School of the Americas Report
MARCH 6, 1997
U.S. Policy in Central America: 1980-1991:
When the Reagan Administration came into office in 1981, one of
its top priorities was ending the guerrilla war in El Salvador. A
second priority was to aid the contra guerrilla war against the
Sandanistas in Nicaragua. Honduras, a small country located
between El Salvador and Nicaragua, became the U.S. base for
American efforts in Central America, and will be the focus for this
section of the Report.
In 1980, Colonel Gustavo Alvarez became the head of the police in
Honduras. According to a top U.S. official who was in Honduras at
the time, who declined to be named, the pattern of human rights
abuses was in full swing by February of 1981. In a meeting with
Col. Alvarez in 1981, this official was told that U.S. insistence on
legality and human rights would not succeed, and that the
Argentine model of eliminating subversives should be followed.
In 1982, Alvarez was promoted to general and named commander of
the army. That same year Battalion 316, a secret army intelligence
unit in Honduras trained and supported by the CIA, came into
existence. Battalion 316 became notorious for committing human
rights abuses.
Atrocities committed by Honduran death squads were reported by
James LeMoyne, former El Salvador bureau chief for The New
York Times, on June 5, 1988. In his article, LeMoyne told the story
of Florencio Caballero, a self-confessed interrogator in a Honduran
army death squad. Caballero says he was trained in Texas by the
Central Intelligence Agency.
According to Caballero, who sought exile in Canada, he and 24
others were taken to Texas between 1979 and 1980 to be trained by
the army and the CIA. Caballero says that, in Texas, the Americans
taught
"interrogation in order to end physical torture in Honduras. They
taught us psychological methods - to study the fears and
weaknesses of a prisoner. Make him stand up, don't let him sleep,
keep him naked and isolation, put rats and cockroaches in his cell,
give him bad food, serve him dead animals, throw cold water on
him, change the temperature." 3
Caballero told LeMoyne that the Americans had trained him not to
murder and physically torture people.4 Caballero claimed the
interrogations had started out okay, i.e. they just involved
psychological "coercion", but somehow everything had gone all
wrong, and they began to physically torture and murder people.5
Caballero told LeMoyne that he tortured and murdered about 120
Hondurans and other Latin Americans. And he told LeMoyne about
secret jails, murder, and CIA involvement in Honduras.6
Between 1980 and 1984, the Honduran army, with American
support, uncovered and then systematically wiped out much of the
small Honduran guerrilla movement.7 At that time, no civil justice
system existed in Honduras; there were no trial courts or lawyers to
defend the accused.
Caballero told LeMoyne about the torture of 24 year old Ines
Murillo in 1983, which LeMoyne was able to confirm. Murillo was
a prisoner in a secret army jail in Honduras, and Caballero
interrogated her and watched her get tortured. For 80 days, Murillo
was beaten, electrically shocked, burned, starved, exposed,
threatened, stripped naked, and sexually molested. To keep her
from sleeping, her captors poured water on her head every ten
minutes.
According to Caballero, an American C.I.A. agent sometimes
visited the secret jail where he worked, and where Murillo was
being tortured. The agent was given edited interrogation reports on
the prisoners there. Caballero did not know how much the
Americans knew about the physical torture that was taking place.8
Murillo confirmed that during the months that she was in a secret
jail, an American official periodically visited her. He was never
present when she was tortured. However, Murillo "does not believe
the CIA could fail to know what was going on." 9
While in jail, Mr. Caballero and other interrogators gave her raw
dead birds and rats for dinner, threw freezing water on her naked
body every half hour for extended periods of time and made her
stand for hours without sleep and without being allowed to urinate.
Murillo survived her torture experience, mostly due to the
intervention of her father, who formerly served in the Honduran
military. Her father bribed a soldier to tell him where his daughter
was being held. The soldier also revealed the name and phone
number of the purported C.I.A. operative. After Murillo's father
threatened to publish this information, his daughter was released
into a regular jail in Honduras. 13 months later, she was allowed to
go into exile.
