and repeated attempts to
escape, he was encased in a full body cast to immobilize him. The
report indicated that Bamaca was questioned for about a month in
San Marcos by military intelligence division officers, and that he
had talked freely about the guerrillas' policies, personnel, and
activities, though he provided false information about arms caches.
After the military intelligence division decided Bamaca was no
longer of use, it issued an order that he be killed and sent a D-2
helicopter which took Bamaca away from San Marcos while he was
still alive. The report speculated that Bamaca had probably been
dumped at sea, which may be why the government could not now
produce the body. (The DOD had disseminated a report in April
1994 which suggested that in the mid-1980's, the D-2 often dumped
captured guerrillas into the sea from aircraft to eliminate evidence
that prisoners had been tortured and killed.)
In late January 1995, the station disseminated a report from a
source who said that he had been told that it was known within the
senior ranks of the army that Alpirez had killed Bamaca.
In April 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from
a source who had heard that Bamaca was said to be buried at the
Cabanas army detachment, which was located in the village of
Montanita, on the Cabuz River. The source was unable, however, to
provide any other details on what had happened to Bamaca.
IOB conclusions:
After reviewing all available information, the IOB believes that
Bamaca was captured on March 12, 1992 after a firefight and was
interrogated by numerous Guatemalan officers, including those
identified by Santiago Cabrera Lopez. We believe that Bamaca was
killed at some point between approximately four months and a year
after his capture. The available evidence does not allow us to
conclude who killed him, where he was killed, or where his remains
are, but we believe it plausible that his execution would have been
ordered at the highest levels of the Guatemalan military and that his
interrogation at times included torture. The widely publicized
allegation that Alpirez killed Bamaca was at best third-hand and
has been contradicted by numerous other accounts. We do,
however, believe that Alpirez participated in at least part of
Bamaca's interrogation. Some then-active CIA assets or liaison
contacts have been alleged in various, often-contradictory accounts
to have been involved in or to have known of Bamaca's
interrogation and death. Although the Board believes that assets or
liaison contacts were likely involved or knowledgeable, it found no
indication that the CIA was aware of these links at the time.
Provision of intelligence to Jennifer Harbury
As the State Department went to great lengths in pressing the
Guatemalan government on the case, it used intelligence-based
information in the process and in briefing Jennifer Harbury. In
November 1994, the US ambassador to Guatemala, on instructions
from the State Department, provided to Harbury the department's
intelligence-based conclusions about Bamaca's fate: that Bamaca
had suffered non-life-threatening wounds and had been captured,
but that the US government had no information suggesting that he
remained alive much beyond the first few weeks after- his capture.
In February l995, the State Department again told Harbury that
information suggested that Bamaca was killed following his
capture. In May 1995, the State Department provided Harbury
intelligence information from the April 1995 report on the alleged
location of Bamaca's remains--with appropriate cautions about the
report's potential unreliability.
Nonetheless, although the intelligence information concerning
Bamaca was conflicting and offers no proof of his fate, we believe
the State Department should have sought authority from the
intelligence-originating agencies to include more information from
the most credible intelligence reports in briefings given to Jennifer
Harbury (preferably, however, without revealing that this
information came from intelligence). Further, we found no
indication that the State Department conducted or requested a
search of previously collected intelligence on Bamaca until October
1994. If it had done so in early 1993, when Jennifer Harbury first
raised the issue of her husband's fate, the Department might have
been able at a much earlier date to provide her with useful
information about him--that is, a report that he had been taken
alive.
The Department of Defense provided 38 declassified intelligence
reports to Ms. Harbury under FOIA in May 1995. The CIA released
105 documents to her under FOIA in February 1996.
Sister Dianna Ortiz
Sister Dianna Ortiz, a US citizen, lived in Guatemala from 1987 to
1989, where she taught indigenous children. She says that after
receiving repeated verbal and written threats, she was abducted on
November 2, l989, from a religious retreat in Antigua, Guatemala,
by two armed men. She reports that she was taken by bus and
police car to a location where she was accused of supporting the
guerrillas, interrogated, raped, and tortured. She says a man called
"Alejandro," whom she believes to be a North American and who
appeared to exercise authority over her torturers, finally interceded
the next morning and was taking her to a friend he claimed to have
at the US embassy when she escaped from his vehicle in traffic in
Guatemala City and ultimately made her way to the Papal Nuncio's
residence. Sister Ortiz departed Guatemala on November 5, 1989,
and was treated for more than 100 apparent cigarette burns on her
back. No suspects have ever been identified or charged.
At the request of the embassy, the FBI in December 1989 opened
an investigation into this matter, but closed the case in March 1991
after it was unable to interview Ortiz, who was apparently
incapable of discussing her experience at that time. The case was
briefly reopened later in 1991 in order to incorporate the affidavit
that Ortiz had provided to the Guatemalan government, but there
was no further attempt to interview her. DOJ reopened the Ortiz
again case in 1995 in conjunction with the government-wide
Guatemala review.
Significant intelligence bearing on the case of Sister Ortiz:
In early November 1989, the station reported to DO headquarters
on a November 4 meeting between the COS and the Guatemalan
Minister of Defense (MOD). At the US ambassador's request, the
COS raised the issue of Ortiz's desire to leave Guatemala. The
MOD noted that the police had asked to interview Ortiz and that,
having been denied permission to do so, they had obtained a court
order to force Ortiz to speak with them. After the COS pointed out
that this would lead to unfavorable publicity for the Guatemalan
government, the MOD suggested that the COS talk to the chief of
police. When the COS did so later that day, the chief of police
agreed to let the matter pass.
A DOD intelligence report stated that in response to concerns
about international criticism and accusations of possible military
involvement, Guatemalan authorities in early November 1989
agreed to step up their investigation into the kidnapping of a U.S.
person (presumably Ortiz) from a Guatemalan religious retreat,
even though the victim allegedly refused to provide details of the
kidnapping. Guatemalan authorities maintained that the military
played no role in the kidnapping.
At some time prior to October 15, 1991, a source told the station
that Ortiz had in fact been kidnapped as she claimed and that it was
probably done by the S-2 (Intelligence) office of Military Zone
302, which covers Antigua. This source said that Ortiz had been in
contact with the guerrillas, and this contact led to her arrest. The
source, however, said that he did not believe that Ortiz had been
raped because women prisoners were not normally sexually
molested. Instead, he said, women were usually either stabbed to
death to make it look like an ordinary criminal incident, or drugged
and released in a disoriented state. This report was not sent to DO
headquarters or disseminated as intelligence. Station personnel,
while not remembering seeing the report at the time, told the IOB
upon reviewing it that the report would not have been disseminated
because it was not reliable intelligence in that there was no chain of
information explaining how the source claimed to have knowledge
of it.
In late December 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence
report indicating that President Serrano had dismissed Minister of
Defense Mendoza due to Mendoza's blocking of the investigations
of several human rights cases, two of which involved US citizens.
The source said these two cases were those involving Ortiz and
DeVine. The new Minister of Defense, Garcia Samayoa, had
promised to immediately advance the DeVine investigation.
