James Baker on Columbian Narcoctics Traffickers
by James Baker
TESTIMONY OF JAMES JAY BAKER
DIRECTOR
FEDERAL AFFAIRS
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION
INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
ON
COLOMBIAN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND
THE ACQUISITION OF FIREARMS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS
ABUSE AND CONTROL
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
November 1, 1989
The NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA is a non-profit organization
founded in 1871 and supported by the membership fees of almost three million
public-spirited citizens. Like almost all of America's seventy million
firearms owners, the NRA membership supports strong law enforcement efforts
against violent criminals who misuse firearms. These millions of law-abiding
gun owners are adversely affected by proposals to limit their constitutional
rights which invariably have no effect on criminals.
Today, Colombia is experiencing armed violence by political insurgents and
drug traffickers. Unfortunately, that country has been wracked by violence
for the last forty years. Opponents of the Second Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution are using Colombia's misfortunes to advocate the disarming of
law-abiding citizens of the United States.
Specifically, Colombian violence is being used to advocate prohibitions on
the manufacture, importation, and even possession of firearms in the United
States, and requirements of police approval and waiting periods for purchase
of firearms by law-abiding citizens in the United States. E.g., Mary McGrory,
"How About a War on Guns?"
Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1989, C1. Yet violation of the Second Amendment
rights of U.S. citizens would have absolutely no effect on violence in
Colombia.
The National Rifle Association of America represents law-abiding citizens
of the United States, not firearms exporters. Accordingly, NRA has no
objection to a prohibition on the exportation of firearms to Colombia. If it
believes that the military, police and citizens of Colombia are so corrupt
that exportation of arms to that country should be prohibited, then the U.S.
Department of State is free to impose such a prohibition. This would have
little or no effect, however, because small arms may be imported from
countries other than the United States.
Literally tons of machineguns and other arms, undoubtedly obtained from
covert or military sources, have recently been seized in Colombia. The
Washington Post reported on Sept. 14, 1989 at A34:
The military announced it had discovered the most powerful arsenal of
modern weapons to date, along with a radio communications network.
In a video shown by the 13th Brigade on national television, the
military said it had recently seized more than two tons of weapons
and ammunition belonging to Jose Rodriguez Gacha, known as "the
Mexican," including AK-47 and Galil assault rifles, Uzi submachine
guns and 9mm pistols and hand grenades.
The weapons and communications installations, including sophisticated
equipment to monitor police communications, were found on three ranches
outside Rodriguez Gacha's stronghold of Pacho. The arms were buried in
underground tunnels and wrapped in plastic near a safe house, the
military said.
The military called the find "a great blow" against Rodriguez Gacha,
believed to be one of the two principal leaders of the Medellin cocaine
cartel.
It is easy to understand why the small arms seized were AK-47 assault
rifles, Uzi submachineguns, and Galil fully automatic rifles. AK-47 assault
rifles manufactured in Communist countries are widely available from leftist
insurgents throughout Central and South America, including Colombia itself.
Uzi submachineguns are imported from Israel by the Colombian government for
use by the Colombian police. The Galil fully automatic rifle imported from
Israel is the official service arm of the Colombian military. The Uzis and
Galils were stolen or purchased by the drug traffickers from official
Colombian military and police sources. The following indicates the major
sources of firearms to Colombia:
MAJOR SOURCES OF FIREARMS TO COLOMBIA
Source: Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms Today (Harrishing, Pa.: Stackpole
Books, 1988) pages 110-11:
Galil automatic rifle, Israeli Military Industries: 10,000 +
Uzi submachine, Israeli Military Industries: Unknown
MAC-10 submachineguns for the National Police, U.S. State Dept. licenced sale:
395 (1977)
.30 M1, M2 carbines, U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) and U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS): 7,500 (pre 1968)
HK G3 automatic rifle (early 1970s) "Portuguese-made G3s, from Angola via Cuba, are being used by drug traffickers."), H&K, Germany: 30,000
FAL automatic rifle, "Origin unknown; some have arrived in country via drug traffickers." Unknown qauntity
M14 automatic rifle, U.S. FMS: 4,000 (1974), 2,478 (1980)
.30 M1 rifle (pre-mid 1960s), U.S. MAP/FMS: 19,000
.38 Smith & Wesson revolver Model 10 for National Police, U.S. State Dept. licensed sales: 20,000 (1985)
Kits for assembly in Colombia: 15,000 (current per annum)
... for National Police: 4,900 (1977-78)
... for Ministry of Defense: 1,500 (1979)
.32 cal. kits for Ministry of Defense: 1,500 (1979)
.38 Ruger revolver, U.S. State Dept. licensed sales: 5,000 (current per annum)
.45 M1911 A1 pistol, U.S. MAP/FMS, 2,920 (pre-1966)
In addition to the above, Dr. Ezell further documents the flow of fully
automatic machineguns from various Communist suppliers to Colombian and other
Latin American insurgents. "Cuba purchased in excess of 35,000 FALs from FN,
1958-59. Some have been recovered from antigovernment forces in Chile,
Colombia and El Salvador." (118.)