One American official who spoke with LeMoyne told him that "the
CIA knew what was going on, and the Ambassador [John D.
Negroponte] complained sometimes. But most of the time they'd
look the other way."10 Ambassador Jack R. Binns, who was
stationed in Honduras before Negroponte, expressed the same
sentiments.
Ambassador Binns made the point that torture practices in Latin
America were used long before Battalion 316 came into existence.
However, he also stressed that the United States was complicit in
Battalion 316 activities, and complicit in training the individuals
who made up Battalion 316, because the United States ignored the
human rights violations that were taking place in Honduras.
Ambassador Binns felt strongly that USSOUTHCOM should be
closed down.11
Ambassador Binns tried to bring the situation to the attention of
the Department of State in Washington, D.C. According to Binns,
he reported human rights violations to State, and was "begging for
them to take some action."12 Not only was State not receptive, but
they told Binns to stop reporting human rights violations through
regular channels. He was told to use back channels, and take great
care that information was not leaked to Congress. Otherwise, he
was told, it would be difficult to get Congressional approval for
security and economic assistance to Honduras. 13
This attitude undoubtedly sent the message that human rights
abuses would not be punished by the United States. It was the same
attitude that contributed to the development of training manuals
that taught torture, execution and murder in Latin America in the
1980s.
Development of the Training Manuals
Some follow-up actions were recommended when the different
training manuals, outlined below, came to light. Apparently,
however, there was little or no follow-up on those
recommendations.14 Furthermore, in all instances, no one was held
accountable for the fact that the United States was teaching training
techniques which violated U.S. army policy. To this day, it appears
that the United States is unwilling establish accountability for the
development of these manuals, or the fact that the manuals were in
use at the U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA).
1983 Interrogation Manual
In 1983, a manual known as the 1983 CIA Interrogation Manual
was put together with material from notes from the Honduran
training course, lesson plans used in the course, and the 1963
KUBARK manual.15 The 1983 manual, officially titled the
"Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual," first surfaced at
a classified Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on June 16,
1988. This hearing was prompted by allegations by James LeMoyne
in his 1988 New York Times article, "Testifying to Torture," that
the United States had taught Honduran military officers who used
torture.
This manual was declassified on January 24, 1997. It gave detailed
information on training methods used against suspected subversives
in Latin America in the 1980s. The methods used by Battalion 316
in Honduras, and the methods taught in the interrogation manual,
were strikingly similar.16
The CIA confirmed at a hearing before the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee in 1988 that it provided intelligence and
counterintelligence training to Honduran military groups. At the
hearing, Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations at the CIA,
testified that from February 8 to March 13, 1983, the CIA trained
Caballero, Maro Turo Regalatta, and other Hondurans in
interrogations.
According to Stolz, the courses included practical exercises with
actual prisoners, and the presence of a CIA instructor during
interrogation. The course's lesson plans or programs of instruction
were based on the instructor's personal experience in the U.S. army,
on army field manuals (FM) - especially FM 30-15, and on
personal experience.17
Stolz also testified that the course emphasized the value of humane
treatment and perceptive psychological approaches to questioning.
He claimed that physical abuse or other degrading treatment was
rejected not only because it was wrong, but because it has
historically proven to be ineffective.18
Under questioning, however, Stolz acknowledged that the agency
taught the Hondurans that in dealing with prisoners they should
deny them sleep, make them stand up, keep them isolated. In terms
of teaching to change the room temperature, or, as stated in the
manual, to "manipulate the subject's environment, to create
unpleasant or intolerable situations," Stolz asserts that "that's not
impossible." He denied all other allegations raised by LeMoyne in
his 1988 New York Times article. When asked if there were any
corrective actions dealing with the person responsible for the
manuals, Stolz responded, "Not to my knowledge."
The most graphic part of the Interrogation Manual is the section
discussing "coercive techniques." This section recommends
arresting suspects early in the morning by surprise, blindfolding
them, and stripping them naked. Suspects should be held
incommunicado and deprived of any kind of normal routine in
eating and sleeping. Interrogation rooms should be windowless,
soundproof, dark and without toilets.