In early April 1992, the station sent DO headquarters a cable
reviewing Ortiz's account of the incident, adding that the
Guatemalan military did not take the incident seriously and
believed that Guatemalan Catholic Church officials were using the
incident for political purposes.
A DOD intelligence report stated that a U.S. person (presumably
Ortiz) was in Guatemala in early April 1992 to make a deposition
to the Guatemalan courts regarding her alleged kidnapping by
Guatemalan police in 1989. A Guatemalan official was aware that
people in Antigua, Guatemala had said that they had seen this US
person meet alone with two men at a bridge and get into a police
car. The location of one of the witnesses was also reportedly
known.
In 1992, the station reported to DO headquarters that a source had
stated that two guerrillas, captured two days before Sister Ortiz left
Huehuetenango, had told the army that they had been waiting for
Sister Ortiz to bring them food and ammunition.
In mid-February 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence
report from a source who stated that the old Guatemalan Military
Academy could not possibly have been the location where Ortiz
was held and tortured as she had said. The source said the D-2 had
moved out of that building in early 1985 and had completely
dismantled all of its detention cells at that time.
In early November 1994, a source told the station about a foreign
journalist who had reportedly stated during one of Ortiz's later
visits to Guatemala that he had learned from a URNG source that
the Ortiz story was fabricated and had been intended to provoke an
end to US funding for the Guatemalan security services. The source
could remember no details concerning the journalist's identity,
however. The station added that it too had doubts about the Ortiz
story, but it did not disseminate this report beyond DO
headquarters.
In early November 1994, the station disseminated a report from a
source who stated that the D-2 headquarters had been at the old
Guatemalan Military Academy from 1978 to 1984, and that there
were D-2 holding cells there then, but that these cells were
dismantled when the D-2 moved out in 1984. (The source did say,
however, that from about 1984 to July 1994, the D-2 had holding
cells near the Mobile Military Police (PMA) compound in Zone 6
of Guatemala City.) The station commented that this inconsistency
in Sister Ortiz's story was viewed by Guatemalans as proof that her
claims were fabricated.
IOB conclusions:
Based on our inquiry to date, the IOB believes that Sister Ortiz was
subjected to horrific abuse on November 2, l989, but US
intelligence reports provide little insight into the details of her
plight. Because the Department of Justice is still conducting an
extensive reinvestigation of the incident, we do not draw any
conclusions on the case at this time.
Provision of intelligence to Sister Ortiz:
Prior to the IOB review, no intelligence on the incident was
provided to Sister Ortiz by the US government. On May l0, 1996,
pursuant to White House authorization, Sister Ortiz was given
declassified versions or summaries of the ten intelligence reports
the IOB identified during its review as shedding light on the facts
and circumstances of her case. None of this intelligence, however,
offers any reliable insight into the matter, and none addresses the
identity of "Alejandro."
Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis
Nicholas Blake was a US citizen and free-lance journalist visiting
Guatemala, and Griffith Davis was an expatriate US photographer
living in Guatemala. They both disappeared in late March I985
while trying to find guerrillas to interview. The two men were
presumed to have been killed by the guerrillas until September
1987, when a local school teacher claimed that they had been killed
by members of the Civil Defense Patrol (PAC)--a community-based
paramilitary force loosely controlled by the army. The teacher later
said the army knew that the PAC had detained the two men and had
been involved in a cover-up of the PAC's role in their
disappearance. In May and June 1992, a regional PAC commander
helped the families recover the men's remains.
Significant intelligence bearing on the Blake/Davis case:
Between April 1985 and June 1985, there were twelve separate
DOD intelligence reports that related to the disappearance of
Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis. These reports indicated that a
coordinated search was being conducted by the military patrols and
checkpoints, but with little progress. By mid-April, the military
began to conclude that Blake and Davis had indeed found the
guerrillas and were either still interviewing them or had been killed
by them. The guerrillas claimed, however, that the military was
afraid that the PAC may have killed the two Americans. (Other
DOD intelligence reports continued, however, to convey the
Guatemalan military's stated belief that the two Americans were
with the guerrillas.)
In May 1985, the station reported that relatives of the missing US
citizens and an embassy officer had visited the commander of the
Quiche military zone to inquire about the search for Blake and
Davis. Despite persistent efforts, no additional information had
turned up on the two Americans' whereabouts.
A DOD intelligence report stated that, approximately a year after
the disappearance of Blake and Davis, several U.S. reporters had
attempted to uncover more information about their disappearance.
A Guatemalan military commander was reported to have become
concerned about possible negative publicity and to have speculated
that the two men could have been killed by insurgents who believed
all US and European journalists are really CIA agents. The two
journalists were last seen by the villagers of Las Majadas as they
left for the village of Palob. The reporters, however, reportedly
believed the journalists were killed by Civil Defense Forces for
their valuables.
A DOD intelligence report suggested that in early September 1992
a Guatemalan military officer had become concerned that
contradictory reports regarding his whereabouts during the 1985
murders of the two US citizens in the E1 Quiche area might
wrongly link him to the murders.
IOB conclusions:
We have little doubt that Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis were
killed by the Civil Defense Patrol. It is possible that army officials
subsequently learned the truth of the PAC's involvement and
engaged in a cover-up, but intelligence provides no evidence of
this, nor of any army involvement in or prior knowledge of the
killings.
Provision of intelligence to the Blake and Davis families:
The US embassy in Guatemala made vigorous efforts to find Blake
and Davis when they disappeared in 1985, and later helped to
locate their remains in 1992. The embassy did not provide any
intelligence-based information to the families, but none of the
intelligence available indicated what had happened or who had
been involved.
In April 1993, the Blake family submitted a Freedom of
Information Act request to NSA for all documents related to the
death of Nicholas Blake. NSA's initial response was that it had
found no relevant NSA-generated documents. NSA had not,
however, searched the database that contains NSA-generated
intelligence. After an appeal, NSA conducted a second search,
which included that database; NSA then responded that it had
uncovered six relevant documents. The broader search conducted in
connection with our review, however, identified an additional
sixteen documents that were relevant, though none of these
additional documents identified who killed Nicholas Blake or
whether the Guatemalan army had been involved. In December
1995, NSA informed the Blake family of the correct number of
relevant reports.
Peter Wolfe
Peter Wolfe was a US citizen and Peace Corps volunteer who was
shot to death near his home in Guatemala City early in the morning
of October 28, 1984. A witness later identified Boris Rene Acosta
Diaz as the killer. Acosta was arrested, initially confessed that he
had committed the murder as part of a robbery, and then claimed on
national television that he had killed Wolfe in self-defense. In his
televised confession, Acosta also implicated Julio Cesar Gramajo
Castillo. By the time of the trial, however, Acosta had recanted,
both he and Gramajo had produced alibis, and the principal witness
had disappeared--all of which led the judge to release both
suspects. The Peace Corps office in Guatemala received an
anonymous letter and an anonymous visitor in the year after the
murder, both claiming that the military had intimidated witnesses to
the killing. The office also learned that Gramajo was related to two
Guatemalan Supreme Court magistrates and was apparently also a
distant relative of Colonel Hector Gramajo, who later became the
Minister of Defense. Additionally, Acosta was reported by one
anonymous source to be the godson of the chief of D-2. After
strong intervention by the US embassy, a new arrest order was
issued for both suspects, but neither man was ever re-apprehended.