The U.S. abandoned almost one million M16 automatic rifles in Vietnam and
Cambodia in 1975. "During the past decade, the current government of Vietnam
has been supplying some of these arms to allied countries and to the
revolutionary and terrorist organizations in other countries, such as Chile,
Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Uruguay. . . . It is obvious
that these weapons will continue to be seen around the world for the next
several decades." (444.) Nicaragua has large quantities of M-16 automatic
rifles left over from the Somoza regime as well as obtained from Vietnam.
(282.) Again, thousands of M16s have been captured from, and lost to,
antigovernment forces in El Salvador. (140.) Cuba obtains AK-47 and AKM
assault rifles from the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact countries. (117.) All of
the above are sources of arms to Colombian insurgents and drug traffickers.
Insurgents or drug traffickers would have no incentive to obtain expensive
sporting designs from the United States. A black market, full automatic
AK-47, Uzi, or Galil in Colombia could be obtained free or for perhaps
$100.00. Before the recent import ban in the United States, the suggested
retail for the semiautomatic AK-47 type rifle was between $595.00 and $675.00;
for the Uzi carbine, $698.00; and for the Galil semiautomatic rifle, $940.00.
Gun Digest 1989.
Retail purchase entails completion of Form 4473 and identification
requirements. Then the rifles would have to be exported. Moreover, these
rifles are semiautomatics designed not to be convertible to full automatic
according to the specifications of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, and are thus far inferior for use as weapons to the inexpensive
black market guns already in Colombia.
AK-47 assault rifles (machineguns) have been made widely available in
Central and South America from sources in Cuba, Nicaragua, and various
Communist countries. The guerrilla movements in El Salvador and Colombia
itself are ready sources of AK-47s. Colombia's guerrillas have obtained
quantities of AK-47s from Cuba, which used them in the Angolan civil war.
Some of these AK-47s were manufactured in Romania.
The magnitude of arms smuggling in Colombia is exemplified by the seizure
of 1,000 rifles, 250 light machine guns, and 10 mortars being shipped to that
country from Portugal. According to the Colombian government, forged
documents said the arms were intended for the Colombian army, but the arms
were actually destined for use by the pro-Moscow Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC). (Reuter Library Report, Jan. 11, 1989.)
Firearms exports must be approved by the Department of State pursuant to
22 C.F.R. Section 120.1 et seq. A license from the Office of Munitions
Control must be obtained prior to the export. Section 123.1. It is the
policy of the United States to deny export licenses to Communist countries
such as Cuba, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, to South Africa, and "wherever an
export would not otherwise be in furtherance of world peace and the security
and foreign policy of the United States." Section 126.1. If the exportation
of firearms from the United States to Colombia is contrary to U.S. interests,
then the State Department should deny such licenses.
A license is not required for export of firearms for carrying out any
foreign assistance, cooperative or sales program authorized by law and subject
to control by the President or by other means. Section 126.4. If U.S.
assistance programs result in arms being transferred from corrupt Colombian
military and police sources to drug traffickers, then the United States should
not be supplying such arms to the Colombian government.
The Colombian government is unable to maintain any semblance of law and
order in many parts of the country. Guerrilla movements and drug traffickers
have for decades been able to smuggle into the country and to buy from corrupt
military and police personnel tens of thousands of fully automatic
machineguns. These guerrillas and traffickers have little need of expensive
sporting rifles such as the Colt AR-15 and the semiautomatic versions of the
AK-47 from the United States which are made to specifications approved by the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms so as not to be easily convertible to
full automatic.
The Colombian police are so riddled with corruption that 2,500 police
officers were recently fired for their ties to drug lords. Despite tons of
automatic arms available in Colombia and in the Central and South American
market, the Colombian government has called attention to a small trickle of
semiautomatic firearms coming from the United States as a cause of its
problems. The article "Colombia Urges U.S. to Curb Flow of Semi-Automatic
Guns," Washington Post, Sept. 8, 1989, A1, 18 states:
The Colombian government has appealed to the Bush administration for
help in curbing an escalating flow of semi-automatic rifles, handguns and
other weapons from U.S. gun dealers to Colombian drug traffickers . . . .