The Manual does advise that torture techniques can backfire, and
that the threat of pain is often more effective than the pain itself. It
notes that "while [the CIA] does not stress the use of coercive
techniques, [they] do want to make you aware of them and the
proper way to use them." It states that "illegal detention" and
"coercive techniques"19 always require prior headquarters
approval.20 It justifies the use of coercive techniques for those
subjects "who have been trained or who have developed the ability
to resist non-coercive techniques.21
The Manual then goes on to recommend psychological techniques
to break an individual's will to resist. The techniques include:
prolonged constraint; prolonged exertion; extremes of heat, cold, or
moisture; deprivation of food or sleep; disrupting routines; solitary
confinement; threats of pain; deprivation of sensory stimuli;
hypnosis; and use of drugs or placebos.
The U.S. military made a superficial attempt between 1984 and
1985 to correct the inappropriate material contained in the 1983
Interrogation Manual, primarily because of the strong public
reaction following the disclosure of the Contra Training Manual,
discussed below, which was made public in October, 1994. A page
advising against using coercive techniques and discouraging torture
was inserted into the Interrogation Manual.
In addition, handwritten notes and changes were written
haphazardly throughout the text. For example, "Deprivation of
sensory stimuli induces stress and anxiety. The more complete the
deprivation, the more rapidly and deeply the subject is affected"
was altered to read: "Extreme deprivation of sensory stimuli
induces unbearable stress and anxiety and is a form of torture. Its
use constitutes a serious impropriety and violates policy."22
Despite the handwritten changes, it is still quite easy to read the
original text, which was simply crossed out.
Both the alterations and the new instructions that appeared in the
manual in 1985 indicate that the torture methods taught in the
earlier version contradicted U.S. army policy. Senator Cranston
made this exact point in the 1988 Select Intelligence Hearing, when
he pointed out that the wording in the 1983 manual instructed the
reader to "use coercive methods."23
The Contra Training Manual
A CIA document instructing Nicaraguan rebels in the techniques of
political assassination and guerrilla warfare was leaked to the
House Intelligence Committee in October, 1984. The manual,
"Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare," instructs how to
organize a guerrilla movement and lead it to power by winning
popular support and using violence.
The manual was compiled in late 1983 by John Kirkpatrick, a CIA
adviser to the Contra rebels. The 90-page document recommends
the hiring of professional criminals to carry out "selective jobs,"
creating a "martyr" by arranging a violent demonstration that leads
to the death of a rebel supporter, and coercing Nicaraguans into
carrying out assignments against their will.
The document also states that unpopular government officials can
be "neutralized" with the "selective use of violence." These terms
are not defined in the text. And according to President Reagan,
being "neutralized" simply means being fired from one's position.
According to almost everyone else, however, it means something
entirely different.
When the Contra Manual was publicly released in October 1984,
there was a general outcry over the contents of the document. The
House Intelligence Committee held hearings on its disclosure, and
high level officials spoke out strongly against the document, and
called for the resignation of William Casey, then-Director of the
CIA. The ultimate outcome, however, was nothing dramatic or
decisive. A few American officials got a slap on the wrist.
In 1988, the CIA clearly stated U.S. policy for training intelligence
and counterintelligence to foreign militaries. According to the CIA:
The policy is not to participate directly in nor to encourage
interrogation which results in the use of force, mental or physical
torture, demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment
of any kind as an aid to interrogation. The policy is to actively
discourage the use of these methods during interrogations.
Personnel should play a positive role in influencing foreign liaison
to respect human rights. 24
Thus at least twice during the 1980s, training materials used by the
U.S. army in Latin America came under intense scrutiny.25 As a
result of that scrutiny, the Pentagon issued a policy brief which
stated that the U.S. would not participate in interrogation
techniques that violated U.S. policy, and would actively discourage
the use of those methods. It also stated that U.S. personnel should
play a positive role in promoting human rights.26
Despite this scrutiny, and previous policy statements,27 a series of
training manuals were produced in 1987 which contained
objectionable material. These manuals were then used to train
MTT's in Latin America, and foreign military personnel in
classrooms at USARSA. The fact that the USARSA manuals came
into existence indicates that army controls or review procedures
established as a result the disclosure of the 1983 Interrogation
Manual and the 1984 Contra manual must have been either
inadequate or nonexistent.