According to a Guatemalan death notice, Acosta died in a
motorcycle accident on April 5, 1987.
Significant intelligence bearing on the Wolfe case:
We found no significant intelligence bearing on the murder of Peter
Wolfe.
IOB conclusion:
The absence of any meaningful intelligence on this case does not
permit us to reach firm conclusions, but we see no reason to doubt
the implication from publicly available information indicating that
Boris Acosta in the company of Julio Gramajo killed Peter Wolfe.
The Guatemalan judiciary's handling of the case and the reported
intimidation of witnesses do appear to demonstrate that the
government wished to shield Acosta and Gramajo from prosecution.
Provision of intelligence to the Wolfe family:
We know of no intelligence-based information that sheds any light
on this case.
Janey Skinner and Jennifer Roitman
Janey Skinner and Jennifer Roitman were US volunteers working in
Guatemala with the human rights groups Peace Brigades
International and the Mutual Support Group for Families of the
Disappeared (GAM). On August 15, 1989, explosives were thrown
at the GAM headquarters building, and minutes later two grenades
were thrown at the building that housed the Peace Brigades office
and residence. There were no injuries in either incident.
Significant intelligence bearing on the Skinner and Roitman cases:
In August I989, DOD disseminated an intelligence report stating
that the "Special Operations" section of the D-2 was reportedly
responsible for the grenade attacks against the Peace Brigades and
GAM headquarters.
According to a DOD intelligence report, communications problems
in the aftermath of the September 1989 attack on the Peace Brigade
Headquarters alerted foreign organizations to the unreliability of
the phone system and to the possibility of intentional interference.
A DOD intelligence report indicated that in September 1989,
Guatemalan security forces were conducting intense investigations
of recent terrorist acts and had made it known that there were
enough suspects to enable new arrests in the near future. This news
had a significant impact on public opinion, producing a general
feeling of relief, even though the alleged right-wing kingpin, Leonel
Sisniega Otero, had escaped capture. All the recent grenade attacks
had been generally attributed to Sisniega's group, including those
against the GAM, the Peace Brigades, and a US-owned hotel.
Another DOD intelligence report stated that in the autumn of 1989,
Second Captain Rodolfo Leonel Sisniega Otero Cordero, the son
of Leonel Sisniega, had been sent to a post in Venezuela until the
situation concerning his father had been cleared up. According to
the report, his father was apparently implicated in recent terrorist
activity in Guatemala City, including grenade-throwing incidents.
IOB conclusions:
Neither the intelligence suggesting D-2 complicity nor that
suggesting unofficial rightwing responsibility is sufficient to enable
the IOB to conclude who perpetrated the attacks on GAM and the
Peace Brigades.
Provision of intelligence to Janey Skinner and Jennifer Roitman:
No intelligence-based information was provided to Janey Skinner
or Jennifer Roitman, but we do not believe any of the available
intelligence was reliable enough that it should have been provided.
Meredith Larson
Meredith Larson, a US citizen, was working in Guatemala as a
member of Peace Brigades International, an international human
rights organization. On December 20, 1989, while walking to her
residence with two colleagues, she and the others were stabbed by
two men. The attackers said nothing and did not attempt to rob the
victims. Members of the Peace Brigades had received death threats
in May 1989, and their residence had been the target of the August
15 grenade attack described above. Meredith Larson was
hospitalized in Guatemala and left for the United States on
December 28, 1989. The US ambassador lodged a protest with
senior Guatemalan government officials, but no suspects were ever
charged.
Significant intelligence bearing on the Meredith Larson case:
We did not find any significant intelligence bearing on the attack
upon Meredith Larson. The only reference to the assault was in a
DOD intelligence report that cited the attack as one of several
recent incidents of violence. Intelligence relating to the earlier
grenade attack on the Peace Brigades is described in the section
above concerning Janey Skinner and Jennifer Roitman.
IOB conclusions:
The circumstances of the attack upon Meredith Larson suggest that
it was carried out either by the Guatemalan security services or by
unofficial right-wing elements. Given the absence of intelligence on
the attack, however, we have no basis from which to draw any
further conclusions.
Provision of intelligence to Meredith Larson:
No intelligence-based information was shared with Meredith
Larson. In July 1995, she submitted a request under the Freedom of
Information Act for any documents referring to the attack upon her,
the threats and grenade attack against the Peace Brigades, or her
visits to Guatemala in 1994 with Jennifer Harbury. NSA responded
in October 1995 that it had found only one responsive NSA-
originated record, which concerned the Peace Brigades portion of
her request. In the course of our review, the IOB learned of three
more NSA-originated reports referring to the grenade attack on the
Peace Brigades, and one containing a passing reference to the
December 1990 stabbing attack. These reports were apparently not
uncovered in the NSA's FOIA search. None of these reports,
however, provide reliable insight into the attacks on Meredith
Larson or on the Peace Brigades headquarters.
Josh Zinner
Josh Zinner, a US citizen, was a social worker assisting homeless
children in Guatemala City when he reported that he and a co-
worker were assaulted on January 18, 1990 by gunmen who
attempted to force them into a car. The Guatemalan police
reportedly intervened, but released the assailants, who were said to
have displayed military identification. The police then allegedly
detained Zinner and his co-worker, drove them around in a police
car, and threatened them, before eventually releasing them.
Significant intelligence bearing on the Josh Zinner case:
We did not find any intelligence bearing on the attack on Josh
Zinner.
IOB conclusions:
Although the assault appears to have been carried out by members
of the Guatemalan military (either under orders or on their own), or
possibly by right-wing extremists with false identification, we have
no special insight as to who was responsible.
Provision of intelligence to Josh Zinner:
We know of no intelligence that sheds any light on the case.
Peter Tiscione
Peter Tiscione, an American citizen, was an archaeologist
conducting field research on Mayan pottery in Guatemala in August
1992. On the morning of August 22, Tiscione contacted the
embassy duty officer and told her that he feared being detained by
the authorities when he tried to leave Guatemala the next day as
planned. He also said that he had run out of his anti-depressant
medication and was suffering "withdrawal and cosmic doubts."
Tiscione had also reportedly tried to visit the US embassy. When
the duty officer talked to him later in the afternoon, after receiving
a call from Mrs. Tiscione in the United States, Peter Tiscione stated
that he had suffered a reaction but was feeling better and declined
the duty officer's offer to help him get more medication. When
Tiscione spoke to his wife in the evening, however, he again
expressed concern for his safety. After he failed to answer his
wife's phone call later that night, Mrs. Tiscione asked the night
clerk to check his room, at which time the clerk found Tiscione's
fully clothed body in his bathtub with machete wounds to the neck.
The Guatemalan police ruled the death a suicide. The only door to
Tiscione's room had been chained closed from the inside; the two
closed windows were too small for anyone to enter; there was no
sign of a struggle; the only finger prints on the machete were
Tiscione's; and a receipt for the machete's purchase was found
among Tiscione's possessions. A US Department of Justice official
and a consultant who had previously been Costa Rica's chief
medical examiner reviewed the Guatemalan police investigation and
agreed that the death appeared to be a suicide.