National drug policy director William J. Bennett said yesterday that
his office "immediately called" the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF) and asked for an investigation into the arms shipments
after he was told about them by Colombian Justice Minister Monica de
Greiff and her aides in a meeting here Aug. 30.
But Bennett, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee about
President Bush's new anti-drug proposal, emphatically ruled out further
action by the Bush administration against the domestic manufacture of
semi-automatic assault rifles similar to the ban on imports imposed in
July. . . .
Bennett retorted that there are "very serious constitutional
problems" with a ban on assault weapons and the administration does not
want to "interfere with the legitimate rights of gun owners and collectors
and hunters. . . ."
Jack Killorin, chief of ATF public affairs, said the Colombian
government has provided the agency with information about 172 rifles,
handguns and shotguns seized from the cartels and leftist insurgents
during an 18 month period ending Aug. 1.
ATF was able to trace 87--or more than half--of the weapons as having
come from the United States. . . .
John Walters, Bennett's chief of staff, said "preliminary
information" he received from ATF indicates that most of the U.S. weapons
the agency had been able to trace were "sold legitimately" by U.S. dealers
to South American clients and then were diverted into the hands of the
cartel.
Thus, out of literally tons of arms seized--most of which are AK-47
machineguns smuggled from Cuba and other Communist countries, and Galils
and Uzis stolen from or sold by members of the Colombian military and
police--only 87 firearms came from U.S. dealers, and they were sold
legitimately.
A Freedom of Information Act request for BATF records on the above traces
reveals that many of the above firearms were sold directly to the Colombian
government. For example, 23 of the firearms were Smith & Wesson Model 10 .38
cal. revolvers--hardly "assault rifles"--and almost all of these were sold
directly by Smith & Wesson to Colombia, undoubtedly for police use. The Model
10 is a standard police service revolver in Colombia.
In addition, 11 of the firearms seized were Thompson .45 cal.
submachineguns. Thompsons have not been manufactured since World War II.
These guns were almost without doubt sold to the Colombian government, and
could have been in that country for fifty years. Other items of apparent
American military surplus include several Ithaca and Remington World War II
production Model 1911 .45 cal. pistols.
Other firearms included a Remington XP-100 single shot pistol, Remington
Model 70 bolt action hunting rifle, and other sporting arms.
Not one semiautomatic AK-47 type rifle is on the BATF trace list. Drug
traffickers would have little use of a sporting version, semiautomatic only
rifle made to the exacting requirements of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, and costing perhaps $595.00 to $675.00 when purchased in the United
States. (Since the import ban, these rifles sell at $1,000.00 to $1,500.00).
Full automatic AK-47 assault rifles are already easily available in Colombia
through Communists or other underground sources either free or for as little
as $100.00.
The BATF trace list includes a Colt M-16--compliments of the U.S.
military--and less than five dozen Colt AR-15 rifles. Before Colt suspended
sales of the AR-15 in 1989, its suggested retail (HBAR Model) was $869.95.
Asking price is now $2,000.00. There are also a few Uzi, Ingram, and
Interdynamic pistols. Each and every one of these models have been closely
scrutinized and approved by BATF so as not to be easily convertible to full
automatic. The list likewise includes a few Ruger Mini 14 rifles. These
rifles are popular items used by private security forces in Colombia. They
were legally exported from the United States, and may have been stolen from
their legitimate Colombian owners.
In sum, a paltry 87 firearms seized over a period of a year and a half
were traced to American manufacturers. These firearms were apparently legally
sold in the United States and legally exported to the Colombian government
itself or to private security or other authorized persons in Colombia. The
diversion of this extremely small quantity of revolvers and semiautomatic
firearms is insignificant compared to the tons of fully automatic firearms
obtained by Colombian insurgents and criminals from corrupt Colombian
government officials and military-police sources or from Communist and black
market sources.
The Colombian government has chosen not to share with BATF any information
concerning the enormous quantities of military firearms seized. The Freedom
of Information Act request from which the above data was obtained also sought:
"Records concerning M-16s, AK-47s, or other military firearms which have been
seized by the Colombian government, or which may be possessed by or available
to Colombian narcotics traffickers or terrorists from sources in Central or
South America or elsewhere." BATF could produce no records on the subject and
could only suggest, by letter dated Sept. 22, 1989, that "you should address
your request to the Government of Colombia."