USARSA Training Manuals
Just a few years after the Contra Manual was made public, the
470th MIBDE at USSOUTHCOM, in Panama, retrieved from
USARSA in 1987 a series of documents that included training
material which taught murder, extortion and torture. These training
materials were distributed in Latin America and at USARSA,
despite the CIA statement on U.S. army policy cited above. The
history of the USARSA training manuals begins with Project X.
Project X:
Project X, part of the U.S. Army's Foreign Intelligence Assistance
Program, was the basis for the training materials taught at the U.S.
Army School of the Americas in the 1980s. The program was
developed from 1965-66 by the Office of the Assistant of Staff for
Intelligence to assist select foreign countries in organizing and
developing military intelligence operations.
Project X, one of the types of foreign assistance available through
the Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program, provided U.S. Army
Intelligence Publications and Training Materials. It was developed
and executed by the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird,
Maryland. Virtually no official documentation of the origin or
scope of the project exists today.28
During the mid-1970s, after moving to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) began
exporting, on request, Project X materials to U.S. military agencies
participating in the U.S. advisory-training effort in friendly
countries. In addition, instructors at USAICS used Project X
material as reference material in preparing lesson plans for the
Foreign Officer Course.
Sometime between 1975 and 1981, USAICS transferred control of
all Project X materials to the Reserve Affairs Office. In 1983,
responsibility for Project X was transferred to the Nonresident
Training Branch, Unit Training Division, Directorate of Training
and Doctrine. In 1990, responsibility was transferred to the
Individual and Collective Training Division.
Training Materials from U.S. Army School of the Americas:
In 1982, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(OACSI) tasked USAICS to provide unclassified lesson plans to
the School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia. USAICS
formed a working group to satisfy this requirement. The working
group decided to use Project X materials because they previously
had been cleared for foreign disclosure.
The working group asked the OACSI whether Project X material
was still releasable to foreign students. The OACSI replied that
USAICS could release all unclassified Project X material to the
School of the Americas after reviewing it to ensure that it was
current. The material was reviewed and released for use at the
School of the Americas. All Project X material was in English.
Lt. Col. Victor Tise was a young captain in a military course at
USAICS. In late February, 1982, he was assigned to update the all-
source intelligence course for the U.S. Army School of the
Americas, Fort Gulick, Panama Canal Zone. Tise worked with
Captain John Zindar, who was also at Fort Huachuca.
It was the understanding of both of these men that President Carter
had stopped intelligence training in Latin America because of the
escalating reports of human rights abuses. Carter was reportedly
concerned that the training and the abuses were linked. It was also
their understanding that it was a top priority for President Reagan
to reinstate intelligence training in Latin America immediately.29
Tise and Zindar had until the end of September to design and
implement intelligence training at SOA,30 and to update Project X
material for use at USARSA.31 They were supervised at Fort
Huachuca by Major Richard L. Montgomery, and given a proposed
Program of Instruction from SOA that outlined the courses that
Tise and Zindar were to develop.
According to Tise, the Project X material was approved by Major
Montgomery, and also by J.W. Taylor, Department of Human
Intelligence, Fort Huachuca. The materials also had to be cleared by
"Washington," and were sent through the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations for clearance (DCSOPS). Tise recalls that the material
came back from Washington approved but unchanged.32
Tise stated that he did not notice that there was inappropriate
training material contained in the Project X documents. Tise also
noted that although all of the Project X material was unclassified,
much of it came word-for-word from FM 30-18, a classified field
manual on intelligence tactics.33 Zindar, on the other hand, does
recall the inappropriate material, and says that most of it dated back
to the Vietnam era, and needed major revisions.34 Both Tise and
Zindar worked on revising the material so that it could be taught at
SOA.