Significant intelligence bearing on the Tiscione case:
We did not find any intelligence bearing on Peter Tiscione's death.
IOB conclusions:
The evidence surrounding his death leads us to believe that it was,
as initially concluded, a suicide.
Provision of intelligence to the Tiscione family:
We found no intelligence-based information that could have been
provided to shed light on the case.
Melissa Larsen and June Weinstock
On March 8, l994, Melissa Larsen, a tourist from the United States,
was chased by a mob of villagers in Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa,
Guatemala, who apparently believed that she was engaged in baby
stealing. Larsen was taken from the town by the police and held for
two weeks in protective custody before being released. The
Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman concluded that the riot had
been encouraged by outside agitators, and several townspeople
reportedly said they had been warned about impending violence.
On March 29, 1994, June Weinstock, another tourist from the
United States, was stoned, stabbed, and beaten to unconsciousness
in the town of San Cristobal by a mob of Guatemalans who falsely
accused her too of child stealing. Weinstock fled the mob and
found refuge in the local courthouse until a group of striking and
apparently intoxicated highway workers arrived on the scene and
led an assault on the building. In the assault, Weinstock suffered
brain damage and has still not recovered all of her faculties. As the
situation developed, US embassy, defense attache, and station
officers exhorted their Guatemalan counterparts to act quickly to
defuse the crisis. Soldiers were dispatched, but because of a series
of delays, they arrived too late to help.
The Guatemalan mobs in both incidents were responding to a
malicious rumor that US citizens stole Guatemalan children in
order to sell their body parts for US transplant operations. The
rumor had apparently surfaced in Honduras in 1987 and was soon
repeated throughout the region, partly through a propaganda
campaign directed against the United States by the Soviet Union
and its allies, including the Guatemalan insurgents. This rumor
received renewed publicity in Guatemala in November 1993 after
an irresponsible British and Canadian television broadcast, which
was followed by equally inaccurate and unhelpful comments by a
Guatemalan official. In an apparently coordinated campaign, graffiti
appeared overnight in many parts of Guatemala City denouncing
American "gringo baby stealers."
Significant intelligence bearing on the Larsen and Weinstock cases:
A DOD intelligence report in April 1994 mentioned the attack on a
US citizen in San Cristobal in the midst of rumors that US citizens
were kidnapping children to use their organs in transplants. The
report noted that this rumor had, as perhaps intended, put the US
embassy on the defensive by forcing it to issue statements denying
these allegations. The rumor was also reported to have created
conditions which made the work of international observers of the
Human Rights Agreement difficult.
In April 1994, DOD disseminated a report that the Guatemalan
minister of defense had stated that he believed the attack on June
Weinstock to have been part of a joint effort by the guerrillas and
the Public Workers Union to destabilize the government of
Guatemala.
The other US intelligence reports that mentioned the Weinstock
incident discussed the Guatemalan government's fear of a US travel
advisory or relayed updates on Guatemalan government
investigations of the attack. The account provided through these
investigations largely mirrored publicly known information. There
was also, however, a suggestion that some of the striking highway
workers may have had a personal interest in the destruction of court
files that occurred during the riot.
IOB conclusions:
The mobs that attacked Melissa Larsen and June Weinstock were
motivated by the false rumor of kidnapping for body parts. We do
not know why the false rumor resurfaced in the Guatemalan press
in 1994, but we do not dismiss the possibility that it was raised by
elements opposed to the De Leon government and to US policy.
Provision of intelligence to Melissa Larsen and the Weinstock
family:
We know of no intelligence on these cases that offers significant
insight into the attacks.
Daniel Callahan
Daniel "Sky" Callahan, a US citizen, was filming a documentary in
Guatemala City for a human rights organization when on July 4,
1995, a soldier hit his legs with a baton or rifle butt while he was
filming. On July 7, Callahan was forced into a car, beaten, and
threatened with additional harm if he did not leave Guatemala. One
of his attackers also made reference to the July 4 attack. Callahan
returned to the United States for medical treatment on July 10,
1995. The Department of Justice is currently investigating the
Callahan case to determine whether it falls under US jurisdiction.
Significant intelligence bearing on the Callahan case:
The station made inquiries, but it learned no new information about
what had happened to Callahan.
In July I995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report recounting
the allegation that the abduction of Callahan did not result from
army policy, but that it was possibly perpetrated by "off duty" army
elements operating without the knowledge of the senior leadership.
Another DOD report related a claim that although soldiers may
have "nudged" Callahan on July 4 and off-duty army personnel may
have been involved in his later abduction, the army as an institution
was not implicated and was anxious to bring the Callahan case to a
swift conclusion.
In late July 1995, a DOD intelligence report indicated that
Guatemalan military officials wanted to show the US that they were
actively investigating alleged attacks by Guatemalan soldiers on a
US citizen on July 4 and 7, 1995. The officials believed it
important for Guatemala to demonstrate to the US that it was
interested in resolving the case. One military official reportedly
suspected that the assailant in the first attack may have been an off
duty soldier working as a bank guard near the scene. The officials
seemed, however, to have no evidence that the military was
involved in the second attack, and noted that the police sketch of
one of the assailants did not look like a Guatemalan soldier.
IOB conclusions:
The circumstances of the abduction lead us to believe that it was
conducted either by military (either under orders or on their own)
or by right-wing elements, but we found no intelligence reports that
provide greater insight.
Provision of intelligence to Daniel Callahan:
No intelligence-based information has been provided to Callahan,
but none provides reliable insight as to the perpetrators of the
abduction.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX A: INTELLIGENCE BEARING ON THE MURDER
OF MICHAEL DEVINE
In late June 1990, the Department of Defense (DOD) disseminated
a report suggesting that the army "definitely" did not kill DeVine.
The report also indicated that the army had issued orders to find
out promptly who had committed the murder, which may have been
connected to robbery. DOD cautioned that this report "was
anything but a definitive report" but was optimistic that the army's
vigorous investigation to clear itself would produce the killers.
In August 1990, the station disseminated its first intelligence report
on the murder from a source who reported that Colonel Garcia
Catalan, the military zone commander, had ordered the surveillance
of DeVine and that it was carried out by five enlisted men. The
source added that the Ministry of Defense was engaged in a cover-
up, including the destruction of a white Toyota pickup used to
conduct the surveillance of DeVine. (By the time of this report, the
embassy, because of Carl West's investigation, already strongly
suspected that members of the army killed DeVine.)
Also in August 1990, the station disseminated an intelligence
report from a source who reported that President Cerezo, under
pressure from the US ambassador, had ordered a proper
investigation by the Ministry of Defense. The source also stated
that rumors that DeVine had been somehow involved with the
guerrillas were apparently unfounded and perhaps part of the
military cover-up.
In September 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report which
suggested that DeVine may have been killed by soldiers from
Military Zone 23. It had been rumored that DeVine had been
providing support to the guerrillas, but this report speculated that
the murder had not been officially ordered. By another account
related in this report, the Ministry of Defense was blocking any
investigation and had already executed the killers.
Later in September 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
suggesting that President Cerezo and the military high command
intended to placate the U.S. embassy as much as possible on the
DeVine case, but did not really expect to bring the case to any
particular conclusion.