The violence in Colombia hardly began with the drug traffickers. "The
background of violence and civil war makes Colombia unique among Latin
American countries." There were 135,000 deaths from the period in Colombia
lasting 1949-1958 known as "la violencia" (the Violence). R. Gott, Guerrilla
Movements in Latin America 224 (1971). "The bulk of the assassinations and
atrocities committed during the period of the violencia were the work of
Liberals or Conservatives. . . ." Id. at 231. The Communist insurgencies
since the 1960s sprang from this tradition. See id. at 241-304.
The Communists who have controlled large parts of the countryside for
decades have never had any problem obtaining small arms. In a well
executed operation a decade ago, the M-19 leftist guerrilla group tunnelled
into an army arsenal and stole 4,883 weapons. See "Voices from a Bogota
Jail," Washington Post, June 7, 1981, D5; "Arrests Raise Torture Issue in
Colombia," Washington Post, Jan. 12, 1979, A31.
Communist sources outside Colombia, including both poor socialist states
desperate for hard currency as well as various movements and groups, account
for most M-16 and AK-47 automatic rifles in the hands of insurgents and drug
traffickers. The U.S. abandoned one million M-16s in Vietnam, which has
admitted to providing some M-16s to Communist guerrillas in El Salvador. P.
Brogan and A. Zarca, Deadly Business 182-83 (1983). Nicaragua--either the
Sandinistas or the contras--could also be a ready source for M-16s. Plenty of
M-16s are available on the international market.
The easy flow of large quantities of arms between antagonists in Latin
America is further exemplified in the following recent report of weapons being
sent clandestinely from Nicaragua to El Salvador's guerilla organization,
FMLN. The incident was reported in "Honduras Says it Seized Arms Bound for
Salvadoran Rebels," Washington Post, Oct. 20, 1989, A35:
A preliminary search of the truck found 307 rocket-propelled grenades
and an undetermined number of launchers; 74 automatic rifles, including
AK-47s and M16s with an undetermined amount of ammunition; explosive
detonators, radios and urban guerrilla training manuals with "FMLN"
stamped on them, the sources said.
. . .
Salvadoran and U.S. officials frequently have charged that the
Sandinista government of Nicaragua supplies Salvadoran guerrillas with
arms and ammunition, but efforts prove the charges conclusively have been
disputed.
Over the years a number of arms shipments allegedly bound for the
FMLN have been captured in Honduras. A large weapons shipment was seized
in Comayagua, Honduras, in 1981. Another was discovered in late 1985 when
a car packed with arms and ammunition had an accident on the Pan American
Highway in Honduras, spilling the contents.
The most recent seizure came last summer, when about 60 AK-47s were
discovered in a cache in a rural community about 50 miles north of
Tegucigalpa. While the armed forces charged that the shipment came from
Nicaragua and was bound for the FMLN, there was speculation it was
destined for Honduras guerrillas.
The above was only one seizure out of many shipments which made it to
their destinations. An indication of the large quantities of arms available
from Cuban sources is set forth in the following inventory of arms found by
U.S. forces in Grenada in 1983, from Sylvia and O'Donnell, Guns of Grenada 40
(1984):
Soviet AK-47 Assault Rifle 1,626
Czech Model 52 Rifle 1,120
SKS Rifle (Communist Bloc) 4,074
Soviet Mosin Nagant Rifle 2,432
Soviet M-1945 Submachine Gun 180
Mortars and Machine Guns (crew served) 99
Hand Grenades 1,824
The fully automatic AK-47 assault rifle is perhaps the most widely
available firearm in human history. As explained by Edward C. Ezell, The AK47
Story 11-12 (1986):
The AK47 assault rifle, and its many variants, has become the most
widely distributed and best known military shoulder weapon of the
post-World War II era.
Some people might argue that the United States Army's M16 rifle deserves
that title. But it is the Kalashnikov that is seen nightly on the evening
television news from Beirut, the Iranian desert, the jungles of El
Salvador, or the mountains of Afghanistan. . . .
An estimated thirty million to fifty million Kalashnikov-type rifles
and light machineguns have been manufactured since the introduction of this
design in 1947. At least a dozen countries have manufactured or are
manufacturing versions of this weapon. At least fifty-five nations and
an untallied number of guerrilla and terrorist organizations use these
guns daily.
Some of the largest producers of AK-47 assault rifles are poor states in
desperate need of hard currency which actively supply the international
arms market.