Major Ralph Heinrichs was in the Department of Training
Development at SOA during the period that these training manuals
were being updated and transferred to SOA. Heinrichs confirmed
that Project X material was in use at the School prior to 1982.35
According to Heinrichs, Project X material was used at the School
until the mid-1970s.36
Heinrichs stated that his boss, Ramon Quijano, and the
Commandant of USARSA, Col. Nicholas A. Andreacchio, travelled
to Washington, D.C. to get approval to teach the training materials
after they were transferred from Fort Huachuca and updated by Tise
and Zindar. According to Heinrichs, Quijano and Andreacchio had
a disagreement with the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at
the Pentagon, who ultimately approved the Project X materials to
be reintroduced into SOA.37 It was Heinrichs' understanding that a
few changes in the training material were needed. For example: the
SOA should not use the term insurgent, insurgency, or counter
insurgency. Rather, they should use the term guerilla.
In addition, some human intelligence terms and agent handling
techniques were sanitized. The SOA position was that the materials
had been taught for 10 years or longer to thousands of trainees
around the world, and did not need to be changed. Ultimately, the
Pentagon approved the materials.38
According to Tise, Margarito Cruz, a native Puerto Rican teaching
Human Intelligence at SOA in 1982, recognized the materials being
taught from the 1970s, when he was also an instructor at SOA.
Cruz reportedly recommended revamping some of the materials,
after they were approved in DC, and Tise believes that the
objectionable wording was removed.39 It is unclear, however, how
much of the objectionable material was removed from the training
material before the intelligence classes were reinstated at USARSA
in the fall of 1982.
Both Zindar and Tise say that they personally did not teach any
objectionable materials at USARSA. They could not confirm or
deny whether someone else taught these materials. Tise left SOA in
November, 1982, and returned from 1986-89. Zindar stayed at SOA
until mid-1983. No one was interviewed who taught at the School
from 1983-1986. The Pentagon claims that the objectionable
materials were not taught at USARSA during this period.
Development of USARSA Training Manuals:
There is broad consensus as to how the existing training manuals
were developed. In 1984, the SOA moved to Fort Benning,
Georgia. In 1987, the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade (470th
MIBDE) of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM),
stationed in Panama, asked SOA for help putting together
instruction materials for Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) in Latin
America.
MTT's were used around the world to bolster the efforts of
permanently assigned advisors by conducting specialized
intelligence training beyond the capabilities of the local advisory
and intelligence personnel. The MTT's can be organized to meet a
request for almost any type of intelligence and security training and
assistance.
The training materials obtained by the 470th Military Intelligence
Brigade included the original training materials with objectionable
wording which had been flagged by Cruz in 1982.40 Apparently
this material was not subjected to an independent review by the
470th MIBDE or USSOUTHCOM when it was brought into
Panama from USARSA.
In 1987 USSOUTHCOM began issuing the training manuals, with
the objectionable material, to students and military intelligence
schools in Latin America. In 1989, a former member of the 470th
Military Intelligence Brigade assumed instructor duties at the
USARSA, and used these manuals as student handouts.41 The
manuals were issued to students from ten countries: Bolivia,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
In March 1991, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) discovered
the objectionable materials while planning for Mobile Training
Team unit to be sent to Columbia to provide training in
counterintelligence and foreign intelligence. DIA requested a copy
of the proposed Program of Instruction and training manuals from
USARSA. The Spanish language manuals that were to be used were
translated into English, and DIA discovered the objectionable
material.43
The CIA reviewed the manuals, and noted some policy and
classification discrepancies. The documents contained several
passages which provided training regarding use of truth serum in
interrogation, abduction of adversary family members to influence
the adversary, prioritization of adversary personalities for
abduction, exile, physical beatings and executions.