Another DOD report disseminated in September 1990 provided an
account of the investigation being carried out by the new
commander of Military Zone 23, Colonel Ortega.
In October 1990, the station learned from a source that five army
suspects had been arrested, and that although they had not been
ordered to kill DeVine, they had been ordered to surveil him in
order to recover one or two missing Galil rifles believed to be in his
possession. The source opined that the soldiers had gotten into an
altercation with DeVine and went too far. The source repeated
these findings to the station again in October. In that second cable
the station also stated that it had been told that DeVine drank
heavily and practiced his karate moves on troops from the Poptun
base beating them senseless, though the station had not verified
this.
In mid-October 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
claiming that several soldiers had been charged with DeVine's
killing as a result of US embassy pressure, but that those charged
were not believed to be guilty. The report said that the assistant G-2
of Military Zone 23, Second Captain Santos Bohr Avendano, had
been in charge of the operation, and that another officer may also
have been involved. It also reported that the motive for the killing
remained unclear, but DeVine was said to have been involved in
providing logistical support to the insurgents and possibly in arms
smuggling. This DOD report also referred to an anonymous phone
call to the embassy that fingered Captain Bohr as the officer on the
scene.
In December 1990, the station disseminated an intelligence report
from a source who stated that he believed that Captain Bohr
Avendano and all but perhaps one of the arrested soldiers were
innocent, and that those who had killed DeVine had not acted
under official orders. (All but one of the soldiers in fact appear to
have been innocent, and in February 1991 they identified the
soldiers who were eventually convicted.) The source also reported
that the Minister of Defense, against the advice of the Army Chief
of Staff, was an obstacle to pursuing a proper investigation. (This
intelligence contributed to the US ambassador's recommendation
that almost all military aid to Guatemala be suspended; the
suspension was implemented almost immediately.)
In late December 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
saying that DeVine had reportedly tried illegally to buy two army
rifles for 1,000 quetzales. Soldiers from the military zone G-2
section reportedly were attempting to bring him in for questioning
when he punched one of them in the face; the soldiers then
knocked DeVine to the ground and killed him. By this account, the
zone commander had not ordered a murder, but certainly knew
about the events. The report said the army recovered the two rifles
but did not say from whom. It also recounted the rumor that
DeVine's killers had been executed by the army, but that the other
soldiers who had been charged for the crime might be convicted
anyway.
In early January 1991, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
recounting that at the time he was killed, DeVine was being
investigated for providing medical supplies and food to the
guerrillas. The report stated that the zone commander knew of the
investigation--and became part of the cover-up--but that he had not
intended that DeVine be killed.
In April 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report with a
source's information that the soldiers had killed DeVine while
interrogating him about a missing Galil rifle. The military zone had
heard that the rifle had been sold by a deserter to DeVine, and the
D-2 had instructed the military zone commander, Colonel Garcia
Catalan, to recover it. One of Colonel Garcia's subordinates,
Captain Contreras, had sent a group of four sergeants and eight
soldiers on the mission. When DeVine either did not know
anything or refused to talk, one of the sergeants killed him with a
machete. Contreras was now being criticized for having failed to
supervise the enlisted men. Many officers reportedly believed that
Contreras, who was known for his temper and abuse of soldiers,
probably frightened the soldiers into taking extreme actions out of
a fear that they would be severely punished if the rifle were not
recovered.
Also in April 1991, the station obtained a copy of a report relating
to the De Vine case. It included a personality profile of DeVine,
which was generally positive, but noted a sometimes aggressive
manner and a readiness to denounce people involved in narcotics
trafficking. It recounted various claims or rumors that provided
possible motives for the killing: that DeVine was an army
informant, that he had denounced drug traffickers, that he was a
victim of guerrilla extortion, that he was killed by persons who
wanted to acquire his property, that he had personal problems with
two army deserters, and that it was revenge by someone DeVine
had shot years before. The station noted that the report contained
nothing that directly incriminated the army (whose involvement was
by then well-established) and did not disseminate the information
in the report as intelligence.
In May 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report
recounting that a source stated that President Serrano apparently
blamed the chief of the D-2 for blocking the investigation. The
source stated that the D-2 chief was indirectly responsible for
DeVine's death since he had ordered that a missing rifle be
recovered--and directly responsible for the subsequent cover-up--
but that there was no evidence that he had intended harm to
DeVine.
Also in May 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report
from a source stating that Captain Contreras and five sergeants had
been arrested in the DeVine case. Contreras was identified as
having issued the order to stage the operation, although he did not
accompany the men, but the source was not certain if the order was
to kill DeVine or to just "teach him a lesson." Colonel Garcia
Catalan was reportedly not in Peten at the time and neither involved
in nor aware of the operation. Contreras' immediate supervisor,
Major Paiz, was also reportedly uninvolved. The source said that
preliminary investigative findings indicated that Colonel Portillo
Gomez had been aware that some operation was planned against
DeVine, but it was not yet known if he was more deeply involved.
In late May 1991, DOD disseminated an intelligence report in
which Colonel Portillo was described as being very concerned at
being reported in the press as having been involved in the DeVine
killing. He reportedly maintains that he was not in the area at the
time and that he is being framed.
In early June 1991, DOD disseminated an intelligence report with a
claim that Colonel Portillo was being used as a scapegoat for the
DeVine murder and that it may have been Colonel Garcia Catalan
who was actually involved.
In June 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report from
multiple sources that the Minister of Defense was attacking the D-2
for doing more work for US intelligence agencies than for the
Guatemalan defense ministry. The minister was reportedly likely to
replace the chief of the D-2 for this, and because he believed the D-
2 had informed the US government that Guatemalan soldiers had
killed DeVine.
In July 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a
source who stated that Colonel Portillo, who had been alleged to
have been in temporary command of Military Zone 23 at the time of
the murder, had not in fact been in command of this area. The
source also said that it was apparently common knowledge that
there was some kind of personal or business relationship between
Colonel Garcia Catalan and DeVine.
In August 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report that
a source believed the killing was the result of the enlisted soldiers
carrying out their mission in an inappropriately hostile manner and
that there was no evidence that DeVine was involved in any
significant illegal activity other than occasionally smoking
marijuana. The source stated that Colonel Portillo knew nothing
until after the killing. The source stated that senior army officers
were covering up army involvement because they felt that if they
admitted involvement, the US government would react angrily,
which would hurt the army's image, provide propaganda to the
insurgents, and jeopardize military aid. According to the source, the
case had become so charged with nationalism that the army could
not see a way to back away from its actions without an enormous
loss of prestige.
In October 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report
from a source stating that Colonel Alpirez, who commanded the
Kaibil training base near DeVine's farm, had been present when
DeVine died during interrogation conducted by Captain Contreras
at the base. Colonel Garcia Catalan had reportedly ordered
Contreras to recover a missing rifle. The report also indicated that
Alpirez was an extremely violent man and had exhibited bizarre
behavior. (The CIA passed the information to the Department of
Justice to determine if the crime fell under US jurisdiction. The
handling of that crimes report by the CIA and DOJ was described
earlier in this report.)