Dr. Ezell provides the following details:
In addition to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the
German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, North
Korea, Hungary, and Yugoslavia have manufactured the AK47. The People's
Republic of China, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, North
Korea, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Egypt have also manufactured the AKM-type
assault rifle. (181)
There are no known accurate estimates of the number of Kalashnikov-type
weapons produced to date by the Chinese. With a regular army establishment
of more than three million people and reserve forces numbering between five
and seven million, it probably would not be unreasonable to project a
production total somewhere between ten and twenty million. This estimate
seems especially reasonable in view of the Chinese material support of
North Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and subsequent sales and gifts of
such weapons. The People's Republic of China is currently very active in
the international marketplace with export sales of their light infantry
weapons being carried out by the China North Industries Corporation
(NORINCO). (186)
There are no reported estimates of the number of East German Kalashnikov-
type weapons manufactured to date, but a reasonable guess would be between
1.5 and 2.0 million. the Germans have made substantial export sales of
these weapons. (186)
The Polish small arms factories have also manufactured the AKM for domestic
and export consumption. . . . An estimated 1.5 to 2.0 million Polish
Kalashnikovs have been manufactured to date. (189)
During the past decade the Romanians and their neighbors the Bulgarians
have been very active in the international arms market. The Kalashnikov
assault rifles have been among their most popular products, and it is
estimated that between them the arms factories of the two nations have made
one million of these weapons. (190)
It is difficult to estimate the number of Kalashnikov weapons produced by
the Yugoslavian arms factory Zavodi Crvena Zastava, but it is probably in
the half-a-million to one million range. Many of these weapons have been
exported. (193)
It has been estimated that the [North] Korean small arms factories
identified by the numbers 61 and 65 combined have been producing Kalashnikov
weapons at an annual rate of about 150,000 units. It is not clear just how
many years this rate has been in effect; if it has been in effect for the past
twenty years that would mean that the Koreans have manufactured in excess of
three million guns. This may be the reason for the recent proliferation of
North Korean assault rifles in the international arms trade. (195).
With thirty to fifty million full automatic AK-47 assault rifles
manufactured in the world today, it is ludicrous to focus on a minute number
of semiautomatic rifles designed for target shooting which are available in
the United States. "Assault rifles" refer to selective fire weapons which
shoot fully automatically, and are thereby machineguns. By contrast, the term
excludes semiautomatic rifles, which fire only one shot per trigger pull.
Assault rifles such as the M-16 and AK-47 are machineguns. However, the AR-15
and the AK-47 type semiautomatic rifles are not assault rifles or machineguns.
This terminology is made clear in Harold E. Johnson, Small Arms Identification
and Operations Guide--Eurasian Communist Countries (Department of Defense
Intelligence Document, Foreign Science and Technology Center, 1980) as
follows:
Assault rifles are short, compact, selective-fire weapons that fire a
cartridge intermediate in power between submachinegun and rifle
cartridges. Assault rifles have mild recoil characteristics and, because
of this, are capable of delivering effective full automatic fire at ranges
up to 300 meters.
The Soviet designed Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle, a gas-operated,
selective fire, box magazine-fed weapon, was the major infantry arm for
most Eurasian Communist Countries.
In 1981, the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center sent Mr.
Johnson, author of the above, to Colombia to identify the origins of some 300
to 400 fully automatic m/961 G3 rifles, 40 to 50 submachineguns, and about 750
hand grenades which Colombian authorities had seized from M-19 leftist
guerrillas. Mr. Johnson determined from the markings and overall design that
these machineguns and grenades were manufactured in Portugal. The Portuguese
colonialists had used and abandoned them in Angola when they were defeated by
nationalist insurgents. The ordnance was then obtained by the Cubans, who
were involved in the Angolan civil war. Obviously, these machineguns and
grenades were taken by the Cubans from Angola and given to insurgents in
Colombia.
None of the above firearms and events are remotely connected with the
semiautomatic sporting rifles available on the commercial market in the United
States. These rifles are not "assault rifles," and while cosmetically
similar, have been designed according to BATF's exacting standards so that
they are not easy to covert to full automatic. In 1963, BATF determined that
the Colt AR-15 Sporter is not a machinegun. From the passage of the Gun
Control Act of 1968, which imposed the sporting criteria for firearm imports
(18 U.S.C. Sec. 925 (d)(3)), until 1989, BATF approved semiautomatic AK-47, HK
91, and similar rifles to be sporting rifles suitable for importation.
Colombia itself is a primary example of why gun control laws do not work.
These laws apply only to law-abiding citizens. One can legally purchase
firearms only with permission of the police. Many in the police and military
are in league with corrupt politicians and drug traffickers. Everyone in
Colombia is armed except the law-abiding citizens who cannot afford the police
bribes or do not have the right connections. Civil liberties are suspended.
Ironically, the Colombian government now is asking the United States more
stringently to restrict acquisition of firearms by U.S. citizens, as if a tiny
trickle of such arms to Colombia has any effect.