In the summer of 1991, Secretary Cheney was alerted to the
existence of the manuals and the objectionable material. An
independent inquiry into the documents was conducted, and
Congressional Armed Services and Intelligence Committees were
informed of the error. According to the Pentagon, copies of the
manuals were retrieved. The Inspector General noted in its 1997
review, however, that total retrieval of all of the manuals in
circulation was considered doubtful.44
During the first week of August 1991, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense notified the Congressional Committees on this matter, and
the Assistant to the Secretary for Defense reported the incident to
the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.
On August 9, in a secret memo to the Secretary of the Army, U.S.
Commander in Chief - Southern Command (USCINCSO) and the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense announced that it completed a study of one of the manuals
in question, "Manejo de Fuentes" (or "Handling of Sources"). The
study concluded that the manual advocated methods and activities
which contradicted U.S. army policy.
As a result of these findings, a number of offices were tasked to
review U.S. training material and training procedures. USCINSCO
was responsible for reviewing all intelligence and
counterintelligence training material. It was also responsible for
recovering the objectionable materials and educating foreign
military groups on acceptable U.S. material. USCINSCO also
informed military groups that the recovered manuals were not U.S.
policy, and that an error was made by including the objectionable
material in the manuals.
The Assistant to the Secretary for Defense was responsible for
launching a full investigation into the use of the manuals,
submitting a report, together with recommendations, to the
Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army was tasked to
collect all Project X related and training material at USARSA and
Fort Huachuca related to the objectionable material, and to put the
materials under secret level and wait for instructions for disposal.
The ATSD was also tasked with reviewing all intelligence and
counterintelligence training material.
On June 28, 1996 the Intelligence Oversight Board issued a Report
on the Guatemala Review. In that report, there was a short reference
to training materials that were used at USARSA which violated
U.S. army policy. Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy launched an effort to
have the manuals released to the public. On September 20, 1996,
the Department of Defense made the manuals public.
1997 Inspector General Report
After Secretary of Defense Cheney was notified in the summer of
1991 of the training manuals in use at USARSA, he directed the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense - Intelligence Oversight
(ATSD-IO) to investigate the use of Spanish language intelligence
training manuals, which contained materials considered
inconsistent with U.S. and Department of Defense policies. The
ATSD-IO issued its report on March 10, 1992.
On September 30, 1996, the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the
Inspector General, Department of Defense, to review the 1992
ATSD-IO report to determine whether it was adequate to assess
individual responsibility. The Inspector General was also asked to
determine whether corrective actions recommended by the March
1992 report were satisfactorily implemented. On February 21, 1997
the Inspector General completed this review and released it to the
public.
The Inspector General report has a number of inaccuracies. First,
the Report claims that army personnel did not realize that the
USARSA manuals violated standard army policy. However, this
office has spoken with several individuals who indicated that they
raised the issue of the content of the manuals to their superiors, and
were still told to teach the training materials.
Second, according to the IG, neither the army element at the
USSOUTHCOM nor the faculty at USARSA followed army policy
for doctrinal approval of the manuals. Yet before the material was
transferred to USARSA, it was approved by at least two different
people at Fort Huachuca and in Washington, D.C.,45 and also by
the USARSA. Despite numerous phone calls to the Pentagon,
former USARSA instructors, and USAICS officials in Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, this office was not able to determine what
constituted official army policy for doctrinal approval. However, all
of the individuals who were interviewed noted that the manuals did
appear to be reviewed extensively before they were taught at
USARSA.
According to Lt. Col. Tise, the USARSA in Panama fell under the
command of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS),
which is part of army headquarters at the Pentagon. Tise recalls that
the material was sent through DSCOPS by USAICS for clearance
and came back approved but unchanged.46
Although Tise does not recall that USARSA fell under the
supervision of Training and Doctrine (TRADOC), he claims that
the approval it got at Fort Huachuca would have constituted
TRADOC approval. Major Heinrichs, at USARSA, recalls that the
material was sent by USARSA to Washington, D.C., where it was
approved by the Deputy Secretary for Intelligence at the Pentagon.