In December 1991, the station disseminated two intelligence
reports from sources stating that President Serrano had relieved
Minister of Defense Mendoza at least in part for his obstruction of
the investigation in the DeVine case (as well as the Ortiz case). The
new Minister of Defense, Garcia Samayoa, had promised to
immediately advance the DeVine investigation.
In April l992, the station learned from a source a view that the
military should allow some of the military officials implicated in
"less significant" human rights cases to be prosecuted in order to
end the army's reputation for covering-up to protect its own. The
DeVine case was reportedly cited as an example of a "less
significant" case. This information was not disseminated beyond
the CIA.
In early May 1993, DOD disseminated a report recounting that
Colonel Garcia Catalan may have given "the order" in the DeVine
case. (It was not clear, however, what "the order" actually meant.)
In late May 1993, the station reported that a source claimed that
Contreras had been heard to say that he had picked up DeVine, had
informed the armed forces general staff "through channels" that he
had DeVine in custody, and asked for instructions. Contreras had
then reportedly been instructed to "do whatever it takes to resolve
the situation." The source explained that "the situation" meant
recovering the missing rifle, and that "through channels" meant that
he had advised the general staff of DeVine's apprehension and had
received this response through D-2 channels. The source believed
that the order must have come from the general staff.
In late May 1993, DOD disseminated a report claiming that
Contreras had been sighted in north central Honduras.
In February 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
indicating that Contreras may have been hiding in Venezuela. A
March 1995 report from the DOD corroborated this. In April l995,
the DOD disseminated a report of rumors that Contreras had
returned to Guatemala from Venezuela and that the D-2 had put out
an order for his death.
In April 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report in which it
was suggested that Lieutenant Colonel Felipe Alfonso Ochoa
Montero, the assistant director of the D-2 under Colonel Ortega
(who was abroad at the time), may have ordered Contreras to kill
DeVine. The report also related that Colonels Garcia Catalan,
Portillo, and Alpirez were reportedly not aware of the order (though
all three had participated in the cover-up). The DOD report also
said that Ochoa was reported to have since died of cancer. (This
report appears to be of dubious credibility in that in June 1990
neither Ortega nor Ochoa was in the D-2, and Ochoa was not in
Contreras' chain of command.)
In April 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report that
included the allegation that Colonel Garcia Catalan had sent
Captain Contreras and two or three soldiers to investigate reports
that DeVine was involved in arms and narcotics trafficking.
According to the report, DeVine was murdered by one of the
soldiers who wanted to rob him during the interrogation.
In early May 1995, DOD disseminated a report which said that
Alpirez had an audio tape that proves that he had no prior
knowledge of the DeVine murder, that he had been ordered to
participate in the cover-up, and that former ministers of defense had
been involved in the cover-up. The report recounted one
individual's belief that Colonel Cabrera, chief of D-2 at the time,
had ordered the interrogation of DeVine. Knowledge of the
existence of Alpirez' tape was reportedly becoming increasingly
widespread, and Alpirez had been heard to say that it would be
made public should anything happen to him.
In May 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a
source who stated that he believed that the Ministry of Defense was
using Colonels Alpirez and Garcia Catalan as scapegoats to protect
more senior retired officers. The source did not believe Alpirez
knew about the killing until after the fact and felt Alpirez had
participated in the cover-up only on orders. The source also
recounted that Contreras had reportedly claimed not to have killed
DeVine, but said that an enlisted soldier had done so.
In May 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a
source recounting that the Guatemalan government would probably
postpone investigation of the cover-up of the DeVine murder at
least until after the conclusion of a peace accord with the
insurgents, since some 20 military officials were suspected to have
been involved and an investigation would cause chaos in the
military.
In May 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a
source who said that he had heard that Alpirez had nothing to do
with the murder of DeVine and that he had refused to allow the
interrogation team onto his base. According to the source, the team
then went to a local drinking establishment and Alpirez had no
prior knowledge of their intent to apprehend and interrogate
DeVine. The source had also heard that Alpirez was unhappy about
DeVine s death because he had known Mrs. DeVine from visits to
the DeVine restaurant. The source speculated that Alpirez would
not have been in the military zone chain of command at the time of
DeVine's death.
In June 1995, the station reported to its headquarters that a source
said that the army seemed to have proof that Alpirez was not
involved in the death of DeVine--for example, that he was not in
charge of the soldiers who killed DeVine. The source said that
Alpirez could lose his life if he disclosed what he knows.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX B: INTELLIGENCE BEARING ON THE FATE OF
EFRAIN BAMACA
In March 1992, the station disseminated an intelligence report
based on a source's information that on March 12,1992, the
Guatemalan army had captured "Everardo," the commander of the
Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) Luis
Ixmata Battalion, in an ambush near San Marcos. The source said
that Everardo, although lightly wounded in the arm, was in good
condition, being well treated by the army, and cooperating fully
with his captors. According to the source, the news of Everardo's
capture had not been publicized and would probably be kept secret,
or even concealed by a claim that he had been killed, in order to
maximize his intelligence value. The source also stated that
Everardo had told his captors that Cuba was providing training and
weapons to his guerrillas, and that the latest weapons shipment had
come six months earlier. (There was no mention in the report of
Everardo s actual name, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, and thus it
apparently received no attention until the report was rediscovered
in early November 1994.)
In April 1992, the station reported a source's claim that ORPA
leader "Comandante Everardo" had allegedly been recently killed in
combat in Quiche.
In late May 1992, the Department of Defense (DOD) disseminated
an intelligence report indicating that the Guatemalan government
was concerned by the precedent set by the Human Rights
Ombudsman's office in filing a request directly with the courts
rather than through the attorney general's office to exhume a body
at the request of a "Mr. Bamaca" whose son was believed to be
buried in the grave. Twelve bodies were presumed to be in the
grave.
In May 1993, the station learned from a source recounting the
apparent accuracy of the stories being told by "Willy" and "Carlos"
(escaped guerrillas Jaime Adalberto Augustin Recinos and Santiago
Cabrera Lopez) regarding captured guerrillas being held in
clandestine prison cells by the Guatemalan military, including their
description of particular captured insurgents--including Bamaca.
The source reported an allegation that Bamaca was alive, but he
could neither confirm nor refute the allegation.
In September l993, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
claiming that clandestine military prisons had "always" existed in
Guatemala, and that guerrilla prisoners were commonly held
incommunicado in isolated military zone locations, interrogated,
and killed after the army had extracted all useful information from
them. It was also reported that Bamaca had been held
incommunicado, interrogated a number of times, and killed, and his
body disposed of in an unidentified location.
In May 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report that a
source claimed that unidentified D-2 officers took Bamaca away
shortly after his capture and that was the last the source had heard
anything about Bamaca's whereabouts or status. The source had
also suggested that Bamaca was in good health at the time.
In June and August 1994, the station reported that it had heard that
the escaped guerrillas' testimony that they had seen Bamaca alive in
a clandestine prison was fabricated in order to support the
guerrillas' propaganda objectives. Reportedly Bamaca had actually
died shortly after being wounded and captured in the fire fight with
the army.
In October 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report
from a source stating that Bamaca's capture was viewed as a great
success because Bamaca was the only important indigenous
guerrilla leader--as opposed to those of mixed "Spanish-
indigenous" descent--at the time. He also said that to the best of his
knowledge Bamaca died of his wounds shortly after his capture.