Leftist insurgency and drug wars in Colombia are in step with that
country's earlier history in the period known as la violencia. Tons of
machineguns are readily available to Colombians from Communist sources and
from corrupt military and police personnel. If it determines that it would
serve the national interest, the U.S. State Department could prohibit any
exportation of firearms to Colombia. However, violation of the Second
Amendment rights of the target shooters and other law-abiding citizens of the
United States by banning semiautomatic rifles in our country would not reduce
violence in Colombia in the slightest respect.
Appendix to Testimony of James Jay Baker
THE RELATIVE LACK OF CRIMINAL MISUSE OF
SEMIAUTOMATIC RIFLES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
This hearing primarily concerns the sources of supply of small arms to
Colombian antigovernment forces and drug traffickers. As noted, the major
sources are purchases or theft from the Colombian military and police, and
transfer from Communist countries and movements. However, questions have been
raised whether semiautomatic, military style rifles are disproportionatley
misused by drug traffickers and other criminals in the United States itself.
As the following demonstrates, such rifles are the least likely type of
firearms to be misused criminally.
ATF RECORDS REVEAL THAT SEMIAUTOMATIC RIFLES
ARE RARELY TRACED IN RELATION TO CRIMINAL MISUSE
Records of firearms traces conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms contain little or no information of use in connecting specific
firearms with specific types of crime. Such records generated in recent
months are particularly unreliable in this respect, because BATF has been
conducting massive numbers of "forward traces" of semiautomatic firearms to
determine ownership, and not due to any criminal misuse. In fact, ATF itself,
rather than local police, requests the majority of traces, and the leading
reason given for the majority of traces is "miscellaneous" and not some
specific crime.
The following analysis is based on ATF records disclosed under the Freedom
of Information Act. The request was for the same records disclosed to the Cox
newspapers resulting in publication of its article on "assault type guns."
ATF stated about that study:
In providing Cox Newspapers access to ATF's trace requests, we
provided only normally disclosable information limited to the type of
weapon, manufacturer, model, magazine capacity, serial number and type of
crime. We do not necessarily agree with the conclusions of Cox Newspapers
and need toexpress that all firearms trace requests submitted by law
enforcement agencies are not crime guns and that the 42,000 traces
examined are but a small percentage of all firearms recovered by law
enforcement during the period.
According to the Cox article, the firearms traced by ATF most frequently
are handguns. In order of the number traced, they are: the Raven .25 cal.
pistol; Smith & Wesson Model 60 .38 cal. revolver; Smith & Wesson Model 36 .38
cal. revolver; Jennings .22 cal. rimfire pistol; and the TEC-9 9mm pistol.
Total traces by type of firearm are as follows:
Firearm No. traced % of traces
Revolver 13,983 33%
Pistol 12,424 29%
Shotgun 5,493 13%
Rifle 5,305 12%
"Assault
weapon" 4,249 10%
"All others" 738 2%
Derringer 581 1%
42,818
The Cox article states that it reviewed traces of 42,758 firearms covering
the period Jan. 1, 1988 through March 27, 1989. Atlanta Journal Constitution,
May 21, 1989, A1 et seq. Throughout, the article alleges that the firearms
were traced "to crimes," when in fact no crime was specified for the majority
of traces.
The Cox article used the term "assault weapon" or "assault gun,"
apparently because the data so totally fails to suggest any disproportionate
use of "assault rifles," and to distort the statistics by including certain
pistols and shotguns.
ATF records disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act include
listings of specific firearms traces, showing the requesting agency and the
reason for the trace. The raw data reveals that "miscellaneous"--rather than a
specific crime--is the most frequent reason for the trace; that ATF rather
than local law enforcement is the most frequent requester; and that most
"miscellaneous" traces are initiated by ATF. The reason appears to be that
ATF has been "forward tracing" large numbers of semiautomatic firearms just to
determine who purchased them and not in relation to any crime. Numerous
licensed importers, manufacturers, and dealers have revealed to NRA that ATF
inspectors have inspected and copied all records on purchasers of
semiautomatic firearms allegedly to develop an "end user profile." Whether
this program is a fishing expedition or a quasi-registration system, the
"miscellaneous" traces are not suggestive of criminal misuse.
ATF has confirmed the existence of its "forward tracing" program, but
refuses to disclose records about the program under the Freedom of Information
Act. Indeed, ATF refused the same inspection rights to ATF data to NRA as it
accorded to Cox newspapers based on the following: "Your request to review
the same material examined by personnel from the Atlanta Journal is denied.