Even if the material did not make its way through the entire
approval process, according to our sources it was approved by at
least two offices at Fort Huachuca and in Washington, D.C., and at
least one office at USARSA. Thus it should be possible to
establish accountability for reintroducing the materials to
USARSA, whether by a deliberate attempt to violate Department of
Defense policy or not.47 Regardless, gross negligence certainly
was at play.
Third, the IG report states that there was no English language
version of the manuals. However, all of the materials used in the
manuals originated in English, and were approved in English for
use at USARSA before being translated into Spanish. Thus, it is
misleading to suggest that the English language training materials
approved for use at USARSA are different from the Spanish
language materials incorporated into the training manuals.
The IG report released February 21, 1997 does analyze whether
corrective actions recommended by the March 1992 report were
satisfactorily implemented. The IG report concludes that they were
not, that the report had only a minimal impact, and that ultimately it
was unsuccessful.48
The IG report summarizes why the 1992 investigation and
recommendations were unsuccessful. It states that:
The army and the Defense Intelligence Agency were the only DoD
Components that published documents in support of the
memorandum; other action addressees had no record of receipt or
considered no action was necessary. The [Assistant Secretary for
Defense (ASD(C3I)] had no mechanism in place to monitor
compliance with the memorandum. As a result, the issue of DoD
policy on intelligence and counterintelligence training of non-U.S.
persons evaporated and current ASD(C3I) staff members have little
or no recollection of the 1992 memorandum. (emphasis added.)49
We know that previous investigations and subsequent follow- ups
were also ineffective.
The United States Army School of the Americas - also known as
the School of Assassins - has graduated many of Latin America's
most notorious foes of democracy and human right violators. In El
Salvador, 48 officers cited for human rights violations in a U.N.
Truth Commission were trained at the school.
This includes Col. Elena Fuentes, one of the country's most
notorious hardline officers. Elena Fuentes was in the room when
Salvadoran military leaders gave the order to murder to murder the
Jesuit priests in 1989. He was an instructor at the school in 1985
and 1996. In fact, 19 of the 26 officers cited by the U.N. Truth
Commission for involvement in the Jesuit murders and coverup
were SOA graduates.
And there are countless victims -- individuals who have suffered so
much at the hands of those who were taught to torture and murder
by elements within our own government.
Archbishop Oscar Romero was gunned down in cold blood by
SOA graduates because he stood up for the powerless against the
powerful. Four Ursuline nuns were ravaged and mutilated and
thrown into a ditch for the crime of teaching children to read. The
children of El Mozote were machine gunned by SOA alumni for the
sin of living in the wrong place at the wrong time.
The Clinton administration has put the promotion of democracy
and human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy. Continued
operation of the School of the Americas, given its history and
tradition, stands in the way of establishing a new U.S. relationship
with Latin America based on strengthening civilian, democratic
institutions.
Fifty years ago, the U.S. Army School of the Americas opened its
doors in Panama to a class of Latin American and Caribbean
military officers to receive training in the art of war.
Half a century later, it is time to shut the School down.
---
ENDNOTES (these begin with #3 as #1 and #2 are part of the
Executive Summary which was released as part of the whole
report).
3. Caballero, as quoted by LeMoyne, James, "Testifying to
Torture," in The New York Times, June 5, 1988, Section 6, p. 45.
4. Caballero does not include psychological methods under the
heading of torture. According to LeMoyne, Caballero did not
include psychological "coercion" in the same category as physical
torture.
5. Conversation with LeMoyne, March 5, 1997.
6. LeMoyne, James, "Testifying to Torture," The New York Times,
June 5, 1988, Section 6, p. 45, Column 1.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Conversation with Ambassador Binns, Jan. 27, 1997.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. The sole fact that the USARSA manuals came into existence in
the late 1980's, after the Contra Training Manual was publicly
revealed and the Honduran Interrogation Manual was edited, proves
this fact.
15. The KUBARK manual was written in 1963 for use by U.S.
agents against communist subversion. It was not written for use in
training foreign military services.