In early November 1994, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
saying that the army reportedly did not have Bamaca in custody and
speculating that if the army knew where Bamaca was, whether dead
or alive, it would turn him over to end the media attention. The
report also described the practice by which the Guatemalan army
reputedly interrogated captured guerrillas and then forced them to
work for army intelligence or face summary execution.
In early November 1994, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
saying that Bamaca had reportedly received a relatively minor
wound in the arm in a firefight near Retalhuleu, was captured, and
was interrogated at Retalhuleu and later at San Marcos. Because of
Bamaca's importance and because of his repeated attempts to
escape, he was encased in a full body cast to prevent escape. The
report indicated that Bamaca may have been questioned for about a
month in San Marcos by military intelligence division officers, and
talked freely about the guerrillas' policies, personnel, and activities,
but provided false information on arms caches. After the military
intelligence division decided Bamaca was no longer of use, it
issued an order that he be killed and sent a D-2 helicopter which
took Bamaca away from San Marcos still alive. The report
speculated that Bamaca had probably been dumped at sea, which
may be why the government could not now produce the body. DOD
had disseminated a report in April 1994 which suggested that in the
mid-1980's, the D-2 often dumped guerrillas from aircraft into the
sea to eliminate evidence that prisoners had been tortured and
killed.
In early November 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence
report from a source who said that the description of Bamaca did
not match that of the guerrilla killed in the firefight on March 12,
1992. The report recounted an observation that the army may have
substituted another guerrilla's body for that of Bamaca, who was
apparently killed elsewhere to cover up evidence of torture.
Also in November 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence
report from a source who said that Bamaca was dead and that
Jennifer Harbury's efforts to draw international attention would
only bring condemnation on the Guatemalan government and strain
relations between Guatemala and the international community.
In mid-November 1994, DOD heard that Bamaca had been
interrogated in San Marcos principally by Majors Soto and Sosa.
This report claimed that Bamaca was uncooperative and tried to
escape and was, therefore, incapacitated in a full body cast.
In mid-November 1994, DOD disseminated a report indicating that
Bamaca was dead and recounting an allegation that Bamaca's
remains were in a place that made them "impossible" to recover.
In mid-November 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence
report indicating that the guerrillas apparently did not know what
happened to Bamaca after March 12, 1992, but that they felt
Bamaca could still be alive only if he had betrayed the guerrillas
and cooperated with the army. In case Bamaca had cooperated and
was still alive, it was reported that the guerrillas believed Jennifer
Harbury's demonstrations would force the army to kill Bamaca and
thereby remove a threat to the URNG. They believed, however, that
Bamaca was probably dead, and the report recounted that the
URNG intelligence apparatus had been sending Harbury fabricated
reports that Bamaca was alive in order to encourage her highly
visible political activities against the Guatemalan government.
In mid-November 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence
report from a source who had heard that Bamaca had surrendered
without resistance, was turned over to the G-2 in San Marcos, and
was held at San Marcos and Santa Ana Berlin, Quetzaltenango
Department.
In late November 1994, the station heard from two sources who
offered their views on Bamaca's fate. One speculated that Bamaca
may have died of his wounds while being interrogated.
In late November 1994, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
recounting that it was believed that Bamaca had died of his wounds
shortly after the firefight in March 1992.
In early December 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence
report stating that a source said that Bamaca was captured
unharmed or lightly wounded and may have been alive for four or
five weeks. The source opined that he had probably been killed
once he had outlived his usefulness. He also said that Bamaca's
high-level guerrilla rank was not discovered until after his death.
The report also stated that Colonel Alpirez took charge of Bamaca's
interrogation.
In early December 1994, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
stating that on March 12, 1992, Guatemalan journalists were shown
the bodies of two guerrillas, one of whom they were told was
Bamaca (who was described to them as only a platoon lieutenant,
not a higher-level commander). After the journalists examined a
diary taken from the body reported to be Bamaca's and
photographed the body, a civil judge came to record the deaths.
It appeared to be normal procedure for then-Human Rights
Ombudsman De Leon both to receive all information about
guerrillas captured by the army and to take custody of any
guerrillas released after they agreed to give up their armed struggle.
The DOD report commented that in light of all of the reports of
Bamaca's capture, at least one of these observers had probably been
duped into thinking that a dead guerrilla was Bamaca.
In mid-December 1994, the station learned from a source that he
had heard that Alpirez, Major Raul Oliva, and Colonel Leonel
Godoy had "worked with" Bamaca after his capture. The source did
not know if Bamaca was dead or alive but assured the station that
Bamaca was not killed in San Marcos. The source also described a
burial site for guerrillas killed in the attack on Bamaca's column,
but said that Bamaca was not buried there.
In mid-January I995, the station was informed by a source that he
had heard that an official who had investigated the Bamaca case
had found witnesses to Bamaca's suicide. The information was
passed only to the DO.
In late January 1995, the station disseminated a report from a
source who said that he had been told that it was known within the
senior ranks of the army that Alpirez had killed Bamaca.
In early February 1995, DOD disseminated a report saying that
Alpirez had reportedly overseen the interrogation of Bamaca. The
report did not recount any allegations about who had actually killed
Bamaca, but expressed doubt that Alpirez would have personally
done so.
In late February l995, the station disseminated an intelligence
report stating that sources said the Guatemalan government had
conducted three separate investigations of the Bamaca case and had
decided that he died of his wounds soon after the firefight and that
his identity was not discovered until one or two days later.
In early March 1995, DOD disseminated a report indicating that
Bamaca had probably not been held at either of two Pacific naval
bases in Guatemala.
In early March 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report
stating that the Minister of Defense had said that a body exhumed
in the search for Bamaca's remains (presumably in August 1993)
was indeed Bamaca's. Reportedly, the judge who had claimed
otherwise had been paid to say so, but would soon testify in court
that it had been Bamaca's.
In mid-March l995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report which
recounted that there was no body of Bamaca for the Guatemalans to
produce. It gave no further details.
In March I995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from
a source who said that, at the time of Bamaca's capture, he was
visited at San Marcos by senior officers. The source added that he
believed the army would stick to its story that Bamaca died in the
firefight.
In March 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
recounting rumors that Bamaca's body had been thrown in to a river
on an unknown date.
In early April 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
indicating that Bamaca had led soldiers to locate an arms cache on
Santiaguito volcano in Military Zone 1715, where they were
ambushed by guerrillas. The officer in charge, Lieutenant Colonel
Jesus Aguirre, was reportedly wounded, and in his anger ordered
Bamaca killed, possibly by being thrown into the active volcano.
The report suggested that it would be easy to determine exactly
when this occurred because Aguirre's wounds were so severe that
he traveled to Houston, Texas for treatment. It added that Aguirre
had visited the United States in 1992 from March I8 to June 5, and
from September 6 to September 30. The second trip was reportedly
to Houston for unspecified medical reasons. (Escaped guerrilla
Santiago Cabrera has stated that Aguirre had been wounded and
left San Marcos before Bamaca's capture and did not participate in
his interrogations. A March 1992 station report corroborates that
Aguirre was seriously wounded two weeks before Bamaca's
capture.)