Personnel from the Atlanta Journal had access to ATF forms because they were
acting on behalf of ATF at the time of their review. . . ." This contradicts
TF's statement above that "we provided only normally disclosable information"
to Cox.
A group of ATF records which exhibits the Cox-ATF mutual influence or
agreement consists of listings of traces of "bad guns"--selected semiautomatic
pistols, rifles, and shotguns of incomparable designs and tremendously
different sporting uses, but with the common feature that Senator Metzenbaum
does not like them. These are the "assault guns" discussed in the Cox article
which were traced during 1988 and the first quarter of 1989.
The leading firearms traced were not rifles at all, but were respectively
the M10/M11 pistol (773 traced) and the TEC-9 pistol (767 traced). By
contrast, there were only 689 traces of the "AR-15/M-16"--which would include
both AR-15 target rifles sold at sporting goods stores, and M-16 machineguns
stolen from the U.S. military.
There was not a single trace of the Steyr AUG, one of the rifles banned
from importation based on the allegation that "assault rifles" were being
disproportionately misused in crime. Further, ATF records give no comparison
data with ordinary revolvers, pistols, rifles, and shotguns, either in terms
of quantities produced or number of traces.
Most revealing is the reasons for the traces. For all of the "bad guns"
combined--handguns and long guns together--the following are the trace
categories:
Reason for trace Number traced Percentage of traces
Miscellaneous 2,137 43%
Property related 663 13%
Gun Control Act 525 11%
Narcotics 1,078 22%
Homicide 348 7%
Assaults 176 4%
Robbery 60 1%
Arson 8 0.2%
Sex crimes 3 0.1%
Total 4,916
As is clear, 43% of the traces were for "miscellaneous" reasons. These
could have included "forward traces" just to check on purchasers, without any
suggestion of wrongdoing, as well as lost, found, and abandoned guns. For
instance, local police may wish to determine the owner of a found or unclaimed
firearm.
"Property related" traces, 13% of the total, would include stolen firearms
which have been recovered. Local police may be seeking the rightful owners in
order to establish proof of burglary and similar crimes as well as to return
the property.
"Gun Control Act" traces, amounting to 11% of the total, would include
every suspected technical violation under the Act. A hobbyist who sold one
too many collector's items at a gun show, a licensee whose entire inventory is
seized because of a recordkeeping violation, or a person who gave a firearm to
a relative who lived in a different state are only some of the innocuous
reasons which would prompt traces under the Gun Control Act.
"Narcotics" related traces (22% of the total traces) are difficult to
interpret. Situations involving such traces could be everything from a first
time offender in possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use
who happened to have a firearm in a home where he was arrested, to a major
crack or heroin trafficker who is a grave danger to society. Even so, the
dangerous trafficker is far more likely to prefer a pistol or revolver of the
same type that the police use, than such sporting rifles such as an AR-15 or a
Mini 14.
The "Homicide" category demonstrates the lack of value of the trace data.
Rifles of all kinds are used in only 4% of all homicides, and military-style
semiautomatic rifles have been linked to at most 1% of homicides. Of the 348
"bad guns" traced in connection with homicides, the ATF summary fails to
distinguish rifles from pistols, or to give comparison data with pistols and
revolvers of all kinds.
The firearms traced in the Robbery, Arson, and Sex Crimes categories are
practically negligible, especially when compared with the numbers of pistols
and revolvers of the types used by police.
To the extent the Cox/ATF data reveal anything regarding military-style
semi-automatic rifles, it is that they are rarely involved in police traces of
crime guns. Using data prepared by Smithsonian Institution's Edward C. Ezell
regarding the number of various makes and models owned by Americans, police
have requested traces on fewer than one-tenth of one percent of such rifles
now owned. For example, during the 15-month period, only 105 of 126,000
AK-type semi-automatic rifles were traced in relation to the investigation of
violent crimes--just nine one-hundredths of one percent, or roughly one of
every 2,000 AK-type semi-automatics owned by Americans.
In sum, contrary to the Cox article, very little can be concluded from ATF
tracing data, except that ATF itself conducts most traces for "miscellaneous"
reasons, such as checking on ordinary citizens who enjoy target shooting with
semiautomatic firearms. The overwhelming majority of traces are conducted for
reasons unrelated to violent crime, and the overwhelming majority of firearms
used in crime are not traced.
ACTUAL CRIME DATA DEMONSTRATES THAT
SEMIAUTOMATIC RIFLES ARE RARELY USED IN CRIME
The Cox study found that about 10% of the guns traced were "assault
weapons" based on the definition used by the Bush Administration for the
import ban and the list in the Metzenbaum bill for domestic firearms, with the
number rather higher (a) in Los Angeles and South Florida, and (b) for
"narcotics" and "organized crime" traces.