16. Cohn, Gary et al, "Torture was Taught by CIA; Declassified
manual details the methods used in Honduras; Agency denials
refuted," The Baltimore Sun, January 27, 1997, p. 1A.
17. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing, June 16,
1988.
18. Ibid.
19. Human Resources Exploitation Manual - 1983, p. A-2.
20. Ibid., p. B-2.
21. Ibid., p. L-4.
22. Human Resources Exploitation Manual - 1983, p. K-7.
23. Senate Select Committee Hearing, 1988.
24. Senate Select Committee Hearing, 1988.
25. Those materials, discussed previously, include: (1) the "1983
Interrogation Manual"; and (2) the "Psychological Operations in
Guerilla Warfare" Manual, also known as the Contra Manual.
26. See page 10 of this report.
27. In December, 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12333, which clarified the authorities, responsibilities, and
limitations concerning U.S. intelligence.
28. Department of the Army Memorandum to ATSD-IO, Nov. 4,
1991.
29. Based on conversations with Tise, Zindar.
30. Thus, Tise and Zindar had approximately 6 months to complete
a task which, according to Major Ralph Heinrichs at SOA, would
ordinarily have taken 12-18 months.
31. Both men remember that when they arrived in Panama, they
found some Project X material already there.
32. Conversation between Victor Tise and OASD, August 1, 1991,
declassified by OASD on November 22, 1996.
33. Ibid. Tise was unable to explain why the Project X material was
unclassified, while training manual FM 30-18 remained classified.
34. Both Tise and Zindar recall that most of the Project X material
was not classified, but a portion of it was Top Secret.
35. As Project X documents contained the objectionable material,
the fact that the material was in circulation at USARSA prior to
1982 would indicate that the United States was teaching these
tactics during the 1960s and 1970s. Heinrichs, Tise and Zindar
could not recall if some Project X material was taken from
USARSA archives, or if only the Project X materials revised by
Tise and Zindar at Fort Huachuca were used.
36. It can be assumed that the materials were put out of circulation
in the late 1970's when President Carter called for an end to
intelligence training in Latin America.
37. Heinrichs could not recall the nature of the disagreement.
38. Both Tise and Zindar noted there was a great deal of urgency
putting together the materials for intelligence training. It was made
clear to them that President Reagan wanted it done immediately.
Zindar felt that the Army was flexible on restrictions, and that a
number of shortcuts were taken.
39. This office was not able to locate Margarito Cruz.
40. According to Tise, objectionable material that was removed by
Cruz in 1982 remained in SOA archive files, per SOA policy. Tise
believes that material obtained by the 470th MIBDE at USARSA
was from current lesson plans as well as archive materials.
41. No one interviewed was able and/or willing to identify the
name of this individual.
42. The Pentagon claims that these manuals never existed in
English. Although the manuals were assembled with Spanish
language material, all of the material used originated in English,
and was translated from English into Spanish at USARSA.
43. Point Paper - USSOUTHCOM.
44. Policy and Oversight Report, February 21, 1997, p. 7.
45. It was approved by at least one, and maybe two, offices:
DCSOPS and Deputy Secretary for Intelligence.
46. Tise conversation with OASD, August 1, 1991.
47. It is our conclusion that there was no deliberate attempt to
violate Department of Defense policies. However, we do believe
that there was an unspoken policy coming from the top that the
rules could be ignored.
48. Policy and Oversight Report, Feb. 21, 1997, pp. 13-14.
49. Ibid., p. 14.
Information in this report is based on documentation and
interviews. Staff conducted interviews with former and/or current
military personnel, including those in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Department of the Army, the USSOUTHCOM, the
U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, the U.S. Army
Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, the U.S. Army
School of the Americas, Fort Benning, and the 470th Military
Brigade. Former U.S. Ambassadors were interviewed, as were
representatives from the National Security Archives, the Military
Archives, and the press.
All those who were interviewed and agreed to be identified in this
report are identified. All individuals who were identified by a
source, and confirmed by a second source, are also identified, even
if they were not available or could not be reached for comment.
Any individual who asked not to be identified is not named in this
report.
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