In early April 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
indicating that Alpirez had been in command of an anti-guerrilla
operation away from headquarters during the time Bamaca was
captured. The DOD report noted, however, that in public testimony
before the Attorney General, Alpirez had stated that his duties at
the time were administrative, not operational.
In mid-April 1995, an internal DOD intelligence report indicated
that Bamaca had reportedly been wounded in the shoulder during
the March 12 firefight and had been taken to the Santa Ana Berlin
military installation for treatment and interrogation. During this
time Colonel Alpirez, from the San Marcos military zone, visited
Santa Ana Berlin to follow the situation. Colonel Alpirez
reportedly ordered that Bamaca be put in a full body cast to prevent
his escape. Bamaca was then moved to several different places in
Guatemala for interrogation and then eliminated. The report did not
provide details on Bamaca's death.
In April 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from
a source who had heard that Bamaca was buried at the Cabanas
army detachment, which was located in the village of Montanita on
the Cabuz River. The source was unable to provide any other
details on what had happened to Bamaca.
In early May 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
recounting that Bamaca was reportedly dead, but it gave no further
details or the basis for this statement.
In May 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a
source who said he had heard that Alpirez was not involved in the
death of Bamaca, but that Bamaca had been turned over to military
intelligence in Guatemala City at some point after his capture.
In May 1995, the station reported to its headquarters that the
embassy had informed it that Angel Nery Urizar Garcia--who
claimed to have seen Bamaca alive at Santa Ana Berlin military
detachment at some point in 1992 when Urizar was affiliated with
the D-2 and posted to the region--was reportedly under the
protection of Guatemalan human rights authorities and claimed to
have been the subject of an assassination attempt. The station soon
afterwards disseminated a report to its headquarters and to CIA
analysts that a source had confirmed that Urizar was an enlisted
man who worked for G-2 in the San Marcos region when Bamaca
was captured. The source said that Urizar's claim that the army had
killed and buried a former guerrilla in Bamaca's place appeared to
be credible, as the army wanted to interrogate Bamaca but have the
public believe he had been killed.
In June 1995, the station relayed to its headquarters a source's
report that Colonel Alpirez had Bamaca's interrogation report, but
the source had no specific information that Alpirez had killed
Bamaca. He believed Alpirez was capable of it, but felt Alpirez
would not have acted without orders.
In June 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report that a
source stated that there was a rumor circulating in the Guatemalan
army that the search for Bamaca's remains at the Cabanas
detachment was futile because Bamaca's body had been burned.
In July 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a
source who said that the Guatemalan government felt it unfortunate
that Nery Urizar Garcia had claimed that the army had buried
another guerrilla in Bamaca's place. The source reported
speculation that if Bamaca s body were not found at the gravesite
(apparently at Las Cabanas), it was because the guerrillas had
switched the body.
In early July 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report in
which it was said that Colonel Alpirez had been heard to say to
someone in the Solicitor General's office that he had been the
second commander of a combined task force made up of units from
military zones 18 and 1715, which was under the command of
Colonel Haroldo Antulio Ruano Del Cid and headquartered at
Santa Ana Berlin. Alpirez reportedly stated that task force patrols
had used Bamaca as a guide to lead them to hidden weapons caches
and that one of these patrols, led by Major Jesus Efrain Aguirre
Loarca, had been ambushed and Aguirre wounded. According to
Alpirez, the decision was then made to eliminate Bamaca, but
Colonel Ruano would not take responsibility for the decision,
which was referred to Colonel Harry Ponce, the Military Zone 18
commander, who referred it to the D-2 in Guatemala City. Colonel
Otto Perez Molina, the D-2 director, reportedly then flew to Santa
Ana Berlin with Colonel Hector Mario Barrios Celada to pick up
Bamaca in a helicopter piloted by Captain Erwin Sosa Lara.
Alpirez allegedly did not know where Bamaca's body was located.
The DOD report noted that Colonel Ruano was assigned at the time
as the deputy director of a military high school; such an assignment
would make it unusual for him to have commanded an operational
task force.
In early July 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
recounting that President Serrano had been told that Bamaca's
remains were not at Las Cabanas military detachment, where
Jennifer Harbury was seeking an exhumation--but that there were
clandestine cemeteries in that general area with the bodies of other
victims.
In July 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report that a
source stated that some Guatemalan officials felt that the
government should use legal maneuvers to obstruct the grave
excavation at Cabanas military detachment. They feared that an
exhumation there would indeed unearth guerrilla remains and lead
to calls for exhumations elsewhere. In early August l995, DOD
disseminated an intelligence report recounting speculation that
Colonel Alpirez may know exactly who killed Bamaca and when
and how--and that he may be holding this information as his "ace in
the hole."
In late February 1996, DOD disseminated an intelligence report
stating that the Guatemalan government had obtained declassified
CIA documents relating to Bamaca's capture. These documents
made no mention of Major Sosa Orellana, who had reportedly
ordered the murder of another insurgent who was then passed off as
that of Bamaca.
In late March 1996, DOD disseminated a new account of Bamaca's
fate from a March 1996 letter to the embassy purportedly from
"PREGUA," allegedly a group of disaffected army officers.
According to this account, Bamaca was captured and interrogated
over the course of a year in various military zones and in Guatemala
City with the knowledge of the leadership of the Guatemalan army
and numerous army officers identified by name. The letter stated
that the recent allegation that another guerrilla was killed and
buried in Bamaca's place was true. Reportedly after the efforts of
Bamaca's wife focused greater attention on the Bamaca case,
President Serrano, Minister of Government Perdomo, Minister of
Defense Garcia Samayoa, Army Chief of Staff Perussina Rivera,
Chief of the Presidential Military Staff Ortega Menaldo, and D-2
chief Colonel Perez Molina met to consider the situation. Although
all participants except Colonel Perez Molina supported releasing
Bamaca, it was allegedly decided that Colonel Perez Molina would
take care of the problem. According to the account, Colonel Perez
then ordered his subordinates to kill Bamaca, and the order was
carried out by D-2 enlisted men near Guatemala's southern coast,
with Bamaca's body being buried or burned in a sugar cane field.
The DOD report commented that many of the persons named in the
letter were indeed at the relevant time in the positions that were
asserted in the letter, but that the letter appeared to have been
written by different authors than an earlier letter purportedly from
the same group, and that it appeared unlikely that such a high level
group would have deferred to Colonel Perez Molina on what to do
with Bamaca. The report also noted that although the document
listed 25 officers who were aware of or involved in Bamaca's
interrogation, it did not include two officers who have been
included in many other accounts--Colonel Alpirez and Lieutenant
Colonel Soto Bilbao.
In late April 1996, DOD disseminated an intelligence reporting a
belief that the sort of high-level meeting to decide Bamaca's fate
alleged by the 'PREGUA" letter could have occurred. The report
also recounted speculation that three likely candidates as the author
of the letter were Colonel Alfredo Merida Gonzalez (a former D-2
chief known to have written anonymous letters before) and Colonel
Alpirez and Lieutenant Colonel Juan Gillermo Oliva Carrera (both
of whom had been mentioned in earlier accounts of the case but
were completely absent from the PREGUA letter).
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