The study reported a 46% increase in crime use for these guns between 1987
and 1988, and that the increase was continuing into 1989. If true, that
criminal misuse is rising far slower than availability, for ATF affidavits
suggest that the importation of such rifles increased 900% in the last two
years, while traces less than doubled.
ATF is asked to trace only a fraction of the guns used in crime. ATF
traced about 35,000 guns, although there were over ten times that many
gun-related crimes reported. Clearance rates are not that low, and in fact
violent crimes represent only a minority of bases for guns traced. Cox thus
found less than 500 so-called "assault weapons" traced in connection with
violent crimes, only one tenth of one percent of about 360,000 gun-related
violent crimes.
Even if most traces were for real crimes, there are so few traces that
nothing can be learned from looking at the guns traced. There are about
180,000 gun-related aggravated assaults reported to police annually, half of
which were cleared by arrests, but only 1842 assault-related firearms were
traced in the 15 month period. Thus, there was a gun traced for only one
percent of aggravated assaults. No one can claim the ability to project
involvement of a particular type of firearm in crime based on 1% reporting.
Moreover, the 1% is an exaggeration, since it would involve all guns seized
from someone arrested for an assault for which traces were requested, not
necessarily just the firearm used in the assault.
Cox claims that only 500,000 such guns are privately owned, based on
defining imports as "assault weapons" if on the list of guns temporarily
banned from importation and domestic if named in the Metzenbaum bill. But ATF
has estimated 2-3 million, and Edward C. Ezell of the Smithsonian Institution
estimates about 3-4 million. If Los Angeles' tendency to trace military
lookalikes is typical of law enforcement nationally, and if Los Angeles has
19% lookalikes compared to 10% nationally, then military lookalikes account
for about 1 1/2% of "crime guns." If the ATF/Ezell figures are roughly
accurate, then military-style semi-autos also account for about 1 1/2% of
firearms owned by Americans and are not disproportionately used in crime.
It is significant that Los Angeles was the place where Cox found the highest
involvement in trace guns to be the so-called "assault weapons," since Los
Angeles is also the place where the police looked into guns seized to get a
percentage rather than just to guns traced. So-called "assault weapons"
account for 3% of crime guns, according to the Los Angeles police, so their
accounting for 19% of the guns traced simply demonstrates that police are more
apt to trace so-called "assault weapons." Testimony of Detective Jimmy L.
Trahin, Firearms/Ballistics Unit, to Subcommittee on Constitution, Senate
Judiciary Committee, May 5, 1989. Trahin noted over 4,000 crime guns in Los
Angeles, while Cox noted only 2,740 guns traced in the entire state of
California. Clearly, the Cox percentage is based primarily on the fact that
so-called "assault guns" are more apt to be traced than any others--and by a
substantial margin. Indeed, if Los Angeles' 3% leads to 18% of traced guns,
then it is possible that the national finding of roughly 10% of trace guns
suggests nationally only about 1 1/2% of crime guns.
The data suggest rifle use in crime is diminishing. In Florida, for
example, between 1987 and 1988, rifle use in homicide fell from 3.9% of
homicides to 2.6%, according to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. In
Washington, D.C., where drug trafficking was blamed for a 67% increase in the
homicide rate between 1987 and 1988, only one homicide involved a rifle of any
kind. In Chicago, 1988 saw more murderers using baseball bats than rifles.
The Columbus Police Department has reported on the firearms seized during a
period of roughly one year (April 29, 1988, to April 21, 1989) during "crack"
raids. The 179 firearms seized--which did not include a single semiautomatic
centerfire rifle--were in the following proportions:
Revolvers 51%
Semiautomatic pistols 30%
Shotguns - long barreled, not semiauto 9%
Shotguns - sawed off 4%
Shotguns - semiauto 1%
Rifles - .22 caliber, not semiauto 2%
Rifles - .22 caliber semiauto 0.6%
Rifles - center fire, not semiauto 0.6%
Clearly, rifles of all kinds are the least desirable weapon of criminals,
and semiautomatic centerfire rifles are misused far less than ordinary .22
caliber rimfire rifles.
Nationally, according to FBI reports, firearms of all kinds accounted for
just 4% of the homicides in 1987 and 1988. This represents a drop from the
early 1980s, when over 1000 rifle related homicides annually were reported to
the FBI. In the years 1986-88, fewer than 800 rifle-related homicides each
year were reported to the FBI. The rifle-related homicide rate has dropped
30% during the 1980s, despite dramatic increases in the number of so-called
"assault rifles."
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